Roy Clifford Bebout v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                        FILED
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                                Oct 30 2019, 9:02 am
    court except for the purpose of establishing                                 CLERK
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                  Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    estoppel, or the law of the case.                                             and Tax Court
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Yvette M. LaPlante                                       Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    LaPlante LLP                                             Attorney General of Indiana
    Evansville, Indiana
    Jesse R. Drum
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Roy Clifford Bebout,                                     October 30, 2019
    Appellant-Defendant,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
    19A-CR-1052
    v.                                               Appeal from the
    Vanderburgh Circuit Court
    State of Indiana,                                        The Honorable
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                                      Michael J. Cox, Magistrate
    Trial Court Cause No.
    82C01-1810-F3-6908
    Kirsch, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1052 | October 30, 2019                 Page 1 of 6
    [1]   Roy Clifford Bebout (“Bebout”) was convicted after a jury trial of attempted
    rape1 as a Level 3 felony, criminal confinement2 as a Level 3 felony,
    kidnapping3 as a Level 3 felony, two counts of criminal confinement,4 each as a
    Level 5 felony, and strangulation5 as a Level 6 felony and was sentenced to
    twenty-five years executed in the Indiana Department of Correction. Bebout
    appeals and raises the following issue for our review: whether the trial court
    erred when it denied Bebout’s request to represent himself.
    [2]   We affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [3]   On October 12, 2018, K.H., who was a juvenile at the time, was walking to her
    job at a McDonald’s restaurant, which was about a five-minute walk from her
    home. Tr. Vol. II at 69-70. As she crossed the parking lot of a closed grocery
    store, a man, whom she later identified in a line-up as Bebout, got out of his
    truck and stuck a gun in her right side, stating “This is a gun, if you try to run,
    I’m going to shoot you.” Id. at 70-72. The two struggled until K.H. was inside
    of Bebout’s truck on the passenger side floorboard where the scuffle continued
    as Bebout attempted to handcuff K.H. Id. at 72. Bebout slammed K.H.’s head
    1
    See 
    Ind. Code §§ 35-42-4-1
    (a); 35-41-5-1.
    2
    See 
    Ind. Code § 35-42-3-3
    .
    3
    See 
    Ind. Code § 35-42-3-2
    .
    4
    See 
    Ind. Code § 35-42-3-3
    .
    5
    See 
    Ind. Code § 35-42-2-9
    (c).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1052 | October 30, 2019   Page 2 of 6
    against the console and tried to put a yellow ball with a string on it into her
    mouth. 
    Id. at 72-73
    . K.H. continued to struggle, and at one point, she grabbed
    his gun and threw it into the backseat, but Bebout was able to retrieve it. 
    Id. at 73
    . She also took the pepper spray that she was wearing around her neck and
    tried to spray him, but he wiped the spray onto her face. 
    Id. at 75
    . During the
    struggle, K.H. tried to call police on her cell phone, and she also asked Bebout
    questions. 
    Id. at 74
    . She indicated that she had $16 and offered it to Bebout.
    
    Id.
     He told her that he did not want her money and that he wanted her to
    perform oral sex on him. 
    Id.
     Bebout was eventually able to handcuff K.H., and
    once he had done so, he shoved her legs into the truck and walked around to
    get into the driver’s seat. 
    Id. at 76
    . At that time, K.H. was able to open the
    truck door and escape the vehicle. 
    Id.
     She saw a bus in the parking lot and ran
    across the street to where it was located. 
    Id.
     She made contact with the bus
    driver, who called police. 
    Id.
    [4]   The police arrived and cut the handcuffs off of K.H. 
    Id. at 77
    . The bus driver
    reported that he had observed a red Dodge pickup truck leave the parking lot.
    
    Id. at 91
    . At the scene, the police located a cell phone near where the truck had
    been parked. 
    Id. at 98, 101-02
    . Officers later called the contact labeled “Mom”
    in the cell phone. 
    Id. at 105
    . The woman who answered the phone identified
    herself as Bebout’s mother and identified the phone and number the police
    called from as belonging to her son, Bebout. 
    Id.
     Later that day, the police
    located Bebout at his employment in another county, and they went to that
    location to arrest him. 
    Id. at 158-60
    . After arresting Bebout, the police
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1052 | October 30, 2019   Page 3 of 6
    obtained a warrant to search his red Dodge pickup truck. 
    Id. at 110, 113
    .
    During the search of the truck, they found zip ties, rope, and a pillowcase. 
    Id. at 117
    . In their investigation, the police also recovered a yellow ball with a
    string attached and an airsoft pistol that matched the description of the gun
    used by Bebout. 
    Id. at 150-51
    ; Tr. Vol. III at 33. Officers questioned Bebout,
    and he admitted to the struggle that took place between him and K.H. Tr. Vol.
    III at 7-8. He denied asking her to perform a sex act on him, and instead
    suggested that she had offered to do so during her plea for help. 
    Id. at 9
    .
    [5]   On October 15, 2018, the State charged Bebout with Level 3 felony attempted
    rape, Level 3 felony criminal confinement, Level 3 felony kidnapping, two
    counts of Level 5 felony criminal confinement, and Level 6 felony strangulation
    and alleged that he was a repeat sexual offender. Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 21-
    23, 27. Bebout was appointed a public defender. 
    Id. at 10
    . A jury trial was
    scheduled to commence on March 11, 2019, and on the morning of the jury
    trial, Bebout indicated that he wanted to represent himself at trial. Tr. Vol. II at
    4. The trial court denied Bebout’s request because he was “not prepared to
    represent” himself “on the morning of trial.” 
    Id. at 18
    . The trial then
    proceeded with Bebout being represented by his appointed counsel. 
    Id.
     At the
    conclusion of the trial, the jury found Bebout guilty as charged. The trial court
    sentenced him to an aggregate sentence of twenty-five years executed. Bebout
    now appeals.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1052 | October 30, 2019   Page 4 of 6
    Discussion and Decision
    [6]   Bebout argues that the trial court erred when it denied his morning-of-trial
    request to represent himself at trial. The Sixth Amendment to the United States
    Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant the right to counsel. Wilson v.
    State, 
    94 N.E.3d 312
    , 320 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (citing Jones v. State, 
    783 N.E.2d 1132
    , 1138 (Ind. 2003)), trans. denied. “Implicit in the right to counsel is the
    right to self-representation.” 
    Id.
     (citing Drake v. State, 
    895 N.E.2d 389
    , 392 (Ind.
    Ct. App. 2008)). A criminal defendant has the right to waive counsel and
    proceed pro se if it is shown that he does so of his own free will, knowing and
    understanding his constitutional right to be represented by counsel. Campbell v.
    State, 
    732 N.E.2d 197
    , 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (citing Olson v. State, 
    563 N.E.2d 565
    , 570 (Ind. 1990)). However, the right to self-representation must be
    asserted within a reasonable time prior to the first day of trial. 
    Id.
     Our
    Supreme Court has held that a request to proceed pro se on the morning of trial
    is per se untimely, and denial of a request to proceed pro se on the ground of
    untimeliness is permissible. Moore v. State, 
    557 N.E.2d 665
    , 669 (Ind. 1990);
    Dixon v. State, 
    437 N.E.2d 1318
    , 1321 (Ind. 1982); Russell v. State, 
    270 Ind. 55
    ,
    62, 
    383 N.E.2d 309
    , 314 (1978). See also Campbell, 
    732 N.E.2d at 204
    ; Hotep-El
    v. State, 
    113 N.E.3d 795
    , 809 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied.
    [7]   Here, Bebout did not request to represent himself until the morning of trial.
    Under the circumstances of this case, Bebout’s request to proceed pro se was
    per se untimely and properly denied by the trial court. We, therefore, affirm
    Bebout’s convictions.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1052 | October 30, 2019   Page 5 of 6
    [8]   Affirmed.
    Baker, J., and Crone, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1052 | October 30, 2019   Page 6 of 6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 19A-CR-1052

Filed Date: 10/30/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2019