Jason Tye Myers v. Nalin Desai (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                                FILED
    court except for the purpose of establishing                        Dec 30 2016, 7:26 am
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                  CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    estoppel, or the law of the case.                                       Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    APPELLANT PRO SE                                         ATTORNEYS FOR STATE
    Jason Tye Myers                                          APPELLEES
    Stockwell, Indiana                                       Gregory F. Zoeller
    Attorney General
    Aaron T. Craft
    Elizabeth M. Littlejohn
    Deputies Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Jason Tye Myers,                                         December 30, 2016
    Appellant-Plaintiff,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
    79A02-1604-PL-929
    v.                                               Appeal from the Tippecanoe
    Superior Court
    Nalin Desai, et al.,                                     The Honorable Robert B. Mrzlack,
    Appellees-Defendants.                                    Special Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    79D04-1309-PL-42
    Bradford, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1604-PL-929 | December 30, 2016      Page 1 of 16
    Case Summary
    [1]   In November of 2013, Appellant-Plaintiff Jason Tye Myers stayed in a hotel
    that was owned and operated by Appellees-Defendants Nalin Desai, Bena
    Desai, and Kinjal, Inc. (collectively, “the Hotel Appellees”) for a number of
    weeks. On September 27, 2013, Myers filed a complaint for invasion of privacy
    against the Hotel Appellees, alleging that they had invaded his privacy by
    requiring him to provide the identification of a guest staying with him in the
    hotel and, upon request, subsequently providing this identification information
    to local law enforcement authorities. Myers subsequently amended his
    complaint to include various state and federal claims against the State of
    Indiana; Tippecanoe County Deputy Prosecutor Jonathan R. Dee; Tippecanoe
    Superior Court Judge Gregory Donat; Deputy Attorney General Cynthia L.
    Ploughe; Indiana Court of Appeals Judges John G. Baker, Paul D. Mathias,
    Melissa S. May, and Margret G. Robb; and Indiana Supreme Court Justices
    Brent Dickson, Robert D. Rucker, Steven H. David, and Mark S. Massa
    (collectively, “the State Appellees”). These claims pertained to the denial of
    Myers’s 2012 related petition for post-conviction relief (“PCR”).
    [2]   The trial court eventually entered default judgment against the Hotel Appellees,
    after which the trial court awarded Myers zero dollars in damages. The trial
    court also dismissed the State Appellees from the lawsuit. Myers subsequently
    filed a motion to correct error, which was denied by the trial court.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1604-PL-929 | December 30, 2016   Page 2 of 16
    [3]   On appeal, Myers challenges the trial court’s award of zero dollars in damages
    and the dismissal of the State Appellees. Finding no error, we affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    A. Facts Relating to Related Criminal and Post-
    Conviction Proceedings
    [4]   With respect to the facts leading to the instant appeal, this court’s
    memorandum decision in Myers’s related post-conviction proceedings provide
    as follows:
    As part of an ongoing criminal investigation involving Felicia
    Norris, Tippecanoe law enforcement officials learned that Myers
    and Norris were staying together at the Lincoln Lodge on U.S.
    Highway 52. There were outstanding arrest warrants for Norris
    in both Clinton and Pulaski counties.
    On November 13, 2003, police officers went to Myers’s room
    and asked him if Norris was there. Myers responded that a
    woman by the name of “Becky Best” was staying with him.
    Appellant’s App. p. 74. The officers warned Myers that he
    would be charged with harboring a fugitive if he was lying to
    them about the woman’s identity.
    Thereafter, the police officers learned that Norris was, in fact,
    staying with Myers after the motel manager supplied them with
    Myers’s motel room registration card that listed Norris as the co-
    occupant. The police officers then returned to Myers’s room and
    arrested Norris. Myers was also arrested and charged with
    possession of a legend drug, a class D felony, assisting a criminal,
    a class A misdemeanor, and false informing, a class A
    misdemeanor.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1604-PL-929 | December 30, 2016   Page 3 of 16
    On June 15, 2004, Myers pleaded guilty to false informing, a
    class B misdemeanor, and was later sentenced to 180 days of
    incarceration. In exchange, the State dismissed the remaining
    charges.[1]
    On May 30, 2012, Myers filed a petition for post-conviction
    relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective. Myers
    contended, among other things, that his counsel was ineffective
    for failing “to move to suppress evidence that [Myers] had lied
    about the fact that ... Norris ... was staying in his motel room.”
    Appellant’s Br. p. 4. The State responded that even if Myers’s
    assertions were true, he failed to present any material facts that
    entitled him to post-conviction relief. Thus, the State argued that
    the post-conviction court should deny Myers’s request for relief
    without a hearing.
    On August 24, 2012, the post-conviction court summarily
    dismissed Myers’s petition, concluding that Myers had failed to
    allege any facts or issues not known to him at the time of the
    guilty plea, and that:
    6. [Myers] had no expectation of privacy in the motel
    ledger.
    7. Entry into the motel room was obtained by
    consent.
    8. There is no colorable suppression issue in the case
    at bar.
    1
    At some point, Myers was placed on probation in lieu of incarceration following his guilty plea. While on
    probation, Myers was charged with nine unrelated felony counts, including several Class A felony drug
    charges. He was eventually convicted of four counts of Class A felony dealing in cocaine and sentenced to a
    term of thirty years.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1604-PL-929 | December 30, 2016         Page 4 of 16
    9. [Myers] failed to allege that he would have been
    acquitted had he proceeded to trial on this matter,
    nor has he alleged facts that would rise to a
    constitutional violation under the Indiana and
    Federal Constitutions.
    Appellant’s App. p. 87.
    Myers v. State, 
    2013 WL 1858430
    *1-2 (Ind. Ct. App. May 2, 2013), trans. denied.
    Myers appealed the post-conviction court’s August 24, 2012 summary dismissal
    of his petition. 
    Id. at *2.
    Upon review, this court affirmed the judgment of the
    post-conviction court. 
    Id. at *3.
    Myers’s subsequent petition for rehearing was
    denied on August 16, 2013. Myers then sought transfer to the Supreme Court
    of Indiana. On November 7, 2013, the Indiana Supreme Court denied Myers’s
    petition seeking transfer.
    B. Facts Relating to the Civil Claims at Issue in This
    Appeal
    1. The Hotel Appellees
    [5]   On September 27, 2013, Myers filed a civil complaint for invasion of privacy
    against the Hotel Appellees. Specifically, Myers argued that the Hotel
    Appellees had violated his privacy by requiring him to provide them with the
    identification of the individual staying with him in his hotel room and by
    turning this identification over to representatives of the Clinton County Sheriff’s
    Department. Default Judgment was entered against the Hotel Appellees on
    June 22, 2015. The trial court then allowed Myers to plead damages via
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1604-PL-929 | December 30, 2016   Page 5 of 16
    affidavit. In an order dated February 4, 2016, the trial court awarded Myers
    zero dollars in damages.
    2. The State Appellees
    [6]   On October 28, 2014, Myers amended his September 27, 2013 complaint to
    include various state and federal claims relating to the denial of his 2012 PCR
    petition against the State Appellees. In making these claims, Myers sought an
    order directing the named trial judge, the named judges of this court, and the
    named justices of the Indiana Supreme Court to further review his previously-
    considered PCR petition. Myers also sought that the deputy prosecutor and the
    deputy attorney general be ordered to “[f]urther prosecute the action underlying
    this one … in a manner that is consistent with [his/her] ethical duty[.]”
    Appellant’s App. pp. 252, 253. The State Appellees sought dismissal under
    Trial Rule 12(B)(6), arguing, among other things that each of the named parties
    was entitled to immunity. The trial court subsequently dismissed the claims
    against the State Appellees.
    3. Motion to Correct Error
    [7]   On March 9, 2016, Myers filed a motion to correct error, challenging both the
    award of zero dollars in damages and the dismissal of the State Appellees. This
    motion was denied by the trial court on April 1, 2016. This appeal follows.
    Discussion and Decision
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1604-PL-929 | December 30, 2016   Page 6 of 16
    [8]   Myers appeals following the denial of his motion to correct error. On appeal,
    we review a trial court’s decision on a motion to correct error for an abuse of
    discretion. Knowledge A-Z, Inc. v. Sentry Ins., 
    891 N.E.2d 581
    , 584 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2008), trans. denied. “An abuse of discretion occurs when the decision is against
    the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, and
    inferences that may be drawn therefrom.” 
    Id. (citing Palmer
    v. Comprehensive
    Neurologic Serv., P.C., 
    864 N.E.2d 1093
    , 1102 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied).
    I. Award of Damages
    [9]   With respect to the Hotel Appellees, Myers challenges the trial court’s award of
    zero dollars in damages. “‘The computation of damages is strictly a matter
    within the trial court’s discretion.’” Harlan Bakeries, Inc. v. Muncy, 
    835 N.E.2d 1018
    , 1034 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Romine v. Gagle, 
    782 N.E.2d 369
    , 382
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied). “‘No degree of mathematical certainty is
    required in awarding damages as long as the amount awarded is supported by
    evidence in the record; however, an award may not be based upon mere
    conjecture, speculation, or guesswork.’” 
    Id. (quoting Romine,
    782 N.E.2d at
    382). To support an award of damages, “‘facts must exist and be shown by the
    evidence which afford a legal basis for measuring the plaintiff’s loss.’” 
    Id. at 135
    (quoting 
    Romine, 782 N.E.2d at 382
    ). “‘To that end the damages must be
    referenced to some fairly definitive standard, such as market value, established
    experience, or direct inference from known circumstances.’” 
    Id. (quoting Romine,
    782 N.E.2d at 382-83).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1604-PL-929 | December 30, 2016   Page 7 of 16
    [10]           In awarding zero dollars in damages, the trial court found as follows:
    [Myers] has failed to prove that the [Hotel Appellees] violated his
    right to privacy by cooperating with the police. Even if this
    violation was proven, [Myers] has failed to prove that it resulted
    in damage. Any damage claimed by [Myers] was self-inflicted
    and flowed from the fact that he entered a guilty plea to False
    Informing, a Class B Misdemeanor, pursuant to a plea agreement
    on June 15, 2004.
    Appellant’s App. pp. 455-56.
    [11]   In challenging the trial court’s award of zero dollars in damages, Myers argues
    that his guilty plea did not act as a bar to recovery of damages from the Hotel
    Appellees. While Myers’s guilty plea might not act as a bar to recovering
    damages, it was within the trial court’s discretion to determine whether the
    evidence provided by Myers proved that the alleged invasion of his privacy by
    the Hotel Appellees resulted in measurable damage to him. Upon review, we
    conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion in making such a
    determination and, as a result, awarding zero dollars in damages.
    II. Dismissal of the State Appellees
    [12]   With respect to the State Appellees, Myers challenges the trial court’s order
    dismissing the claims levied against the State Appellees.
    A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(B)(6) tests the legal
    sufficiency of a complaint: that is, whether the allegations in the
    complaint establish any set of circumstances under which a
    plaintiff would be entitled to relief. See Kitco, Inc. v. Corp. for Gen.
    Trade, 
    706 N.E.2d 581
    (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). Thus, while we do
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1604-PL-929 | December 30, 2016   Page 8 of 16
    not test the sufficiency of the facts alleged with regards to their
    adequacy to provide recovery, we do test their sufficiency with
    regards to whether or not they have stated some factual scenario
    in which a legally actionable injury has occurred.
    A court should “accept[ ] as true the facts alleged in the
    complaint,” Minks v. Pina, 
    709 N.E.2d 379
    , 381 (Ind. Ct. App.
    1999), and should not only “consider the pleadings in the light
    most favorable to the plaintiff,” but also “draw every reasonable
    inference in favor of [the non-moving] party.” Newman v. Deiter,
    
    702 N.E.2d 1093
    , 1097 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998). However, a court
    need not accept as true “allegations that are contradicted by other
    allegations or exhibits attached to or incorporated in the
    pleading.” Morgan Asset Holding Corp. v. CoBank, ACB, 
    736 N.E.2d 1268
    , 1271 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (citations omitted).
    Trail v. Boys & Girls Clubs of Nw. Ind., 
    845 N.E.2d 130
    , 134-35 (Ind. 2006). On
    review, we will affirm the trial court’s grant of a Rule 12(B)(6) motion to
    dismiss “if it is sustainable on any theory or basis found in the record.” 
    Deiter, 702 N.E.2d at 1097
    .
    A. Dismissal of Federal Claims
    [13]   Although Myers’s arguments below and on appeal are somewhat unclear, it
    appears that Myers has asserted federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§
    1983”) against all of the State Appellees. § 1983 provides as follows:
    Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
    regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
    District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
    citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
    thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
    secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1604-PL-929 | December 30, 2016   Page 9 of 16
    injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
    proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against
    a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s
    judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
    declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was
    unavailable.
    (Emphasis added).
    [14]   The United States Supreme Court has held that “neither a State nor its officials
    acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t
    of State Police, 
    491 U.S. 58
    , 71 (1989). In reaching this holding, the United
    States Supreme Court explained the following:
    Obviously, state officials literally are persons. But a suit against a
    state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the
    official but rather is a suit against the official’s office. As such, it
    is no different from a suit against the State itself.
    
    Id. (internal citations
    omitted).
    [15]   In determining whether an individual was sued in their official or personal
    capacity, we look to the caption of the case and the allegations and language
    used in the body of the complaint. See Lake Cty. Juvenile Court v. Swanson, 
    671 N.E.2d 429
    , 434 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996).
    If a plaintiff seeks to sue public officials in their personal
    capacities or in both their personal and official capacities, the
    plaintiff should expressly state so in the complaint. We also note
    that courts ordinarily assume that an official is sued only in her
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1604-PL-929 | December 30, 2016   Page 10 of 16
    official capacity when a plaintiff alleges that a state official acted
    under the color of state law giving rise to liability under § 1983.
    
    Id. (internal citations
    ommitted).
    [16]   In filing suit against each of the State Appellees, Myers indicated that each was
    being sued in their official capacities only. Further, the nature of the claims
    brought against each of the State Appellees indicates that they are being sued in
    only their official capacities. Therefore, we will review the propriety of the
    dismissal only as it relates to claims brought against the State and State officers
    in their official capacities.
    [17]   Neither a state nor a state agency is a person under § 1983 regardless of whether
    the claims raised sought retrospective or prospective relief. See Severson v. Bd. of
    Trustees of Purdue Univ., 
    777 N.E.2d 1181
    , 1189 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). As such,
    the trial court correctly dismissed the claims levied against the State of Indiana
    under § 1983. Further, if a plaintiff requests retrospective relief, then a state
    official sued in his official capacity is also not a “person” under § 1983. See 
    id. The trial
    court, therefore, also correctly dismissed the claims levied against the
    remaining State Appellees by Myers which sought retrospective relief because
    the State Appellees were not “persons” under § 1983.
    [18]   If, however, a plaintiff requests prospective relief, then a state official may be
    considered a “person” under § 1983. See 
    id. It appears
    that at least some of
    Myers’s claims are seeking prospective relief. Specifically, it seems that Myers
    is seeking a court order or injunction that would authorize him to seek another
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1604-PL-929 | December 30, 2016   Page 11 of 16
    round of PCR, during which the State Appellees would be compelled to
    conduct said review in a manner consistent with Myers’s view of the law.
    [19]   In Martin v. Heffelfinger, 
    744 N.E.2d 555
    , 558-59 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), we
    concluded that in order to seek prospective injunctive relief against a state
    official under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove that his remedies at law are
    inadequate before he can state a claim for equitable relief. A legal remedy is
    adequate “where it is as practical and efficient to the ends of justice and its
    prompt administration as the remedy in equity.” 
    Martin, 744 N.E.2d at 559
    .
    [20]   In Martin, the plaintiff filed a complaint under § 1983 against a number of state
    officials, including the judge who revoked his probation. 
    Id. at 557.
    Martin
    sought declarative and injunctive relief to bar the judge from presiding over any
    action involving him, claiming that he was entitled to relief because the
    revocation of his probation had caused him to lose his job. 
    Id. The trial
    court
    dismissed Martin’s claim against the judge. 
    Id. Upon review,
    we affirmed,
    concluding that the trial judge was entitled to judicial immunity because Martin
    had failed to prove that he was entitled to declarative or injunctive relief. 
    Id. at 559.
    Specifically, we concluded that Martin had failed to prove why the
    remedies available to him at law were inadequate. 
    Id. In reaching
    this
    conclusion, we noted that Martin could raise the issues presented through the
    proper channels on a direct appeal from his conviction or in post-conviction
    proceedings. 
    Id. Court of
    Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1604-PL-929 | December 30, 2016   Page 12 of 16
    [21]   Just as in Martin, here Myers has failed to show that the legal remedies
    available to him are inadequate. Myers filed an unsuccessful PCR petition.
    Myers does not cite to any authority suggesting that he is entitled to relief under
    § 1983 merely because his PCR petition was subsequently denied. Further, the
    Indiana Post-Conviction Rules set forth a procedure by which one may request
    permission to file a second or successive PCR petition. Nothing in the record
    indicates that Myers has been denied, or even sought, permission to file a
    successive PCR petition. Because we conclude that Myers has failed to show
    that the legal remedies available to him are inadequate, we further conclude
    that the trial court correctly dismissed the claims levied against the remaining
    State Appellees by Myers which sought prospective relief.
    B. Dismissal of State Claims
    1. Named Judges and Justices
    [22]   It is well-established that judicial officers are protected by a common law
    immunity from suit brought on the basis of their judicial acts. See Cato v. Mayes,
    
    270 Ind. 653
    , 655, 
    388 N.E.2d 530
    , 532 (1979) (citing Alexander v. Gill, 
    130 Ind. 485
    , 489, 
    30 N.E. 525
    , 527 (1892)). “The reason for this rule is that such a
    liability for a judicial act would be inconsistent with the proper discharge of
    judicial duties.” 
    Id. at 655,
    388 N.E.2d at 532.
    The test by which the question of the liability of a judicial officer
    is to be governed is twofold: (1) was the act complained of an
    exercise of judicial authority? and (2) did the court have
    jurisdiction of the parties and subject matter? If these two
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1604-PL-929 | December 30, 2016   Page 13 of 16
    questions are answered affirmatively, judicial immunity will be
    accorded to the officer.
    
    Id. at 655,
    388 N.E.2d at 532 (internal citation omitted).
    [23]   Review of the record clearly establishes that acts complained of by Myers were
    exercises of judicial authority and that the named judges and justices had both
    personal and subject matter jurisdiction over the parties and claims before the
    respective courts. As such, judicial immunity covers each of the named judges
    and justices.
    2. Deputy Prosecutor and Deputy Attorney General
    [24]   The Indiana Supreme Court has also recognized that prosecuting attorneys and
    the Attorney General and his or her deputies are protected by absolute
    immunity for acts reasonably within the general scope of authority granted to
    prosecuting attorneys. See Foster v. Pearcy, 
    270 Ind. 533
    , 537-38, 
    387 N.E.2d 446
    , 449 (1979).
    This decision will insure that the prosecutor will be able to
    exercise the independent judgment necessary to effectuate his
    duties to investigate and prosecute criminals and to apprise the
    public of his activities. It will also allay the apprehensions about
    harassment of prosecuting attorneys from unfounded litigation
    which deters public officials from their public duties.
    
    Id. at 537,
    387 N.E.2d at 449.
    [25]   Again, review of the record clearly establishes that the acts complained of by
    Myers were acts within the general scope of authority granted to prosecuting
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1604-PL-929 | December 30, 2016   Page 14 of 16
    attorneys and the Attorney General. As such, both the deputy prosecutor and
    the deputy attorney general were protected against Myers’s claims by
    prosecutorial immunity.
    3. The Indiana Tort Claims Act
    [26]   The State Appellees are further immune from liability under the Indiana Tort
    Claims Act (“ITCA”). The ITCA governs lawsuits against political
    subdivisions and their employees. Myers v. Maxson, 
    51 N.E.3d 1267
    , 1278 (Ind.
    Ct. App. 2016) (citing Irwin Mortg. Corp. v. Marion Cnty. Treasurer, 
    816 N.E.2d 439
    , 445 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004)), trans. denied.
    The ITCA provides substantial immunity for conduct within the
    scope of a public employee’s employment “to ensure that public
    employees can exercise the independent judgment necessary to
    carry out their duties without threat of harassment by litigation or
    threats of litigation over decisions made within the scope of their
    employment.” Irwin Mortg. 
    Corp., 816 N.E.2d at 445
    ; see also Ind.
    Code § 34-13-3-3 (setting forth twenty-four separate categories for
    which immunity attaches). Compliance with the ITCA is a
    question of law for the court to decide. 
    Id. Generally, whether
                   the tortious act of an employee is within the scope of
    employment is a question of fact; however, under certain
    circumstances the question may be determined as a matter of
    law. Bushong v. Williamson, 
    790 N.E.2d 467
    , 473 (Ind. 2003).
    
    Maxson, 51 N.E.3d at 1278-79
    . It is specifically of note in this matter that
    Indiana Code section 34-13-3-3(6) provides that “[a] governmental entity or an
    employee acting within the scope of the employee’s employment is not liable if
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1604-PL-929 | December 30, 2016   Page 15 of 16
    a loss results from the … initiation of a judicial or an administrative
    proceeding.”
    [27]   As is discussed above, each of the State Appellees was sued only in their official
    capacities. It is evident from Myers’s complaint that each were acting within
    their scope of authority and performing discretionary functions of the
    government in relation to a judicial proceeding. The deputy prosecuting
    attorney and the deputy attorney general both acted in accordance with their
    duty to defend against Myers’s PCR petition. Each of the judicial officers were
    acting in accordance with their duty to adjudicate cases, including cases
    involving a request for PCR, which have come before their respective courts.
    As such, each of the State Appellees were entitled to immunity under the
    ITCA.
    Conclusion
    [28]   In sum, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in (1)
    awarding Myers zero dollars in damages with respect to the Hotel Appellees or
    (2) dismissing the claims levied against the State Appellees. As such, we affirm
    the judgment of the trial court.
    [29]   The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
    Vaidik, C.J., and Brown, J., concur.
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