Christopher M. Knight v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2015 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Jul 31 2015, 8:56 am
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
    Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
    precedent or cited before any court except for the
    purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,
    collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Anthony S. Churchward                                     Gregory F. Zoeller
    Deputy Public Defender                                    Attorney General of Indiana
    Fort Wayne, Indiana
    Jesse R. Drum
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Christopher M. Knight,                                    July 31, 2015
    Appellant-Defendant,                                      Court of Appeals Case No.
    02A03-1501-CR-29
    v.                                                Appeal from the Allen Superior
    Court
    State of Indiana,                                         The Honorable Wendy W. Davis,
    Judge
    Appellee-Plaintiff
    Cause No. 02D04-1404-FD-426
    Baker, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A03-1501-CR-29 | July 31, 2015         Page 1 of 5
    [1]   Christopher M. Knight appeals the sentence imposed by the trial court after he
    pleaded guilty to class D felony Domestic Battery.1 Knight argues that the trial
    court abused its discretion by failing to find his guilty plea to be a mitigating
    factor. Finding no error, we affirm.
    Facts
    [2]   Knight and Miranda Jones have one child together. They separated in August
    2013 and had not spoken to one another until the evening of April 14, 2014.
    That evening, Knight was kicked out of a substance abuse rehabilitation center
    because he was intoxicated. Jones picked him up; her two minor children were
    in the backseat of the vehicle. While Jones was driving her vehicle, Knight
    began striking her in the head and face with a closed fist for no apparent reason,
    causing pain, redness, and swelling. Jones called 911. Knight continued
    striking her during the 911 call, so the battery can be heard on the 911 tape.
    Eventually, Jones stopped the car and ordered Knight to get out. He refused
    and she attempted to exit the vehicle. He grabbed her by the hair, pulling her
    back into the car, and yelled at her. He fled, but was later found and arrested
    by law enforcement officers.
    [3]   On April 18, 2014, the State charged Knight with class D felony domestic
    battery. On September 22, 2014, Knight pleaded guilty as charged without a
    1
    
    Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1
    .3(b)(2). The Indiana criminal code has been substantially amended as of July 1,
    2014, but we refer to and apply the version that was in effect at the time Knight committed the offense herein.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A03-1501-CR-29 | July 31, 2015                 Page 2 of 5
    plea agreement. The trial court held a sentencing hearing on November 10,
    2014, and found Knight’s extensive criminal history, the fact that he committed
    new offenses while out on bond for the instant offense, the fact that prior
    rehabilitation has failed, and the facts and circumstances of the instant case as
    aggravating factors. The trial court also stated that “I will note as mitigating
    circumstances his plea of guilty; however, I don’t put a lot of stock in that
    considering it’s all on tape.” Sent. Tr. p. 15. In the end, the trial court found
    that the aggravators outweighed the mitigating circumstance and imposed a
    three-year sentence. Knight now appeals.
    Discussion and Decision
    [4]   Knight’s sole argument on appeal is that the trial court abused its discretion by
    failing to find his guilty plea to be a mitigating circumstance. Sentencing is a
    discretionary function of the trial court, and we afford considerable deference to
    the trial court’s judgment. Eiler v. State, 
    938 N.E.2d 1235
    , 1238 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2010). When sentencing a defendant for a felony, the trial court must enter a
    sentencing statement “including reasonably detailed reasons or circumstances
    for imposing a particular sentence.” Anglemyer v. State, 
    868 N.E.2d 482
    , 490
    (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 
    875 N.E.2d 218
    . We no longer review a trial
    court’s weighing of mitigators and aggravators. 
    Id. at 490-91
    .
    [5]   Initially, we note that during the sentencing hearing, the trial court explicitly
    stated that it did find the guilty plea to be a mitigating circumstance. Sent. Tr.
    p. 15. It merely found that the aggravators outweighed it. As noted above, we
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A03-1501-CR-29 | July 31, 2015   Page 3 of 5
    no longer review the way in which a trial court weighs aggravators and
    mitigators, so this argument is unavailing.
    [6]   We acknowledge, however, that the written sentencing order states that there
    were no mitigators. Appellant’s App. p. 38. Solely for argument’s sake, we will
    address Knight’s argument that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to
    consider the guilty plea as a mitigator. It is well established that the significance
    of a guilty plea is dramatically reduced if substantial admissible evidence exists
    against the defendant. Primmer v. State, 
    857 N.E.2d 11
    , 16 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).
    In this case, Knight can be heard hitting Jones during the 911 call, and his
    battery caused visible injuries to Jones. Given the substantial evidence of his
    guilt, Knight’s decision to plead guilty was pragmatic. See Wells v. State, 
    836 N.E.2d 475
    , 479-80 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). Consequently, we cannot say that the
    trial court abused its discretion in failing to find Knight’s plea as a mitigator.
    [7]   Even if we were to find that the trial court should have found the guilty plea to
    be a mitigator, we would affirm. If we conclude that the trial court has abused
    its discretion—by, for example, neglecting to find a mitigator—we will remand
    for resentencing only “if we cannot say with confidence that the trial court
    would have imposed the same sentence had it properly considered reasons that
    enjoy support in the record.” Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491. Here, Knight’s
    criminal history included three juvenile adjudications, twenty-six misdemeanor
    convictions, five felony convictions, three suspended sentence modifications,
    and five suspended sentence revocations. He was charged with two offenses
    while on bond for the instant case—public intoxication and invasion of privacy.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A03-1501-CR-29 | July 31, 2015   Page 4 of 5
    He failed to appear at his first scheduled sentencing hearing in this case. As for
    the facts and circumstances of the offense, Knight’s estranged girlfriend agreed
    to pick him up because he was too intoxicated to attend substance abuse
    treatment. He began hitting her repeatedly, while she was driving, for no
    reason, causing her to sustain visible injuries. All of this occurred with two
    minor children, one of whom was his child, in the backseat of the car. We are
    confident that even if the trial court had found the guilty plea to be a mitigator,
    the aggravators would have easily outweighed it, and the same sentence would
    have been imposed. In any event, therefore, we affirm.
    [8]   The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
    Bailey, J., and Mathias, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A03-1501-CR-29 | July 31, 2015   Page 5 of 5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 02A03-1501-CR-29

Filed Date: 7/31/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021