Kent Akins v. State of Indiana , 39 N.E.3d 410 ( 2015 )

Jul 31 2015, 9:18 am
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Victoria L. Bailey Gregory F. Zoeller
Marion County Public Defender Agency Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
George P. Sherman
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Kent Akins, July 31, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A02-1412-CR-869
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court.
The Honorable Annie Christ-Garcia,
State of Indiana, Judge.
Appellee-Plaintiff. Cause No. 49F24-1312-FD-79414
Darden, Senior Judge
Statement of the Case
[1] Kent Akins appeals the trial court’s order requiring him to pay restitution to the
City of Indianapolis. We reverse and remand for an evidentiary hearing.
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Issue
[2] Akins raises one issue, which we restate as: whether the trial court abused its
discretion in ordering Akins to pay restitution.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] On December 15, 2013, Akins struggled with police officers outside of a bar in
Indianapolis and was arrested. The State charged Akins with battery on a law
enforcement officer resulting in injury, a Class D felony. Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(2012). The charging information states:
On or about Dec [sic] 15, 2013, in Marion County, State of
Indiana, the following named defendant Kent Akins, did
knowingly touch, Tyler Watson, a law enforcement officer with
the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department, in a rude,
insolent, or angry manner, to wit: punched Officer Watson while
said officer was engaged in the execution of his official duty, and
further that said touching resulted in an injury, to wit: pain
and/or swelling and/or bruising to said officer.
Appellant’s App. p. 15.
[4] The State also charged Akins with resisting law enforcement, a Class A
misdemeanor. Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1 (2013). The charging information
states:
On or about Dec [sic] 15, 2013, in Marion County, State of
Indiana, the following named defendant Kent Akins, did
knowingly and forcibly resist, obstruct, or interfere with Antwon
Keyes, a law enforcement officer with the Indianapolis
Metropolitan Police Department, while said officer was lawfully
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engaged in the execution of his duties as a law enforcement
officer.
Appellant’s App. p. 16.
[5] Akins and the State entered into a plea agreement. Akins agreed to plead guilty
as charged. The parties agreed that his aggregate sentence would be limited to
545 days, with credit for two days served and the rest of the term suspended to
probation. Akins also agreed as a condition of probation to pay restitution to
the “City of Indianapolis” in an amount to be set by the court. Id. at 24.
[6] At the sentencing hearing, the trial court accepted the plea agreement and
imposed the agreed-upon sentence. During the hearing, Akins requested a
separate hearing on restitution. He advised the court:
Well judge, the issue is we recently learned, recently last week
that this officer has a broken leg. No mention of it in the
probable cause affidavit. We’ve not seen any documentation to
that effect so that’s something that I need to look at and
determine if insurance paid any part of it or just what, I guess,
the injuries he sustained and if it matches up with uh, medical.
So that’s the purpose of the hearing.
Tr. p. 7.
[7] The State responded that one of the officers involved in the incident with Akins
did break his leg during the incident and was undergoing treatment. Akins
further stated:
Those are some of the issues I need to look into, if there were, are
any um, monies or things covered by insurance or just the
county, I don’t know yet and so we want to make sure that
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whatever the restitution is isn’t, I don’t know, double dipping, I
don’t know.
Id. at 8. The court scheduled a hearing on restitution.
[8] At the restitution hearing, the State did not present any witnesses. Instead, the
State merely tendered to the court medical records and bills for Officer Antwon
Keyes, which indicated that he had experienced a leg injury on December 15,
1
2013, while struggling with an unidentified “suspect” or “person.” Medical
Records pp. 42, 56. The State requested $27,966.71 in restitution arising from
Officer Keyes’ injury. Akins argued that the State’s request for restitution was
inappropriate because there was no evidence to support the allegations that he
caused Officer Keyes’ injury and the increasing medical expenses and bills.
Without more, the court ordered Akins to pay restitution in the amount of
$27,966.71 and entered a civil judgment against Akins. This appeal followed.
Discussion and Decision
[9] Akins claims the trial court erred in ordering him to pay $27,966.71 in
restitution to the City of Indianapolis because there is no evidence that he
caused Officer Keyes’ injury. The State “does not oppose remand for a new
restitution hearing” because it agrees that there is no evidence to support the
order. Appellee’s Br. p. 4.
1
The records and bills were not formally offered as exhibits by the State or accepted as evidence by the trial
court. The State did not present any witnesses to authenticate the documents. Neither party alleges error
arising from the failure to formally admit the records and bills as evidence.
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[10] When imposing a sentence for a felony or a misdemeanor, a trial court may, as
a condition of probation or without placing the defendant on probation, order
the defendant to make restitution to the victim of a crime. Ind. Code § 35-50-5-
3(a) (2012). Among other considerations, the trial court may base its restitution
order upon “medical and hospital costs incurred by the victim (before the date
of sentencing) as a result of the crime.” Id.[11] The primary purpose of restitution is to vindicate the rights of society and to
impress upon the defendant the magnitude of the loss the crime has caused.
Gonzalez v. State, 3 N.E.3d 27, 29 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). Restitution also serves
to compensate the defendant’s victim. Id. Under certain circumstances, a state
entity may be considered a victim for purposes of restitution. Id. Among other
circumstances, a state entity may be considered a victim when the entity
becomes a surrogate by assuming the costs of the victim’s medical care,
treatment, and lost wages. Id. at 30.
[12] An order of restitution lies within the trial court’s discretion and will be
reversed only where there has been an abuse of discretion. Hill v. State, 25
N.E.3d 1280, 1282 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). A trial court abuses its discretion
when its decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and
circumstances or when the trial court has misinterpreted the law. Id.[13] In this case, the State correctly concedes that there is no evidence in the record
that Akins caused Officer Keyes’ leg injury. Indeed, there is no evidence that
Officer Keyes’ injury occurred in connection with Akins’ arrest. Akins pleaded
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guilty to battering and injuring Officer Watson, not Officer Keyes. Further, the
State charged Akins with resisting law enforcement as a Class A misdemeanor,
which does not require proof of injury. At the time Akins committed his
crimes, the offense of resisting law enforcement was a Class D felony where a
person was injured in the course of the defendant’s resistance. Ind. Code § 35-
44.1-3-1(b). Finally, the medical records that the State submitted at the
restitution hearing refer to a “person” or “suspect” as causing Officer Keyes’
injury without providing a name. Medical Records pp. 42, 56.
[14] Under these circumstances, the trial court’s restitution award was against the
logic and effects of the facts and circumstances, and we must reverse. See Ind.
Code § 35-50-5-3(a) (stating that medical expenses may be the subject of a
restitution order when they are “a result of the crime”); Smith v. State, 471
N.E.2d 1245, 1248-49 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (reversing award of restitution for
medical expenses where the State failed to present evidence that the victim
incurred the expenses as a result of the defendant’s criminal misconduct), trans.
denied.
[15] We remand for an evidentiary hearing on restitution. See Bennett v. State, 862
N.E.2d 1281, 1286 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (“The amount of actual loss is a factual
matter that can be determined only upon the presentation of evidence”). At the
hearing, the State must prove that Officer Keyes’ injury resulted from Akins’
criminal behavior. Restitution must reflect actual medical costs incurred by the
victim and may not include recovery for duplicated medical charges, such as
those covered by insurance. See Little v. State, 839 N.E.2d 807, 810 (Ind. Ct.
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App. 2005) (reversing in part an award of restitution for medical costs because
some of the costs were covered by insurance, resulting in a double recovery by
the victim). Akins must be given an opportunity to test the State’s evidence and
submit his own.
Conclusion
[16] For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and
remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
[17] Reversed and remanded.
Vaidik, C.J., and Bailey, J., concur.
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