Antonio D. Walker v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2015 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Mar 30 2015, 9:11 am
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
precedent or cited before any court except for the
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Jeffrey D. Stonebraker Gregory F. Zoeller
Clark County Chief Public Defender Attorney General of Indiana
Jeffersonville, Indiana
Jesse R. Drum
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Antonio D. Walker, March 30, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
10A01-1407-CR-295
v. Appeal from the Clark Circuit Court
The Honorable Vicki L. Carmichael,
Judge
State of Indiana, Cause No. 10C04-1211-MR-1
Appellee-Plaintiff
Bradford, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] On November 13, 2012, Appellant-Defendant Antonio D. Walker shot Paris
Hamilton five times in the torso. Hamilton died as a result of the gunshot
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A01-1407-CR-295 | March 30, 2015 Page 1 of 9
wounds inflicted by Walker. Appellee-Plaintiff the State of Indiana (the
“State”) subsequently charged Walker with murder. Walker was found guilty
of the murder of Hamilton following a jury trial. On appeal, Walker contends
that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting certain evidence at trial.
We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Walker went to Ashley Riley’s apartment in Jeffersonville to pick up his friend
Amel Scott at approximately 8:00 a.m. on November 13, 2012. Scott was
arguing with Hamilton, who had come to the apartment to pick up Michelle
Ragland. After Hamilton removed his jacket and watch, Walker said, “I don’t
fight with my hands, I fight with this.” Tr. p. 235. Walker then pulled a
handgun from his jacket and pointed the handgun at Hamilton. Walker
lowered the handgun and began to put it away before pulling it out again and
pointing it at Hamilton for a second time.
[3] Moments later, while Walker and Scott were standing in the doorway to Riley’s
apartment, Walker turned, pointed the handgun at Hamilton, and shot
Hamilton five times in the torso. Hamilton died as a result of the gunshot
wounds inflicted upon him by Walker.
[4] After Walker shot Hamilton, Walker and Scott fled the apartment. Walker and
Scott then ran in two different directions. Jeffersonville Police Department
Officer Mark Doherty subsequently located Walker, walking quickly,
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A01-1407-CR-295 | March 30, 2015 Page 2 of 9
approximately one-half mile away from Riley’s apartment. Officer Doherty
apprehended Walker and transported him to the Jeffersonville Police Station.
[5] While at the Jeffersonville Police Station, Detective Isaac Parker informed
Walker of his Miranda1 rights. Walker agreed to waive his Miranda rights and
talk to Detective Parker. Walker initially denied ever owning or possessing a
handgun. Walker, however, eventually confessed to possessing a handgun,
pulling the handgun from his jacket pocket, and shooting Hamilton five times.
[6] On November 15, 2012, the State charged Walker with murder. Walker was tried
before a jury in a trial that commenced on April 14, 2014. On April 16, 2014, the
jury found Walker guilty. The trial court subsequently sentenced Walker to a term
of fifty-five years, with fifty years executed and five years suspended to probation.
This appeal follows.
Discussion and Decision
[7] In challenging his conviction on appeal, Walker contends that the trial court
abused its discretion in admitting certain evidence at trial. The admission or
exclusion of evidence is entrusted to the discretion of the trial court. Collins v.
State, 966 N.E.2d 96, 104 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (citing Farris v. State, 818 N.E.2d
63, 67 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
1
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A01-1407-CR-295 | March 30, 2015 Page 3 of 9
We will reverse a trial court’s decision only for an abuse of discretion.
[Farris, 818 N.E.2d at 67]. We will consider the conflicting evidence
most favorable to the trial court’s ruling and any uncontested evidence
favorable to the defendant. Taylor v. State, 891 N.E.2d 155, 158 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2008). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s
decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and
circumstances before the court or it misinterprets the law. Id. In
determining whether an error in the introduction of evidence affected
an appellant’s substantial rights, we assess the probable impact of the
evidence on the jury. Oldham v. State, 779 N.E.2d 1162, 1170 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2002). Admission of evidence is harmless and is not grounds for
reversal where the evidence is merely cumulative of other evidence
admitted. Pavey v. State, 764 N.E.2d 692, 703 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).
Id.
[8] Walker claims that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence
that Walker had possessed a handgun prior to shooting Hamilton. Specifically,
Walker argues that the challenged evidence was not relevant as it was either (1)
not closely related enough to the events in question or (2) overly prejudicial.
For its part, the State claims that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting the challenged evidence because the evidence was relevant to prove
that Walker had access to the type of weapon used in the murder of Hamilton.
The State also claims that because the mere possession of a weapon does not
amount to misconduct, admission of evidence that Walker had previously
possessed a handgun did not unfairly prejudice Walker. We agree.
[9] Relevant evidence is “evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”
Ind. Evidence Rule 401. “Generally speaking, relevant evidence is
admissible, and irrelevant evidence is inadmissible.” Sandifur v. State,
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A01-1407-CR-295 | March 30, 2015 Page 4 of 9
815 N.E.2d 1042, 1048 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied; Ind.
Evidence Rule 402. Relevant evidence may nevertheless be excluded
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice. Ind. Evidence Rule 403. These basic tenets of
evidence are utilized in addressing the specific issue of when evidence
of other bad acts is admissible.
Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b) provides in pertinent part:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to
show action in conformity therewith. It may, however,
be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence
of mistake or accident[.]
In determining the admissibility of evidence under Rule 404(b), the
trial court must: (1) determine whether the evidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts is relevant to a matter at issue other than the
defendant’s propensity to commit the charged act; and (2) balance the
probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect pursuant to
Indiana Evidence Rule 403. Ware v. State, 816 N.E.2d 1167, 1175
(Ind. Ct. App. 2004). We employ the same test to determine whether
the trial court abused its discretion. Id.
Southern v. State, 878 N.E.2d 315, 321 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
[10] Evidence that Walker had access to and had previously possessed a handgun
that was either the same as or similar to the handgun that he used to shoot
Hamilton was relevant to the question of whether Walker had access to the
murder weapon. “Evidence that a defendant had access to a weapon of the
type used in a crime is relevant to a matter at issue other than the defendant’s
propensity to commit the charged act.” Pickens v. State, 764 N.E.2d 295, 299
(Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (citing Thompson v. State, 728 N.E.2d 155, 160 (Ind. 2000)).
Further, although some proffered evidence may be irrelevant because it is too
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A01-1407-CR-295 | March 30, 2015 Page 5 of 9
remote, evidence of an event occurring in the past can be critical. Id. In this
vein, the Indiana Supreme Court has explained:
Some proffered evidence may be irrelevant because it is too remote.
For example, the fact that an adult defendant threatened the victim
when both were children does not tell us much about their relationship
today. On the other hand, an event occurring in the past can be
critical. If the defendant stole the murder weapon twenty years ago
and its presence is unaccounted for in the interim, the relevance of the
gun theft to show access to the weapon is not obviated by the passing
of time or by the dissimilarity between theft and murder. In short,
admissibility hinges on relevance, not a litmus test based on an
isolated factor—remoteness, similarity, or anything else—that may
bear on relevance.
Hicks v. State, 690 N.E.2d 215, 220 (Ind. 1997).
[11] Walker challenges the admission of the testimony of two witnesses. One of
these witnesses testified that she had seen Walker in possession of a handgun a
month or two before the date in question. The other testified that she had seen
Walker in possession of a handgun just prior to the shooting on the morning in
question. With respect to the first witness, we do not believe that possession of
a handgun by a defendant a month or two before that same defendant uses a
handgun to commit murder is too remote to be relevant to a question as to
whether the defendant had access to a handgun. With respect to the testimony
of the witness who testified that she had seen Walker in possession of a
handgun on the morning in question, such evidence is clearly not too remote as
it goes to prove that Walker had access to a handgun on the date that he shot
Hamilton.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A01-1407-CR-295 | March 30, 2015 Page 6 of 9
[12] The probative value of this evidence also outweighs any potential prejudice.
Walker does not assert that he suffered any specific prejudice, but rather raises
the generalized concern that possession of a handgun may be viewed
unfavorably. As the State argued at trial, possession of a handgun is legal if
certain requirements are met. We do not believe that evidence of mere
possession is overly prejudicial when balanced against the relevance of the
evidence that Walker had access to the type of weapon used in the murder. See
generally, Thompson, 728 N.E.2d at 160 (providing that “[Defendant] points to
no danger of unfair prejudice, other than a generalized concern that selling a
weapon may be viewed unfavorably. This possibility is clearly outweighed by
the probative value of testimony that [the Defendant] had access to a weapon of
the type used in the murder.”).
[13] Further, in the instant case, the additional consideration that the evidence was
offered to impeach Walker and cast doubt on his credibility leads us to the
conclusion that such evidence was not overly prejudicial. Again, Walker
initially told Detective Parker that, prior to the morning in question, he had
never possessed a handgun. Although Walker eventually admitted that he had
previously possessed a handgun, the challenged evidence was relevant to
impeach Walker’s credibility. Walker’s credibility was at issue because
although he admitted that he shot Hamilton five times in the torso, he claimed
that he was justified in doing so. We do not believe that the fact that Walker
subsequently impeached his own credibility by providing inconsistent and false
statements to Detective Parker limits the State’s ability to also impeach
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A01-1407-CR-295 | March 30, 2015 Page 7 of 9
Walker’s credibility by providing evidence which would tend to prove that
Walker’s prior statements were false.
[14] Additionally, we further conclude that to the extent that one could possibly
conclude that it was error to admit the challenged evidence, we agree with the
State that any potential error was harmless in light of Walker’s admission that
he shot Hamilton five times.
Errors in the admission of evidence are to be disregarded as harmless
unless they affect the defendant’s substantial rights. Stewart v. State,
754 N.E.2d 492, 496 (Ind. 2001); Ind. Trial Rule 61; Ind. Evidence
Rule 103(a). An error will be deemed harmless if its probable impact
on the jury, in light of all of the evidence in the case, is sufficiently
minor so as not to affect the substantial rights of the parties. Id.
Rogers v. State, 897 N.E.2d 955, 961 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
[15] Here, in addition to Walker’s confession that he shot Hamilton five times in the
torso, the State presented the testimony of Ragland and Austin Meltzer who
each testified that Walker had a gun in his hand in the moments before
Hamilton was shot. Ragland testified that she had seen Walker point the
handgun at Hamilton twice a few moments before Walker shot Hamilton.
Meltzer testified that he saw Walker pointing the gun into Riley’s apartment
just before he heard five gun shots. Ragland also testified that she heard five
gun shots. We conclude that in light of the unchallenged evidence, coupled
with Walker’s confession, the probable impact of the challenged evidence on
the jury is sufficiently minor so as not to affect Walker’s substantial rights. As
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A01-1407-CR-295 | March 30, 2015 Page 8 of 9
such, any potential error in the admission of the challenged evidence was
harmless.
[16] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Vaidik, C.J., and Kirsch, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A01-1407-CR-295 | March 30, 2015 Page 9 of 9