Andrew Lamont Swanson v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),                             FILED
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                         Nov 15 2016, 11:43 am
    regarded as precedent or cited before any
    CLERK
    court except for the purpose of establishing                   Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                             and Tax Court
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                  ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Adam C. James                                           Gregory F. Zoeller
    Shelbyville, Indiana                                    Attorney General of Indiana
    Ian McLean
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Andrew Lamont Swanson,                                  November 15, 2016
    Appellant-Defendant,                                    Court of Appeals Case No.
    73A01-1604-CR-967
    v.                                              Appeal from the Shelby Superior
    Court
    State of Indiana,                                       The Honorable Chris D. Monroe,
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                                     Senior Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    73D02-1603-F6-116
    Najam, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 73A01-1604-CR-967 | November 15, 2016   Page 1 of 4
    Statement of the Case
    [1]   Andrew Lamont Swanson appeals his sentence following his convictions for
    identity deception, as a Level 6 felony, and driving while license suspended, as
    a Class A misdemeanor, pursuant to a guilty plea. Swanson presents two issues
    for our review, namely, whether his sentence and placement in the Department
    of Correction (“DOC”) are inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses
    and his character. We hold that, because Swanson agreed to a two-year
    executed sentence in the DOC as part of his plea agreement, Swanson may not
    challenge the appropriateness of his sentence or his placement in this direct
    appeal. We affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [2]   On March 28, 2016, in open court, Swanson pleaded guilty to identity
    deception, as a Level 6 felony, and driving while license suspended, as a Class
    A misdemeanor.1 In exchange for that plea, the State agreed to an aggregate
    sentence of two years executed in the DOC, and the State granted Swanson
    “immunity from a further perjury charge.” Appellant’s Br. at 13. Swanson
    agreed to those terms, and the trial court entered judgment of conviction and
    sentence accordingly. This appeal ensued.
    1
    A third charge for false informing was dismissed.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 73A01-1604-CR-967 | November 15, 2016   Page 2 of 4
    Discussion and Decision
    [3]   Swanson contends that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the
    offenses and his character. However, as our supreme court has held, where a
    plea agreement includes a defendant’s agreement to a specific sentence, such
    defendant may not challenge the sentence by means of a timely or belated direct
    appeal. Sholes v. State, 
    878 N.E.2d 1232
    , 1235 (Ind. 2008). Again, here, in open
    court, the State offered Swanson a plea agreement whereby he would be
    sentenced to “two years executed at the [DOC],” and Swanson agreed. Tr. at
    7. Further, the trial court expressly advised Swanson that “when you accept a
    plea offer . . . for a specific executed sentence, you also give up the right to
    appeal the sentence itself.” Id. at 15. The trial court asked Swanson whether he
    understood that, and Swanson stated that he did. Swanson accepted the plea
    agreement, including the two-year executed sentence in the DOC, and,
    therefore, “his sentence is not available for Rule 7(B) review.” Hole v. State, 
    851 N.E.2d 302
    , 304 (Ind. 2006).2
    [4]   Finally, Swanson is also precluded from challenging “his placement at the
    Indiana Department of Correction [as] inappropriate in light of the nature of
    the offense and his character.” Appellant’s Br. at 10. Again, the plea
    2
    We note that the written sentencing order indicates that Swanson’s plea was “open.” Appellant’s App. at
    13. However, because the transcript unambiguously shows that Swanson’s plea agreement was closed in that
    it provided for an executed two-year sentence in the DOC, the notation in the written sentencing statement is
    an error. See McElroy v. State, 
    865 N.E.2d 584
    , 589 (Ind. 2007) (holding that, “[r]ather than presuming the
    superior accuracy of the oral statement, we examine it alongside the written sentencing statement to assess
    the conclusions of the trial court. This Court has the option of crediting the statement that accurately
    pronounces the sentence or remanding for resentencing.”).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 73A01-1604-CR-967 | November 15, 2016           Page 3 of 4
    agreement here specified Swanson’s placement at the DOC. Tr. at 7.
    Accordingly, his placement was not subject to the trial court’s discretion, and
    the issue is not available on direct appeal. See Hole, 851 N.E.2d at 304 n.4
    (noting that placement is subject to Appellate Rule 7(B) review where plea
    agreement gives trial court discretion to sentence defendant to community
    corrections program or the Department of Correction).
    [5]   Affirmed.
    Vaidik, C.J., and Baker, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 73A01-1604-CR-967 | November 15, 2016   Page 4 of 4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 73A01-1604-CR-967

Filed Date: 11/15/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/16/2016