John W. Thomas v. State of Indiana , 61 N.E.3d 1198 ( 2016 )

FILED
Sep 28 2016, 7:17 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Cara Schaefer Wieneke Gregory F. Zoeller
Wieneke Law Office, LLC Attorney General of Indiana
Brooklyn, Indiana James B. Martin
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
John W. Thomas, September 28, 2016
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
84A01-1602-CR-235
v. Appeal from the
Vigo Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable
Appellee-Plaintiff. David R. Bolk, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
84D03-1501-F1-204
Kirsch, Judge.
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[1] Following a jury trial, John W. Thomas (“Thomas”) was convicted of
attempted murder,1 a Level 1 felony, attempted aggravated battery2 as a Level 3
felony, attempted battery with a deadly weapon3 as a Level 5 felony, and
criminal recklessness4 as a Level 6 felony. He appeals his conviction for
attempted murder and raises the following restated issue: whether the trial
court committed fundamental error when it instructed the jury that voluntary
intoxication is not a defense to attempted murder.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] The facts most favorable to the verdict are that, on the evening of January 17,
2015, Damita Jaffe (“Jaffe”) and her boyfriend Craig Robinson (“Robinson”)
were getting into Jaffe’s vehicle when Thomas, whom Jaffe and Robinson
knew, and his wife (“Annette”) pulled up and parked. Thomas got out of his
vehicle and approached Robinson, who also got out of his car, and the two
exchanged words. Thomas’s demeanor was aggressive, and Robinson smelled
alcohol on Thomas’s breath. Thomas asked, “[Y]ou think I’m playin’?” and
then popped the trunk of his car to show Robinson that he had a shotgun in
1
See Ind. Code §§ 35-42-1-1(1), 35-41-5-1.
2
See Ind. Code §§ 35-42-2-1.5, 35-41-5-1.
3
See Ind. Code §§ 35-42-2-1(g), 35-41-5-1.
4
See Ind. Code § 35-42-2-2(b)(1).
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there. Tr. at 57. Jaffe’s adult son, Bobby Vinson (“Vinson”), walked up to the
scene, Thomas’s attention turned to Vinson, and they argued. Thomas
retrieved the shotgun and pointed it at Vinson for two to three minutes.
Thomas put the gun back in the trunk, but thereafter, Thomas swung at Vinson,
and the two fought. Jaffe attempted to defuse the situation, grabbing Thomas’s
arm. She smelled alcohol on his breath. Eventually, Thomas and Annette
drove away.
[4] A short time later, while Jaffe, Robinson, and Vinson were still outside, they
heard gunshots. Thomas was fifty to seventy feet away, walking toward Jaffe’s
house while shooting a shotgun.5 Jaffe was hit in the face and fell to the
ground, near her vehicle. Jaffe heard more shots as she was on the ground.
Robinson and Bobby ran and were not harmed. Jaffe’s daughter, Anna Vinson
(“Anna”), lived at Jaffe’s house along with her two daughters, and at some
point she had stepped out on the front porch and was grazed by pellets from
Thomas’s shotgun. Jaffe was lying injured on the ground near a car, and when
she heard Thomas’s footsteps running away, she drove to a nearby police
station.
[5] Police later found Thomas and Annette at their home. They searched the car
and found two empty vodka bottles. Police observed no injuries to Thomas
when he was arrested later that night. The State initially charged Thomas with
5
Thomas was using a 12-gauge shotgun loaded with birdshot, as opposed to buckshot or a single slug. Tr. at
500; State’s Ex. 18.
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four counts of Level 1 felony attempted murder and one count of Level 5 felony
robbery, but it later amended the charging information by removing a
“knowing” mens rea from Counts 1 through 4 and removing the robbery
charge. A four-day jury trial was held in December 2015.
[6] Annette, who at the time of trial was facing criminal charges of robbery and
criminal recklessness related to the January 17, 2015 incident and had been
granted use immunity, testified that, on the night in question, Vinson had
pointed a pistol at Thomas and had hit Thomas in the face with it. Annette
said that Vinson hit her, as well. She and Thomas got back in their car, and
that, as they drove away from the scene, she heard two “loud noises” that she
believed were gunshots. Tr. at 310, 312. She believed that “they was following
us shootin’ at us[.]” Id. at 312. She said that Thomas’s face was bloody from
being hit by Vinson, describing it as “all messed up” and that he “had blood
everywhere.” Id. at 310. They stopped to wipe his face, and Thomas got out
and popped the trunk and left. She did not see where he went, but heard two
“big booms,” and when she looked out, she saw Thomas running back to the
car. Id. at 317-18. Thomas got in the driver’s seat and said, “[T]he f*ck is
shootin’ at us[.]” Id. at 323. Thomas and Annette sped away while “tryin’ to
ditch them,” but eventually the car’s “back tire blew,” the vehicle left the
roadway, and, after a short ride with a person who offered assistance, they
walked home. Id. at 325. Annette testified that Thomas was intoxicated that
night. Id. at 330.
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[7] The trial court instructed the jury regarding the elements of attempted murder,
as well as the following lesser-included offenses: Level 3 felony attempted
aggravated battery; Level 5 felony attempted battery with a deadly weapon;
Level 5 felony attempted battery resulting in serious bodily injury; and Level 6
felony criminal recklessness. Appellant’s App. at 145-165. The trial court
instructed the jury on the mens rea requirements for acting intentionally,
knowingly, and recklessly. Id. at 168-170, 173. As Thomas was pursuing a
claim of self-defense, the trial court instructed the jury on the elements of a self-
defense claim. Id. at 166.
[8] The trial court also read Final Instruction No. 28 regarding voluntary
intoxication. It stated:
Voluntary intoxication is not a defense to a charge of Attempted
Murder. You may not take voluntary intoxication into
consideration in determining whether the Defendant acted with
the intent to kill as alleged in the Information.
Voluntary intoxication is not a defense to the lesser-included
offenses of Attempted Aggravated Battery, a Level 3 Felony;
Attempted Battery With a Deadly Weapon, a Level 5 Felony;
Attempted Battery Causing Serious Bodily Injury, a Level 5
Felony; and Criminal Recklessness, a Level 6 Felony. You may
not take voluntary intoxication into consideration in determining
whether the Defendant acted recklessly, knowingly, or
intentionally as alleged in the lesser included offenses of those
included in the Information.
Id. at 167.
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[9] The jury found Thomas guilty of: (1) Level 1 felony attempted murder with
respect to Vinson; (2) Level 3 felony attempted aggravated battery with respect
to Jaffe; (3) Level 5 felony attempted battery with a deadly weapon with respect
to Anna; and (4) Level 6 felony criminal recklessness with respect to Robinson.
Id. at 185-205. The trial court imposed an aggregate term of thirty-five years
executed. Thomas now appeals his attempted murder conviction.
Discussion and Decision
[10] Thomas asserts that he was “too intoxicated” to form a specific intent to kill
Vinson and that the trial court committed fundamental error “when it
instructed the jury that it could not consider Thomas’s intoxicated state when
determining whether Thomas possessed the intent to kill Bobby Vinson.”
Appellant’s Br. at 7, 10.
[11] We afford trial courts broad discretion in the manner of instructing the jury,
and we review such decisions only for an abuse of that discretion. Minor v.
State, 36 N.E.3d 1065, 1072 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. This Court will
reverse a trial court’s decision to give a particular instruction only if the giving
of the instruction constituted an abuse of discretion. Id. In reviewing a
preserved challenge to a jury instruction, the reviewing court considers: (1)
whether the instruction is a correct statement of the law; (2) whether there was
evidence in the record to support giving the instruction; and (3) whether the
substance of the instruction is covered by other instructions given by the court.
Hubbard v. State, 742 N.E.2d 919, 921 (Ind. 2001). An improper instruction will
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merit reversal only if it “‘so affects the entire charge that the jury was misled as
to the law in the case.’” Id. (quoting White v. State, 547 N.E.2d 831, 835 (Ind.
1989)).
[12] Here, trial court gave Final Instruction No. 28, which in relevant part stated:
Voluntary intoxication is not a defense to a charge of Attempted
Murder. You may not take voluntary intoxication into
consideration in determining whether the Defendant acted with
the intent to kill as alleged in the Information.
To preserve an instructional error for appeal, “the defendant must object to the
proposed instruction, and such objection must be ‘sufficiently clear and specific
to inform the trial court of the claimed error and to prevent inadvertent error.’”
Minor, 36 N.E.3d at 1072 (quoting Fry v. State, 748 N.E.2d 369, 373 (Ind.
2001)). At trial, Thomas did not object to Final Instruction No. 28 and, thus,
has waived the issue for appeal. He correctly recognizes that he must establish
fundamental error to succeed on appeal. Fundamental error is defined as an
error so prejudicial to the rights of a defendant that a fair trial is rendered
impossible. Perez v. State, 872 N.E.2d 208, 210 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans.
denied. To be considered fundamental, an error “‘must constitute a blatant
violation of basic principles, the harm, or potential for harm must be
substantial, and the resulting error must deny the defendant fundamental due
process.’” Id. at 210-11 (quoting Spears v. State, 811 N.E.2d 485, 488 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2004)).
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[13] As Thomas reviews for us on appeal, the defense of voluntary intoxication in
Indiana enjoys a long and varied history, ranging from not being recognized as
a defense in early common law, to being permitted “to the extent that it
negate[d] specific intent,” which was eventually codified as Indiana Code
section 35-41-3-5(b), which was thereafter determined to be unconstitutional in
Terry v. State, 465 N.E.2d 1085, 1088 (Ind. 1984). See Appellant’s Brief at 13-19.
In 1996, the United States Supreme Court held that a state could prohibit a
criminal defendant from offering evidence of voluntary intoxication to negate
the requisite mens rea without violating the Due Process Clause of the United
States Constitution. Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 56 (1996) (“The people of
Montana have decided to resurrect the rule of an earlier era, disallowing
consideration of voluntary intoxication when a defendant’s state of mind is at
issue. Nothing in the Due Process Clause prevents them from doing so, and the
judgment of the Supreme Court of Montana to the contrary must be
reversed.”). Thereafter, in 1997, Indiana’s legislature enacted Indiana Code
section 35-41-2-5 (“the voluntary intoxication statute”), which provides:
Intoxication is not a defense in a prosecution for an offense and
may not be taken into consideration in determining the existence
of a mental state that is an element of the offense unless the
defendant meets the requirements of IC 35-41-3-5.
Indiana Code section 35-41-3-5, to which the voluntary intoxication statute
refers, states:
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It is a defense that the person who engaged in the prohibited
conduct did so while he was intoxicated, only if the intoxication
resulted from the introduction of a substance into his body:
(1) without his consent; or
(2) when he did not know that the substance might cause
intoxication.
[14] In Sanchez v. State, 749 N.E.2d 509, 519-21 (Ind. 2001), a defendant challenged
the voluntary intoxication statute and argued that it was error to give the
voluntary intoxication instruction because it violated his right to present a
defense under the Indiana Constitution.6 As the State observes, in Sanchez, our
Supreme Court “undertook a comprehensive review of the [voluntary
intoxication] statute” and concluded that it comported with the Indiana
Constitution and did not violate a defendant’s right to present a defense.
Appellee’s Br. at 20. The Sanchez Court found that the voluntary intoxication
statute does not negate the mens rea requirement, explaining:
[W]e agree that a defendant has a right to present relevant
evidence to negate an element of any charged offense. But we
disagree . . . that the voluntary intoxication statute denies this
right. The statute redefines the requirement of mens rea to
include voluntary intoxication, in addition to the traditional
mental states, i.e., intentionally, knowingly, and recklessly.
6
The voluntary intoxication instruction in Sanchez v. State, 749 N.E.2d 509 (Ind. 2001), stated, “Voluntary
intoxication is not a defense to the charge of Rape and Confinement. You may not take voluntary
intoxication into consideration in determining whether the Defendant acted knowingly or intentionally, as
alleged in the information.” Id. at 511.
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Thus, evidence of voluntary intoxication7 does not negate the
mens rea requirement. . . . Rather, it satisfies this element of the
crime.
Sanchez, 749 N.E.2d at 520. Sanchez argued that the voluntary intoxication
instruction bound the jury “to find intent where it may not have been proved, or
to disregard evidence that negates intent,” but the Court was not persuaded:
We do not find Sanchez’s claim persuasive. The voluntary
intoxication instruction does not unconstitutionally compel the
jury to make a finding of intent. In effect, it provides that the
crime is committed if it is done with the requisite mens rea or as
a result of voluntary intoxication.
Id. at 521. The Sanchez Court observed that the voluntarily intoxicated offender
is “at risk for the consequences of his actions, even if it is claimed that the
capacity has been obliterated to achieve the otherwise requisite mental state for
a specific crime.” Id. at 520.
[15] Thomas argues on appeal that, although a defendant’s voluntary act of
becoming intoxicated satisfies the general intent to commit an offense, Indiana
law treats attempted murder differently than other intent crimes, as it requires
proof of specific intent to kill. Thomas relies on this “special treatment” given
7
The Sanchez Court clarified that the voluntary intoxication statute “does not ‘exclude relevant evidence,’”
and thus “does not necessarily proscribe evidence of the defendant’s use of alcohol or drugs. . . . [T]his
evidence may be admissible as general background, or as relevant to something other than lack of mens rea,
e.g., identity.” 794 N.E. at 519-20.
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to attempted murder,8 arguing that “this uniqueness affects the constitutionality
of Indiana Code section 35-41-2-5, the voluntary intoxication statute, as applied
to attempted murder.”9 Appellant’s Br. at 8. His position is that “[w]hile our
Legislature has defined voluntary intoxication as one means of establishing the
general intent element of a criminal offense, it has not defined voluntary
intoxication as a means of establishing specific intent for crimes such as
attempted murder.” Id. at 18 (emphasis added). He contends, then, that the
trial court’s Final Instruction No. 28, which prohibited the jury from
considering evidence of intoxication when determining whether Thomas
possessed an intent to kill Vinson, deprived him of a fair trial and constituted
fundamental error such that his conviction for attempted murder should be
reversed.10
[16] The State responds that Final Instruction No. 28 was a correct statement of the
law, and it was not error, let alone fundamental error, to give it. We agree.
8
“Attempted murder is a special case, deserving special treatment.” Richeson v. State, 704 N.E.2d 1008, 1010
(Ind. 1998) (addressing special treatment of attempted murder in context of jury instructions).
9
We note that Thomas does not contend that there was not enough evidence of intoxication for the trial
court to give the instruction. Indeed, he argues that he was “too intoxicated” to form the requisite intent to
kill Vinson. Appellant’s Br. at 10; see also Reply Br. at 4 (“Clearly Thomas [] established that he was
intoxicated; otherwise, the trial court would not have found it necessary to instruct the jury that it could not
consider the evidence for any reason.”)
10
We note that Thomas’s argument throughout his brief is that the voluntary intoxication instruction denied
him of a fair trial, but he includes the general statement that he was “precluded from presenting evidence” of
his intoxication “that could have negated one of the essential elements of the offense of attempted murder[,]”
and this violated his constitutional right to present a defense and made a fair trial impossible. Appellant’s Br.
at 19. He does not further explain what evidence he was precluded from presenting or when that occurred
during trial. Thus, Thomas has waived any claim that he was erroneously precluded from presenting
evidence for failure to present cogent argument or support. Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8).
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The voluntary intoxication statute expressly states that voluntary intoxication
“is not a defense to a prosecution for an offense.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-5(emphasis added). Thomas is effectively asking us to carve out an exception for
attempted murder, i.e., voluntary intoxication is not a defense to a prosecution
for an offense, except for the offense of attempted murder. Thomas cites to no
case law in support of his position. Like Thomas, we found no case that
directly speaks to the precise question of whether the voluntary intoxication
statute applies to the offense of attempted murder. However, at least a couple
of cases, involving an appeal from an attempted murder conviction, have
touched on the fact that voluntary intoxication is not a defense.
[17] In Berry v. State, 969 N.E.2d 35 (Ind. 2012), our Supreme Court – while
addressing a related issue concerning whether Berry, who was convicted of
attempted murder, had successfully raised an insanity defense at trial –
acknowledged that voluntary intoxication is not a recognized defense. At
Berry’s bench trial for attempted murder for striking another person in the head
with a claw hammer, evidence was presented that Berry began abusing alcohol
at age nine and became a daily drinker during high school. Id. at 36. He also
used marijuana, cocaine, methamphetamine, LSD, mushrooms and ecstasy,
and although at some point he stopped using drugs, he continued drinking
alcohol. Id. He had been hospitalized multiple times for symptoms related to
drug and alcohol abuse and bipolar disorder. Id. Berry pursued an insanity
defense, but the trial court rejected it, finding, among other things,
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Given the Defendant’s longstanding and chronic alcoholism
coupled with heavy drinking on the weekend preceding the
assault on [the morning of the incident], the Court concludes that
these symptoms were brought on by the Defendant’s voluntary abuse of
alcohol, rather than the result of Bipolar Disorder or other mental
disease or defect.
Id. at 39 (emphasis added). The court of appeals reversed, finding that the trial
court erroneously rejected Berry’s insanity defense because Berry’s case fit
within the doctrine of “settled insanity.”11 Id. at 37.
[18] On transfer, our Supreme Court addressed the “murky” “intersection of
voluntary intoxication and insanity,” and held that “[u]ltimately, it is for the
trier of fact to determine whether the accused’s conduct was the result of a
diseased mind—regardless of the source of the disease—or was the result of
voluntary intoxication.” Id. at 43. The Berry Court concluded that, given the
highly deferential standard of review and the evidence presented, it was within
the trial court’s discretion to find that Berry’s behavior was caused by the
voluntary abuse of alcohol and not a mental disease or defect as defined in
Indiana’s insanity statute. Id. at 44. In its analysis, the Court recognized – on
two occasions – that temporary mental incapacity produced by voluntary
intoxication “‘is no legal excuse for, or defense to, a crime.’” Id. at 38 (quoting
Jackson v State, 273 Ind. 49, 52, 402 N.E.2d 947, 949 (1980)), and at 42. It
11
Indiana recognizes situations “where the ingestion of intoxicants, though voluntary, has been abused to the
point that it produced mental disease,” which is referred to as “settled” or “fixed” insanity. Berry v. State, 969
N.E.2d 35, 42 (Ind. 2012).
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further expressly noted the codification of this principle in Indiana Code section
35-41-2-5, the voluntary intoxication statute, stating that intoxication is not a
defense in a prosecution for an offense and may not be taken into consideration
if determining the existence of a mental state that is an element of the offense,
unless the defendant meets the requirements of involuntary intoxication. Id. at
38 n.1. Even though Berry addressed the insanity defense and whether the
defendant had successfully proven it, and thus it is not squarely on point with
the present case, we nevertheless find the Berry Court’s acknowledgement of the
voluntary intoxication statute to be relevant and insightful as to its view of the
voluntary intoxication statute and, particularly, that statute’s application to
attempted murder.12
[19] Given that the Indiana legislature has not expressly identified attempted murder
as an exception to the law negating voluntary intoxication as a defense, and our
Supreme Court has not expressed an indication that any such exception exists,
we decline Thomas’s invitation to create one. Final Instruction No. 28 was a
12
A colleague on this court also has recognized, in an appeal from an attempted murder conviction, that
voluntary intoxication is not a defense. In Collier v. State, 846 N.E.2d 340 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied, a
majority of this court reversed a defendant’s attempted murder conviction because, after taking box cutters,
an ice pick and binoculars, and parking his vehicle at his estranged wife’s place of employment to wait for her
to exit, he fell asleep. The Collier court determined that his conduct did not constitute a substantial step
toward the commission of the crime of murder, but was instead mere preparation. Id. at 342, 350-51. Judge
Barnes dissented, finding that the evidence presented was sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to find that
Collier had taken a substantial step toward the commission of murder and that to conclude otherwise
infringed on the prosecutor’s charging discretion and the jury’s exclusive province to weigh the evidence. Id.
at 354. In his dissent, Judge Barnes opined that the fact that Collier was “passed out asleep” when police
arrived should not disqualify his criminal intent, noting, “Collier does not claim he was involuntarily
intoxicated, and voluntary intoxication is no longer a defense in Indiana to a criminal charge.” Id. at 353 n.2
(emphasis added).
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correct statement of the law, and Thomas has not established that the trial court
committed fundamental error when it instructed the jury.13
[20] Affirmed.
[21] May, J., and Crone, J., concur.
13
The State alternatively argues that “[e]ven if voluntary intoxication was a permitted defense in Indiana, . . .
there was no evidence to support that [Thomas] was so intoxicated that he could not form the requisite
intent[,]” as there was no evidence regarding the time and amount of consumption nor what types of
alcoholic beverages were consumed. Appellant’s Br. at 21, 23. Because we find that under current Indiana
law voluntary intoxication is not a defense to “an offense,” including attempted murder, we do not reach this
argument.
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