John Edward Williams v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2017 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION FILED
Mar 22 2017, 9:11 am
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
regarded as precedent or cited before any and Tax Court
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Valerie K. Boots Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Marion County Public Defender Agency Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana Justin F. Roebel
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
John Edward Williams, March 22, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A05-1608-CR-1919
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable David M. Hooper,
Appellee-Plaintiff Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No.
49G12-1506-CM-22606
Mathias, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1608-CR-1919 | March 22, 2017 Page 1 of 5
[1] John Edward Williams (“Williams”) was convicted in Marion Superior Court
of Class B misdemeanor criminal recklessness. Williams appeals his conviction
and argues that the State failed to prove that his acts were reckless.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] On or about June 26, 2015, Williams reported that his girlfriend’s 1985 tan-
colored Pontiac Parisienne had been stolen. On June 28, 2015, Williams
observed what he believed to be the stolen vehicle traveling southbound on
Interstate 65. He began to follow the vehicle, which was driven by Trent Wilson
(“Wilson”). Wilson’s girlfriend was in the passenger seat, and his two young
nephews were in the back seat.
[4] Wilson exited the interstate onto Raymond Street and proceeded west toward
Shelby Street. He observed that Williams’s vehicle was still following him
closely. Wilson stopped that the intersection of Raymond and Shelby Streets
and planned to turn north onto Shelby Street. Wilson stopped at the
intersection to allow a fire truck to pass. His vehicle was then hit from behind
by Williams’s vehicle.
[5] Wilson began to pull over to check for damage to his car when Williams struck
his vehicle again. Williams used his vehicle to push Wilson’s vehicle down the
street approximately ten yards and up onto the curb. Damage to Wilson’s
vehicle included a bent front driver’s side tire rim, a crack in the hood, and
broken tail lights.
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[6] Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department Officer Jennifer Asher (“Officer
Asher”) was on duty near the 2100 block of Shelby Street. Williams waved
Officer Asher down and reported that Wilson’s vehicle was the vehicle that
Williams had reported stolen two days prior. Williams gave Officer Asher the
stolen vehicle’s title and told her that he rear-ended the vehicle to get it to stop.
Tr. pp. 14, 22. The officer checked the VIN numbers of Wilson’s vehicle and
the vehicle described on Williams’ title, but the numbers did not match.
[7] Officer Asher told Williams that he was mistaken and Wilson’s vehicle was not
the one that had been reported stolen. Williams asked if he could apologize to
the driver and explained that Wilson’s car looked just like the stolen vehicle.
[8] The next day, Williams was charged with Class B misdemeanor criminal
recklessness. Williams was found guilty as charged at a bench trial held on July
28, 2016. He was sentenced to time served and ordered to complete forty hours
of community service. Williams now appeals.
Standard of Review
[9] Williams argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that
he committed Class B misdemeanor criminal recklessness.
When we review a claim challenging the sufficiency of the
evidence we neither reweigh the evidence nor assess the
credibility of the witnesses. Instead, we consider only the
evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom that support
the [judgment]. And we will affirm the conviction if there is
probative evidence from which [the fact-finder] could have found
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
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Suggs v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1190, 1193 (Ind. 2016) (citing Treadway v. State, 924
N.E.2d 621, 639 (Ind. 2010)).
Discussion and Decision
[10] To convict Williams of Class B misdemeanor criminal recklessness, the State
was required to prove that Williams recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally
performed an act that created a substantial risk of bodily injury to another
person. See Ind. Code § 35-42-2-2. The State specifically alleged that Williams’
reckless, knowing, or intentional act of striking Wilson’s vehicle created a
substantial risk of bodily injury to Wilson. Appellant’s App. p. 16.
[11] Relying on his own testimony at trial, Williams argues that the State failed to
prove that he acted recklessly. He claims that he accidentally struck Wilson’s
vehicle and specifically that “the impact occurred as he was looking over his
right shoulder for the police officer he had seen at the intersection.” Appellant’s
Br. at 8 (citing tr. pp. 38-39).
[12] “A person engages in conduct ‘recklessly’ if he engages in the conduct in plain,
conscious, and unjustifiable disregard of harm that might result and the
disregard involves a substantial deviation from acceptable standards of
conduct.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2. Rear-ending another vehicle is generally
negligent conduct that our courts will not consider a criminally reckless act. Cf.
Clancy v. State, 829 N.E.2d 203, 207 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (observing that “proof
that an automobile accident ‘arose out of the inadvertence, lack of attention,
forgetfulness or thoughtfulness of the driver of a vehicle, or from an error of
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1608-CR-1919 | March 22, 2017 Page 4 of 5
judgment on his part,’ is not sufficient evidence of recklessness”), trans. denied
(citation omitted).
[13] However, in this case, the State presented evidence that Williams deliberately
struck Wilson’s vehicle so that the vehicle would come to a stop. When he
struck Wilson’s vehicle a second time, he pushed the vehicle almost ten yards
and up over the curb. Williams then told Wilson that Wilson’s vehicle was his
and had been stolen. Tr. p. 29. Damages to Wilson’s vehicle included a bent
front driver’s side tire rim, a crack in the hood of the car, and broken taillights.
[14] Williams challenges the credibility of the State’s evidence and requests that we
credit his testimony that his acts were merely negligent. It is more than well-
settled that our court will not reweigh the evidence or credibility of the
witnesses. See Suggs, 51 N.E.3d at 1193. For these reasons, we conclude that the
State presented sufficient evidence that Williams acted recklessly. We therefore
affirm his conviction for Class B misdemeanor criminal recklessness.
[15] Affirmed.
Baker, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
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