Nahamani Sargent v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2017 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Jan 30 2017, 10:16 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
court except for the purpose of establishing Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Hilary Bowe Ricks Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Ian McLean
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Nahamani Sargent, January 30, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A02-1607-CR-1666
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Mark D. Stoner,
Appellee-Plaintiff Judge
The Honorable Jeffrey Marchal,
Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No.
49G06-1502-F2-4742
Vaidik, Chief Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1607-CR-1666 | January 30, 2017 Page 1 of 10
Case Summary
[1] Nahamani Sargent appeals his conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm
by a serious violent felon. He contends that the State engaged in prosecutorial
misconduct when it elicited testimony that Sargent remained silent after his
arrest and then referenced that testimony in its closing argument. He also
argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that he
possessed a firearm. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] At around 3:00 a.m. on February 5, 2015, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police
Department Officer John Ly pulled over a Ford Expedition that changed lanes
without signaling. Sargent was driving the truck, Calvin Tunstall was in the
front passenger seat, and Mark Price was in the back seat behind Tunstall.
After checking the status of Sargent’s license, Officer Ly gave him a verbal
warning and told him he was free to go. Sargent sped off and began driving
over the speed limit, and Officer Ly followed him and pulled him over again.
Officer Ly and Officer Michael Wright approached the truck with guns drawn
and ordered the three men to get out. Officer Ly stayed with the three men
while Officer Wright and other officers looked in the truck to clear it. Officer
Wright saw a revolver protruding slightly toward the rear passenger-side
floorboard from underneath the front passenger seat—that is, from underneath
the seat Tunstall was sitting in, toward the seat Price was sitting in. A
subsequent search revealed the presence of two additional handguns and a rock
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1607-CR-1666 | January 30, 2017 Page 2 of 10
of heroin under the same seat. Neither Officer Ly nor Officer Wright heard any
of the men make any statements about the guns. After the men were
transported to a police station, they were advised of their Miranda rights and
chose to remain silent.
[3] The State charged Sargent, Price, and Tunstall with possession of heroin and
carrying a handgun without a license. The State also charged Sargent and Price
with unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon (“SVF”). In
April 2016, Tunstall pled guilty to both of the charges against him. Sargent and
Price took their cases to a joint jury trial two months later.
[4] During the State’s case-in-chief, the prosecutor asked Officer Ly, “At any point
did you hear any of the three suspects make any voluntary statements in regards
to who owned the gun?” Tr. Vol. II p. 87. Officer Ly answered, “I did not.”
Id. Later, the prosecutor asked Officer Wright, “Did any of the three occupants
of that Ford [Expedition] make any voluntary statements as to knowledge of or
ownership or possession of the firearm that you saw?” Id. at 127. Officer
Wright replied, “Not to me. No.” Id. The defendants did not object to either
of the questions or either of the answers.
[5] During their closing arguments, the defense attorneys repeatedly suggested to
the jury that Tunstall’s guilty plea (which had been admitted into evidence)
constituted an admission that the guns and drugs were his. In rebuttal, the
prosecutor referenced the evidence that none of the three men, including
Tunstall, said anything after being ordered out of the truck:
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1607-CR-1666 | January 30, 2017 Page 3 of 10
And then there is Tunstall, the “I’m guilty.” Right. If he admits
to it then we don’t have to worry about it. Right. If that is how
everything worked, that only one person has to admit and the
rest go free, our laws would be failing us. That’s all there is to it.
And when does he say it? One of the factors that you guys will
be given is incriminating statements. We ask officers, “Did
anybody say anything when they got out of that car?” Nobody
said a word, including Tunstall. And, in fact, he didn’t say a
word about his guilt –
Tr. Vol. III p. 42. This prompted a defense objection based on the United
States Supreme Court’s decision in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), which
restricts the prosecution’s use of a defendant’s silence. The trial court overruled
the objection without explanation, and Sargent’s attorney did not request an
admonishment or a mistrial. The prosecutor then resumed her argument,
adding that Tunstall “didn’t say a word about his guilt until April 15th, 2016.
Fourteen months later.” Id.
[6] The jury found Sargent and Price not guilty of possession of heroin but guilty of
carrying a handgun without a license. Both then filed waivers of their right to a
jury trial on the SVF charges. When the parties returned to court for the SVF
bench trial, the trial court began by addressing a “Motion for Judgment on the
Evidence or as an Alternative to Set Aside Judgment and Grant a New Trial”
that Sargent filed that day. Among other things, the motion asked the court to
revisit the claim that the State violated the defendants’ right to remain silent by
referencing their post-arrest silence. Sargent’s attorney explained why he did
not object when the prosecutor asked the officers whether any of the suspects
had made any statements regarding the guns or when the officers answered:
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1607-CR-1666 | January 30, 2017 Page 4 of 10
I don’t believe that the question in and of itself was improper.
And the reason for that it, that easily one of those officers could
have said, “Mr. Tunst[a]ll said that guns were his,” which would
have been admissible because it’s a statement against penal
interest. However, that’s not what the officer said and that’s not
what the prosecutor’s answer – or question expected. What the
answer was, “nobody said anything.” There was no comment
from any of the defendants. Now, if that was the only thing that
had occurred during the trial, my personal belief is that would be
harmless error.
Tr. Vol. III p. 67. He argued that the objectionable matter occurred—and noted
that the defense did object—during the State’s closing argument, when “the
Deputy Prosecutor specifically commented and argued that their silence was
evidence of guilt.” Id. The trial court denied Sargent’s motion without
explanation, incorporated the jury trial and the jury’s verdict into the bench-trial
record, and, after taking evidence of the defendants’ serious violent felonies,
found both of them guilty on the SVF charges.
[7] The trial court entered judgments of conviction on the SVF counts but due to
double-jeopardy concerns did not enter separate convictions on the carrying-a-
handgun-without-a-license charges and instead “merged” the jury’s guilty
verdicts on those charges with the SVF convictions.
[8] Sargent now appeals.1
1
Price appealed separately. In another memorandum decision issued today, we affirm Price’s conviction.
See Mark A. Price v. State, No. 49A02-1607-CR-01665 (Ind. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2017).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1607-CR-1666 | January 30, 2017 Page 5 of 10
Discussion and Decision
[9] Sargent raises two issues on appeal. First, he argues that the State committed
prosecutorial misconduct when it elicited the officers’ testimony that he
remained silent after his arrest and then mentioned that testimony during its
closing argument. Second, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting his conviction.
I. Prosecutorial Misconduct
[10] Sargent first contends that the State’s elicitation and use of evidence that he
remained silent after being arrested constituted prosecutorial misconduct. See,
e.g., Peters v. State, 959 N.E.2d 347, 353 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (“[P]ost-arrest, pre-
Miranda silence cannot be used as substantive evidence in the State’s case-in-
chief.”). Because Sargent did not object when the State introduced the
challenged evidence, he must establish that its introduction constituted
fundamental error. See Gavin v. State, 41 N.E.3d 1038, 1042 (Ind. Ct. App.
2015). The doctrine of fundamental error is an extremely narrow exception to
the waiver rule that requires the defendant to show that the alleged error was so
prejudicial to the defendant’s rights as to make a fair trial impossible. Id. The
defendant must show that, under the circumstances, the trial judge erred in not
raising the issue sua sponte because the alleged error (a) constituted a clearly
blatant violation of basic and elementary principles of due process and (b)
presented an undeniable and substantial potential for harm. Id.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1607-CR-1666 | January 30, 2017 Page 6 of 10
[11] Sargent must also demonstrate fundamental error with regard to the State’s
closing argument. While there was a defense objection at that time, and the
objection was overruled, neither Sargent nor Price then asked for a jury
admonishment or a mistrial. Our Supreme Court has held that a defendant
must do so in order to preserve for appeal a claim of closing-argument
misconduct. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 799 N.E.2d 1064, 1066 (Ind. 2003)
(“Because Brown failed to request an admonishment or move for a mistrial
when the trial court overruled his objection, his claim of prosecutorial
misconduct is procedurally foreclosed and reversal on appeal requires a
showing of fundamental error.”).
[12] Sargent has not convinced us that the initial introduction of the silence evidence
was fundamental error. His attorney not only declined to object when the
questions were asked and the answers were given but later acknowledged that
(1) he had a strategic reason for not objecting to the questions (i.e., because the
answers could have been good for Sargent) and (2) any error in allowing the
officers’ answers to stand was “harmless,” presumably because a defendant’s
silence, standing alone, is not necessarily a bad thing. See Tr. Vol. III p. 73
(Price’s attorney explaining that he did not object to the evidence “because one
of the elements of constructive possession that the Court instructed is a lack of
incriminating statements by a defendant”). In light of these acknowledgements,
we simply cannot say that the trial court was required to step in, sua sponte,
and strike the silence evidence.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1607-CR-1666 | January 30, 2017 Page 7 of 10
[13] We reach the same conclusion with regard to the State’s reference to Sargent’s
silence during its closing argument. First, the State did not cite Sargent’s
silence as affirmative evidence of his guilt during the initial portion of its
closing. Second, when the State did mention Sargent’s silence during its
rebuttal, it was referencing evidence that had come in without objection. And
third, when the State noted that “[n]obody said a word” after getting out of the
truck, it did so only in response to the defendants’ closing argument that
Tunstall’s guilty plea—fourteen months after the traffic stops—amounted to an
admission that all of the guns were his. The State did not explicitly contend
that Sargent’s silence proves his guilt or that Sargent “would have said
something if none of the guns were his.” While it is true that the State easily
could have, and definitely should have, made its point about Tunstall’s silence
without also referencing Sargent’s silence, we cannot say that the limited
reference “made a fair trial impossible.” See Gavin, 41 N.E.3d at 1042.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[14] To obtain a conviction for SVF, the State was required to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that Sargent possessed a firearm after having been convicted
of a crime that qualifies as a “serious violent felony.” Sargent asserts that the
State failed to prove that he possessed any of the guns that were in the truck. In
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction, we consider
only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict.
Wilson v. State, 39 N.E.3d 705, 716 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. We do
not reweigh the evidence or assess witness credibility. Id. We consider
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1607-CR-1666 | January 30, 2017 Page 8 of 10
conflicting evidence most favorably to the verdict. Id. We will affirm the
conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. It is not necessary that the evidence
overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Id. The evidence is
sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the
verdict. Id.
[15] Where, as here, the State does not allege actual possession, it must establish
constructive possession. “Constructive possession occurs when somebody has
the intent and capability to maintain dominion and control over the item.”
Henderson v. State, 715 N.E.2d 833, 835 (Ind. 1999). Sargent concedes that, as
the driver of the truck, “he is presumed to have the capability to possess
everything inside of it.” Appellant’s Br. p. 30 (citing Gee v. State, 810 N.E.2d
338, 340 (Ind. 2004)). Therefore, the only issue is whether the State proved that
he had the intent to possess one or more of the guns.
[16] To prove such intent, the State must demonstrate the defendant’s knowledge of
the contraband. Henderson, 715 N.E.2d at 835. Knowledge may be inferred
from the exclusive dominion and control over the premise containing the
contraband. Id. But when, as in this case, the defendant’s control over the
premise is non-exclusive, there must be “evidence of additional circumstances
pointing to the defendant’s knowledge of the presence of the contraband.” Id.
at 835-36 (quoting Woods v. State, 471 N.E.2d 691, 694 (Ind. 1984)). Examples
of such circumstances are: (1) incriminating statements by the defendant, (2)
attempted flight or furtive gestures, (3) proximity of the contraband to the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1607-CR-1666 | January 30, 2017 Page 9 of 10
defendant, (4) location of the contraband within the defendant’s plain view, and
(5) the mingling of the contraband with other items owned by the defendant.
Id.
[17] Several “additional circumstances” existed in this case. First, the fact that there
were three guns and three men supports a conclusion that each man possessed
one gun. Second, although the guns were not under Sargent’s seat, they were
still in close proximity to him. Third, as the State notes, “the location of the
guns is consistent with Tunstall’s having hidden his own and Sargent’s gun to
keep them from being seen either before the first or second stop[.]” Appellee’s
Br. p. 36. Finally, while the parties dispute whether Sargent’s high-speed exit
from the first traffic stop actually constituted an attempt to “flee” (since Officer
Ly acknowledged that he “didn’t have to pursue [Sargent] in any kind of high
speed chase,” Tr. Vol. II p. 94), the jury was certainly entitled to consider this
odd behavior as evidence of guilt. All of this evidence supports the jury’s
finding of constructive possession.
[18] Affirmed.
Bradford, J., and Altice, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1607-CR-1666 | January 30, 2017 Page 10 of 10