Bennie Truth v. State of Indiana ( 2014 )

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before Dec 18 2014, 8:26 am
any court except for the purpose of
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
MICHAEL R. FISHER GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
RICHARD C. WEBSTER
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
BENNIE TRUTH, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 49A02-1405-CR-334
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Carol Orbison, Senior Judge
Cause No. 49F09-1310-FD-70066
December 18, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MAY, Judge
Bennie Truth appeals his conviction of Class D felony failure to register as a sex
offender.1 He claims the State’s evidence was insufficient to support that conviction. We
affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Truth was required to register as a sex offender because he committed rape in 1998.
On September 17, 2013, Truth registered his address as Room 152 at the King’s Inn Hotel,
6850 E. 21st Street, in Indianapolis. As of October 21, 2013, Truth had not changed his
registration.
On October 21, Marion County Sheriff Department Deputy Timothy Doughty went to
the King’s Inn Hotel to find Truth. Deputy Doughty found Room 152 empty and then went
to the front desk. The manager told him Truth had never been a registered guest in any room
at the Hotel, and police began the process of obtaining a warrant to arrest Truth for failure to
register.
Police arrested Truth on November 14, 2013, at a bar on the west side of Indianapolis.
Truth told the arresting officer “he was staying at the King’s Inn at 21st and Shadeland, but
he also went on to say that he was homeless and that he had registered homeless.” (Tr. at
17.) The officer confirmed Truth’s official address with the registry was “6850 East 21st
Street, Room 152.” (Id. at 17.)
The State charged Truth with three counts of Class D felony failure to register as a sex
1
Ind. Code § 11-8-8-17.
2
offender: Count 1 alleged he made “a material misstatement or omission while registering as
a sex offender,” (App. at 20); Count 2 alleged he did not “reside at the address . . . registered
as [the] address of residence,” (id. at 21); and Count 3 alleged he did not “update [his]
address within seventy-two hours after changing [his] address, (id. at 22). Truth waived his
right to a jury trial. The court found him guilty of all three charges, but it entered a
conviction on only one count. The court imposed a three-year sentence to be served through
community corrections.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
When we review claims of insufficient evidence, we do not reweigh evidence or
assess witness credibility, and we will affirm unless no rational factfinder could have found
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Sasser v. State, 945 N.E.2d 201, 204 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied.
Sex offenders who are required to register must provide law enforcement with their
“principal residence address, other address where the . . . offender spends more than seven
(7) nights in a fourteen (14) day period, and mailing address, if different from the . . .
offender’s principal residence address.” Ind. Code § 11-8-8-8(a). Once registered, a sex
offender who changes his “principal residence address . . . shall report . . . the sex or violent
offender’s new principal address or location not more than seventy-two (72) hours after the
address change.” Ind. Code § 11-8-8-11(a); see also Ind. Code § 11-8-8-8(c) (requiring
offender to contact local law enforcement within 72 hours of any change in reported
information).
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A sex offender commits Class D felony failure to register if he knowingly or
intentionally:
(1) fails to register when required to register under this chapter;
(2) fails to register in every location where the sex or violent offender is
required to register under this chapter;
(3) makes a material misstatement or omission while registering as a sex or
violent offender under this chapter;
(4) fails to register in person as required under this chapter; or
(5) does not reside at the sex or violent offender’s registered address or
location . . . .
Ind. Code § 11-8-8-17(a). The court found Truth committed Class D felony failure to
register in three distinct ways -- providing an address that was not his, not staying at the
address he provided, and failing to update the registry within 72 hours of moving.
Truth asserts the evidence was insufficient to support any of those findings. Truth
testified he had been staying in room 152 with two men, Reginald Smith and D.J. Luckett,
who had registered the room in their names, and he was giving Smith money to help pay for
the room. In support of his claim, he noted one of the managers testified he had seen Truth at
the Hotel on three or four occasions.
Another Hotel manager confirmed Smith and Luckett had been registered at the hotel
as part of a Department of Correction program. However, she testified that Smith checked
out on October 15 or 17, and Luckett “had already gone.” (Tr. at 64.) Thus, even if Truth
had stayed in Room 152 with Smith and Luckett, he could not have been living there after
October 17. The trial court could therefore infer that by October 21, Truth had failed for
more than 72 hours to update his address with the registry.
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We acknowledge Truth’s testimony he was staying in Room 152 at the King’s Inn
Hotel when he registered that location as his address and he stayed there thereafter, but we
may not accept Truth’s invitation to reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the
witnesses. In light of the conflicts between Truth’s version of events and those presented by
other witnesses, the court was not required to find Truth’s uncorroborated testimony credible.
See Sasser, 945 N.E.2d at 205 (“this case boils down to an assessment of witness credibility.
And that is a task for the jurors”). We therefore cannot overturn the trial court’s findings
that Truth made a material misstatement when registering and that Truth did not reside at his
registered address. Accordingly, we affirm.
Affirmed.
BARNES, J., and PYLE, J., concur.
5