James Matt Hayes v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2015 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
Aug 28 2015, 9:26 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Mark Small Gregory F. Zoeller
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Jodi Kathryn Stein
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
James Matt Hayes, August 28, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
28A01-1412-CR-554
v. Appeal from the Greene Circuit
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Erik Allen, Judge
Appellee-Plaintiff Trial Court Cause No.
28C01-1404-FB-14
Baker, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 28A01-1412-CR-554 | August 28, 2015 Page 1 of 10
[1] James Hayes appeals his convictions for Class B Felony Dealing in
Methamphetamine,1 Class D Felony Possession of Methamphetamine,2 and
Class B Felony Conspiracy to Commit Dealing in Methamphetamine,3 arguing
that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence obtained after
law enforcement officers searched a mobile home and Hayes’s person. Finding
that Hayes lacked a sufficient privacy interest in the mobile home and that the
officers’ conduct did not violate the United States or the Indiana Constitutions,
we affirm.
Facts
[2] On April 15, 2014, after a night of smoking methamphetamine, Cory Slaven,
Sierra Sipes, and Defendant James Hayes gathered at a mobile home in Greene
County. They brought with them the accoutrements of methamphetamine
production, including Mucinex D, Coleman camp fuel, and iodized salt. Hayes
planned to make a fresh batch to smoke.
[3] The mobile home belonged to Craig Blake, who lived there with a friend.
Hayes did not live there. Blake was briefly present on April 15, but then left.
1
Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1.1.
2
I.C. § 35-48-4-6.1.
3
I.C. § 35-48-4-1.1; Ind. Code § 35-41-5-2.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 28A01-1412-CR-554 | August 28, 2015 Page 2 of 10
At the bottom left corner at the end of the mobile home, there was a small “no
trespassing” sign.4
[4] At some point in the evening, Slaven and Sipes had a heated argument, and
Slaven left. Around 7:30 p.m., he called in an anonymous tip to the Greene
County Sheriff’s Department, telling the dispatcher that there was a
methamphetamine lab at Blake’s mobile home. Lieutenant Marvin Holt and
Deputy Jordan Allor proceeded to the property in a marked police car, but did
not use the lights or sirens. They parked out front and followed a gravel path
that led to the main entrance of the home. They used flashlights to illuminate
their way.
[5] The officers came up to a sliding glass door, knocked on it, and asked for Blake.
From the doorway, they could see Sipes and Hayes sitting in the dark on a
couch. Lieutenant Holt immediately recognized Hayes from an outstanding
arrest warrant issued two days prior. He ordered Hayes to exit the home.
Hayes eventually complied, after secreting away a two-liter bottle underneath a
jacket.
[6] Hayes was placed in handcuffs and patted down. Lieutenant Holt discovered a
wet paper towel wrapped in cellophane giving off a strong chemical odor.
Hayes confirmed that it was methamphetamine. The officers then applied for,
4
The sign appears in photographs taken several months after April 15, 2014, and Hayes testified that Blake
put it there around a year earlier. The State argues that it might have been placed there after April 15. For the
purposes of this decision, we will assume the sign was posted before April 15.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 28A01-1412-CR-554 | August 28, 2015 Page 3 of 10
and were granted, a warrant to search the mobile home. During the execution
of that warrant, officers found the two-liter bottle, which held active
methamphetamine solution, along with other methamphetamine
manufacturing paraphernalia.
[7] On April 23, 2014, the State charged Hayes with class B felony dealing in
methamphetamine, class D felony possession of methamphetamine, and
alleged that he was an habitual substance offender. On August 22, 2014, the
State added a charge of class B felony conspiracy to commit dealing in
methamphetamine. Prior to trial, Hayes filed a motion to suppress, arguing
that the officers’ conduct violated his rights under the United States and Indiana
Constitutions. The trial court denied his motion. Hayes renewed his argument
by objecting at trial to the evidence obtained at the mobile home, and the trial
court again ruled against him. Following the November 2014 trial, the jury
found Hayes guilty as charged, and the trial court sentenced him to an
aggregate sentence of thirty-two years imprisonment. Hayes now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
I. Standard of Review
[8] We review a trial court’s decision regarding the admission of evidence for an
abuse of discretion. Smith v. State, 889 N.E.2d 836, 839 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
An abuse of discretion occurs when the decision is clearly against the logic and
effect of the facts before the trial court. Figures v. State, 920 N.E.2d 267, 271
(Ind. Ct. App. 2010). While we do not reweigh evidence and we construe
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 28A01-1412-CR-554 | August 28, 2015 Page 4 of 10
evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, we will consider
uncontroverted evidence in the defendant’s favor. Cole, 878 N.E.2d at 885. We
conduct a de novo review of a trial court’s ruling on the constitutionality of a
search or seizure. Belvedere v. State, 889 N.E.2d 286, 287 (Ind. 2008).
II. Fourth Amendment
[9] First, Hayes argues that when the officers walked onto the property and looked
through the sliding glass door, his rights under the Fourth Amendment were
violated.5 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects
“[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .” While it is meant to
protect personal privacy and dignity against unlawful intrusion by the State, its
“proper function is to constrain, not against all intrusions as such, but against
intrusions which are not justified in the circumstances, or which are made in an
improper manner.” Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 768 (1966).
[10] The United States Supreme Court does not frame its analysis as one of
“standing” when analyzing Fourth Amendment rights but instead requires a
defendant to “demonstrate that he personally has an expectation of privacy in
the place searched, and that his expectation is reasonable.” Minnesota v. Carter,
5
Hayes only challenges the officers’ initial approach and their looking through the sliding glass door as
unlawful. He claims the search of his person incident to arrest and the subsequent search of the mobile home
pursuant to the search warrant were fruit of the poisonous tree, but does not claim they were unlawful in and
of themselves.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 28A01-1412-CR-554 | August 28, 2015 Page 5 of 10
525 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1998). Under this analysis, defendants who stopped by an
apartment for a matter of hours with the purpose of bagging cocaine did not
have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the apartment. Id. at 91. In
contrast, a defendant’s “status as an overnight guest is alone enough to show
that he had an expectation of privacy in the home that society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable.” Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990).
[11] Hayes never directly argues that he had an expectation of privacy in Blake’s
mobile home or that his expectation was reasonable. His argument centers on
the contention that “[t]he tip was uncorroborated at the time the officers made
illegal entry on the land, past the signs, and looked into the back of the trailer.”
Appellant’s Br. 12. But it has long been the case that “the Fourth Amendment
protects people, not places.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Hayes
cannot successfully argue a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights absent
showing an intrusion into his personal privacy.
[12] Even if Hayes had made that argument, he would not have succeeded. He
testified at trial that he did not live at the mobile home and he was staying
somewhere else. He has maintained throughout that he was merely a visitor.
Thus, he more closely resembles the defendants in Carter—who were present at
a location solely for a drug transaction—than the defendant in Olson, who was
present at a location as an overnight guest. In his brief, Hayes never claims he
spent even a single night at Blake’s mobile home.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 28A01-1412-CR-554 | August 28, 2015 Page 6 of 10
[13] But even if Hayes did have a reasonable expectation of privacy in Blake’s
mobile home, his Fourth Amendment rights still were not violated because the
officers did not conduct a “search.” Our Supreme Court has explicitly
acknowledged the legitimacy of “knock and talk” procedures, holding that there
is no unreasonable search where police enter areas of the curtilage impliedly
open to use by the public to conduct legitimate business. Hardister v. State, 849
N.E.2d 563, 570 (Ind. 2006). This allows the police to “use normal routes of
ingress and egress from a residence to make appropriate inquiries of the
occupants.” Id. The Court further explained that “[a]n anonymous tip is not a
basis for either reasonable suspicion or probable cause, but it is sufficient to
make inquiries which the occupants are free to decline to answer if they so
choose.” Id. “The route which any visitor to a residence would use is not
private in the Fourth Amendment sense, and thus if police take that route for
the purpose of making a general inquiry or for some other legitimate reason,
they are free to keep their eyes open . . . .” Trimble v. State, 842 N.E.2d 798, 802
(Ind. 2006).
[14] That is precisely what happened here. Although Slaven’s anonymous tip did
not create either a reasonable suspicion or probable cause, the police were still
permitted to make legitimate inquiries of the mobile home owner. Upon
arriving, they used the normal route of ingress and egress by walking up the
gravel walkway. Once the officer looked through the glass door and saw
Hayes, the officer had probable cause to order Hayes outside to make the arrest.
Thus, Hayes’s “fruit of the poisonous tree” argument fails, because there is no
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 28A01-1412-CR-554 | August 28, 2015 Page 7 of 10
poisonous tree. In sum, we find that the admission of this evidence did not
violate Hayes’s Fourth Amendment Rights.
III. Indiana Constitution
[15] Hayes next contends that when the officers walked onto the property and
looked through the sliding glass door, his rights under Article 1, Section 11 of
the Indiana Constitution were violated. Although this provision directly tracks
the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, the analysis under
Article 1, Section 11 “turns on an evaluation of the reasonableness of the
officers’ conduct under the totality of the circumstances.” Tate v. State, 835
N.E.2d 499, 507 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). The reasonableness of an officer’s
conduct depends on a “balance of: 1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or
knowledge that a violation has occurred, 2) the degree of intrusion the method
of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen’s ordinary activities, and 3) the
extent of law enforcement needs.” Lichtfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 361 (Ind.
2005).
[16] When analyzing claims under the Indiana Constitution, Indiana courts have
retained a standing requirement, according to which “a defendant must
establish ownership, control, possession, or interest in either the premises
searched or the property seized.” Peterson v. State, 674 N.E.2d 528, 534 (Ind.
1996). The protection afforded by our Constitution extends to “claimed
possessions irrespective of a defendant’s interest in the place where the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 28A01-1412-CR-554 | August 28, 2015 Page 8 of 10
possession was found.” Campos v. State, 885 N.E.2d 590, 598 (Ind. Ct. App.
2008).
[17] Hayes’s rights under our Constitution were not violated because he lacks
standing to challenge the officers’ conduct here. Hayes has not argued, much
less established, ownership, control, possession, or an interest in the mobile
home. He repeatedly referred to it as Blake’s and stressed that he was a visitor.
Nor does he claim a possessory interest in the methamphetamine paraphernalia
seized on the property.
[18] Even if Hayes had established standing, the “knock and talk” procedure used
did not violate the Indiana Constitution. Although an anonymous tip creates a
very low degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge of unlawful activity, the
degree of intrusion was also very low. A simple knock on the front door to
make inquiries is possibly the least intrusive method the officers could have
chosen to investigate the tip. Furthermore, the degree of intrusion was not
increased by the posting of the “no trespassing” sign. As we have said before,
“it is illogical to think that law enforcement should be thwarted from ever
approaching a house without a warrant to conduct an investigation, even along
paths that any regular visitor would take, simply by the posting of a ‘no
trespassing’ sign.” Baxter v. State, 891 N.E.2d 110, 119 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
Finally, law enforcement has a great need to make basic inquiries into the
possible existence of a methamphetamine lab; not only is methamphetamine a
dangerous substance to use, its manufacture involves a high risk of explosion.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 28A01-1412-CR-554 | August 28, 2015 Page 9 of 10
In this case, the second and third factors outweigh the first; the officers did not
act unreasonably.
[19] Here, the officers, acting on an anonymous tip, did not violate Hayes’s rights
under the United States or the Indiana Constitutions by walking up the gravel
pathway to the main entrance of the mobile home, nor by looking in the sliding
glass door. Therefore, the trial court did not err in admitting the evidence
obtained following those actions.
[20] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Riley, J., and Brown, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 28A01-1412-CR-554 | August 28, 2015 Page 10 of 10