Shamus L. Patton v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2015 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Mar 31 2015, 9:38 am
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
precedent or cited before any court except for the
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Kurt A. Young Gregory F. Zoeller
Nashville, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Larry D. Allen
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Shamus L. Patton, March 31, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A04-1406-CR-277
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Grant W. Hawkins,
Judge
Appellee-Plaintiff
Cause No. 49G05-1306-FC-42038
49G05-1007-FB-56351
Pyle, Judge
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Statement of the Case
[1] Appellant/Defendant Shamus Patton (“Patton”) appeals his convictions for six
counts of Class C felony forgery.1 On appeal, he claims that insufficient
evidence supports his convictions because the documents at issue are not
included in the definition of a “written instrument,” which is an element of the
offense, and because the State failed to show that Patton acted with an intent to
defraud. Concluding that the definition of the term “written instrument” is
sufficiently broad so as to include the documents at issue and that the State
presented sufficient evidence to prove an intent to defraud, we affirm Patton’s
convictions.
[2] We affirm.
Issue
[3] Whether sufficient evidence supports Patton’s convictions.
Facts
[4] On February 15, 2013, Patton was a resident of Brandon Hall—a work release
facility in Indianapolis—as a result of convictions for Class C felony battery,
Class C felony criminal recklessness, Class D felony criminal gang activity, and
misdemeanor carrying a handgun without a license. Sunder Nix (“Nix”), a
1
IND. CODE § 35-43-5-2(b). We note that, effective July 1, 2014, a new version of this forgery statute was
enacted and that Class C felony forgery is now a Level 6 felony. Because Patton committed his crimes in
2013, we will apply the statute in effect at that time.
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case worker at Brandon Hall, reviewed with Patton the conditions of placement
in Brandon Hall and the potential consequences violating of these conditions.
In relevant part, Patton agreed to the following:
GENERAL RULES
*****
9. You or anyone contacting Brandon Hall on your behalf shall
be truthful and honest with your Case Manager, correctional
staff, and Brandon Hall staff at all times. Any documentation
submitted to your Case Manager that appears forged or
fraudulent will result in a Notice of Violation being filed with the
Court or the Department of Correction and the documents will
be forwarded to the Marion County Prosecutor for criminal
prosecution as necessary.
*****
PASSES TO LEAVE THE FACILITY
22. You may not leave the Brandon Hall for any reason unless
you have an approved pass from your Case Manager or
appropriate Brandon Hall staff.
23. When given a pass to leave the facility, you shall only go to
locations approved in advance. YOU MAY NOT GO TO ANY
LOCATION UNLESS SPECIFICALLY AUTHORIZED IN
ADVANCE. It is a violation of this rule to visit an unauthorized
location while traveling to or from your employer or other
approved location.
24. You are to return directly to the Brandon Hall as soon as the
purpose of your pass is complete. This applies when work shifts
are cancelled or end early. This also applies when a location you
were authorized to visit is closed or a person you were to meet is
unable to see you.
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25. You are required to provide written verification of all
activities that require you to be away from the Brandon Hall.
Written verification means proof of the location of the activity,
the time of arrival, and time of departure. You are required to
get written statements to verify counseling/treatment
appointments, doctor’s appointments, and attendance at outside
meetings. You are required to get written verification of your
having made application for employment if on a pass to find
work.
(State’s Ex. 2A at 17). Patton initialed and signed the contract acknowledging
that he understood the conditions and agreed to abide by them.
[5] In June 2013, Patton received multiple passes out of Brandon Hall to seek
employment. On June 10, 2013, Patton submitted employer contact sheets2
from EZ Pawn, Super 8, and Holiday Inn. On June 11, Brandon Hall gave
Patton a pass to seek employment, and he returned with employer contact
sheets from Kentucky Fried Chicken, McAlister’s Deli, and Mr. Gyro. On
June 17, 2013, Patton received another pass from Brandon Hall to seek work,
and he submitted employer contact sheets from O’Charley’s, Pizza Hut, and
Burger King. The next day, after receiving another pass, Patton submitted
employer contact sheets from Dollar Tree, King’s Ribs, and CVS.
[6] Sergeant Joshua Barker (“Sgt. Barker”) with the Indianapolis Metropolitan
Police Department (“IMPD”) began an investigation into Patton’s employer
2
According to Nix, residents of Brandon Hall complete a contact sheet with information about the location
visited and a telephone number. Residents then must have a manager or assistant manager of the business
sign the sheet verifying a resident’s presence.
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contact sheets. Sgt. Barker examined the documents and suspected that some
of the signatures verifying Patton’s contact with the businesses were fraudulent.
Sgt. Barker selected six locations and went to those businesses to verify the
information. At each location, Sgt. Barker spoke with a manager who later
confirmed that the purported signatures were fake. Sgt. Barker then prepared a
probable cause affidavit for forgery charges.
[7] On June 27, 2013, the State charged Patton with six counts of Class C felony
forgery. A jury trial was held on May 8, 2014, and the jury found Patton guilty
as charged. Patton now appeals.
Decision
[8] On appeal, Patton claims that there was insufficient evidence to support his
forgery convictions, claiming that the employer contact sheets at issue do not fit
the definition of a “written instrument,” which is an element of the offense. He
also argues that the State failed to show his intent to defraud.
[9] When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
conviction, appellate courts must consider only the probative
evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. It is
the fact-finder’s role, not that of appellate courts, to assess
witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether
it is sufficient to support a conviction. To preserve this structure,
when appellate courts are confronted with conflicting evidence,
they must consider it most favorably to the [jury’s verdict].
Appellate courts affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-
finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. It is therefore not necessary that the evidence
overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The
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evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn
from it to support the verdict.
Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146-47 (Ind. 2007) (internal quotation marks,
citations, and footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
[10] To convict Patton as charged, the State was required to show that Patton, with
the intent to defraud, made, possessed, or uttered a written instrument to
Brandon Hall in such a manner that the written instrument was purported to
have been made by another person. IND. CODE § 35-43-5-2(b). INDIANA CODE
§ 35-43-5-1(t) defines “written instrument” as “a paper, document, or other
instrument containing written matter and includes money, coins, tokens, stamps,
seals, credit cards, badges, trademarks, medals, retail sales receipts, labels or
markings (including universal product code (UPC) or another product
identification code), or other objects or symbols of value, right, privilege, or
identification.” (emphasis added).
[11] We note that although Patton frames his entire argument as a challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence, the question of whether his employer contact sheets
fall under the definition of a “written instrument” is a question of statutory
construction.
[12] Our primary goal in interpreting statutes is to determine and give
effect to the Legislature’s intent. State v. Oddi-Smith, 878 N.E.2d
1245 (Ind. 2008). The best evidence of that intent is a statute’s
text. Id. The first step therefore is to decide whether the
Legislature has spoken clearly and unambiguously on the point
in question. Sloan [v. State], 947 N.E.2d [917] at 922 [(Ind.
2011)]. When a statute is clear and unambiguous, we must apply
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the plain and ordinary meaning of the language. Id. There is no
need to resort to any other rules of statutory construction.
Adams v. State, 960 N.E.2d 793, 798 (Ind. 2012).
[13] The clear and unambiguous language of the statue defining a “written
instrument” is broad and inclusive. Indeed, Patton acknowledges this much in
citing Lahr v. State, 731 N.E.2d 479 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), where Lahr was
convicted of forging a letter that his attorney filed with the court in a notice of
supplemental discovery compliance. Accordingly, the employer contact sheets
at issue here were documents and fell within the definition of “written
instruments.” See, e.g., Jacobs v. State, 640 N.E.2d 61, 65 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994)
(concluding that the legislature “intended to broaden the traditional concept of
the crime of forgery with the new statute.”), reh’g denied, trans. denied.
[14] Turning to Patton’s argument that the State failed to prove his intent to defraud,
we note that an intent to defraud includes a showing of “a potential benefit to
the maker or potential injury to the defrauded party.” Eifler v. State, 570 N.E.2d
70, 77 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994). “[I]ntent to defraud may be proven by
circumstantial evidence.” McHenry v. State, 820 N.E.2d 124, 127 (Ind. 2005).
Because intent is a mental state, the fact-finder often must “resort to the
reasonable inferences based upon an examination of the surrounding
circumstance[s] to determine” whether, from the person’s conduct and the
natural consequences therefrom, there is a showing or inference of the requisite
criminal intent. Diallo v. State, 928 N.E.2d 250, 252-53 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).
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[15] At trial and on appeal, the State argues that Patton’s potential benefit was his
ability to leave the facility. Patton, in his brief, responds that he “got to leave
[Brandon Hall] regardless of whether his excursions resulted in applications
being submitted or he gained employment. The signatures affixed after he left
did not result in him being able to leave Brandon Hall.” (Patton’s Br. 13).
However, Patton’s contract clearly states that he was not allowed to leave
Brandon Hall unless he had an approved pass. The jury could reasonably infer
that, by submitting employer contact sheets with fraudulent signatures, Patton
intended to deceive staff at Brandon Hall about his activities while on leave
from the facility in order to keep receiving passes. Accordingly, sufficient
evidence established Patton’s intent to defraud, and we affirm his convictions.
[16] Affirmed.
Barnes, J., and May, J., concur.
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