Reginald Webster v. State of Indiana , 64 N.E.3d 919 ( 2016 )

FILED
Dec 07 2016, 9:32 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Meggan Smith Gregory F. Zoeller
Marion County Public Defender Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
Katherine Modesitt Cooper
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Reginald Webster, December 7, 2016
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A05-1603-CR-417
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable David Hooper,
Appellee-Plaintiff Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No.
49F08-0303-CM-42430
Crone, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] Reginald Webster appeals his conviction for class A misdemeanor carrying a
handgun without a license, following a bench trial. He raises two issues for our
review, one of which we find dispositive: namely, he asserts that the trial court
clearly erred in denying his Indiana Trial Rule 41(B) motion for involuntary
dismissal. Finding that dismissal was warranted, we reverse his conviction.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On March 17, 2003, the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department received
an anonymous tip that three black males and one white female were selling
drugs on the front porch of the residence located at 1554 East Naomi Street in
Indianapolis. Officers Robert L. Wheeling, Jr., and Richard L. Hemphill, Jr.,
were dispatched to the scene. Upon arrival, the officers observed one black
male and one white male sitting on a couch located on the porch. When the
officers exited their police vehicles, they each observed the black male, later
identified as Webster, bend over toward the bottom of the couch and then
quickly sit back up. The officers observed the white male, later identified as
Jason Borenstein, reach over the porch railing and place something shiny in a
shrub. The officers approached the males and asked them to stand. Concerned
for officer safety, Officer Wheeling conducted a patdown search of Webster.
Officer Hemphill then lifted up the couch and found a loaded .357 Magnum
handgun directly under the front edge of the couch where Webster had been
sitting and where he had reached. Webster did not present the officers with a
permit or a license to carry a handgun.
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[3] The State charged Webster with class A misdemeanor carrying a handgun
without a license. During the bench trial, Webster objected to the admission of
and moved to suppress evidence of the handgun arguing that the anonymous tip
was unreliable and that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity when they searched him. The trial court denied the motion and
admitted the evidence. Thereafter, at the close of the State’s evidence, Webster
moved for involuntary dismissal pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 41(B).
Specifically, Webster argued that the State had failed to prove that he possessed
the handgun in a place other than his dwelling, property, or place of business,
which is an element of the offense of carrying a handgun without a license. The
trial court denied the motion and found Webster guilty as charged. This appeal
ensued.
Discussion and Decision
[4] Webster asserts that the trial court clearly erred in denying his motion for
involuntary dismissal pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 41(B). Our review of a
trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to dismiss pursuant to Trial Rule
41(B) is well-established:
The grant or denial of a motion to dismiss made under Trial Rule
41(B) is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. In
reviewing a motion for involuntary dismissal, this [C]ourt will
not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses.
We will reverse the trial court only if the evidence is not
conflicting and points unerringly to a conclusion different from
the one reached by the lower court.
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Todd v. State, 900 N.E.2d 776, 778 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (citations omitted). In a
criminal action, a defendant’s Trial Rule 41(B) motion is essentially a test of the
sufficiency of the State’s evidence. Id. Our review of the denial of a motion for
involuntary dismissal is limited to the evidence presented by the State during its
case-in-chief. Nichols v. State, 31 N.E.3d 1038, 1041 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).
[5] The statute in effect at the time Webster was alleged to have committed his
offense provided in relevant part that “a person shall not carry a handgun in
any vehicle or on or about the person’s body, except in the person’s dwelling,
on the person’s property or fixed place of business, without a license issued
under this chapter being in the person’s possession.” Ind. Code § 35-47-2-1(a).
Thus, the essential elements comprising the offense are that: (1) Webster (2)
possessed (3) a handgun (4) in a place that was not his dwelling, property, or
fixed place of business. See Armstrong v. State, 742 N.E.2d 972, 978 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2001) (noting essential elements of carrying handgun without a license).
Once the State establishes that a defendant carried a handgun on or about his
person, away from his dwelling, property, or fixed place of business, the burden
shifts to the defendant to demonstrate that he possessed a valid license. Id. at
977 (citing Harris v. State, 716 N.E.2d 406, 411 (Ind. 1999)). “Thus, proof of the
presence of a license to carry a handgun is an exemption or exception to, and
not an element of the crime of carrying a handgun without a license.” Id.[6] At the close of the State’s evidence, Webster moved for involuntary dismissal
arguing that the State failed to prove that he possessed the handgun in a place
other than his dwelling, property, or fixed place of business. Specifically, he
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argued that the State presented no evidence to show that 1554 East Naomi
Street was not his dwelling, property, or fixed place of business. We agree.
[7] In response to Webster’s motion for involuntary dismissal, the State argued that
similar to the defendant’s possession of a valid license, the location where the
defendant is carrying the handgun is an exemption or exception to, rather than
an element of, the offense of carrying a handgun without a license. Thus, the
State maintained, and the trial court mistakenly agreed, that it was Webster’s
burden to prove that 1554 East Naomi Street was his dwelling, property, or
fixed place of business as opposed to the State having the burden to prove that
1554 East Naomi Street was not his dwelling, property, or fixed place of
business. 1 This was clear error. As we already stated, the location where the
defendant is carrying a handgun is an essential element of the charged offense.
Armstrong, 742 N.E.2d at 978; see also Harris, 716 N.E.2d at 411 (Ind. 1999);
Washington v. State, 517 N.E.2d 77, 78 (Ind. 1987); Woods v. State, 768 N.E.2d
1024, 1027 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002); Seel v. State, 739 N.E.2d 170, 172 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2000). The State presented no evidence that Webster possessed the
1
During trial, the State directed the trial court to Morgan v. State, 427 N.E.2d 1131, 1135 (Ind. Ct. App.
1981), for the proposition that “it is the burden of the defendant to prove he comes within one of the
exceptions” to the carrying a handgun without a license statute. Relying on Morgan, the State argued that the
location where the defendant is carrying a handgun is an “exception” to the offense, and therefore that
Webster had the burden to prove that he was “carrying it lawfully in his place of abode.” Tr. at 56. The trial
court accepted this argument, concluding that “burden-shifting is allowed” and that “from a common sense
standpoint” it seems logical that a defendant should have the burden to prove that he was in his dwelling,
property, or fixed place of business rather than the State having the burden to prove that he was not in his
dwelling, property, or fixed place of business. Id. at 58. As we stated above, the location where the
defendant is carrying a handgun is an essential element of the offense and not an exception, and despite the
State’s arguments to the contrary, we do not think that Morgan suggests otherwise.
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handgun in a place other than his dwelling, property, or fixed place of
business. 2 Accordingly, the trial court clearly erred in denying Webster’s
motion for involuntary dismissal, and we reverse his conviction for class A
misdemeanor carrying a handgun without a license.
[8] Reversed.
Kirsch, J., and May, J., concur.
2
The State briefly mentions that a 2016 arrest record, admitted for purposes of fingerprint identification, lists
Webster’s address as 3331 West 33rd Street. The State implies that this evidence supports a reasonable
inference that Webster did not reside at 1554 East Naomi Street at the time he committed the alleged offense
in 2003. We agree with Webster that “[l]ittle, if anything, can be inferred” from his address thirteen years
after the alleged offense, and that such evidence was insufficient to prove that Webster was in a place that
was not his dwelling, property, or fixed place of business when he possessed a handgun in 2003. Reply Br. at
5.
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