Mary Stephens v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2015 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Apr 21 2015, 8:10 am
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
    Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
    precedent or cited before any court except for the
    purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,
    collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Jill M. Acklin                                            Gregory F. Zoeller
    McGrath, LLC                                              Attorney General of Indiana
    Carmel, Indiana
    Brian Reitz
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Mary Stephens,                                           April 21, 2015
    Appellant-Defendant,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
    29A04-1409-CR-453
    v.                                               Appeal from the Hamilton Superior
    Court
    State of Indiana,                                        The Honorable J. Richard Campbell,
    Appellee-Plaintiff                                       Judge
    Cause No. 29D04-1310-FD-8683
    Najam, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 29A04-1409-CR-453| April 21, 2015          Page 1 of 6
    Statement of the Case
    [1]   Mary Stephens appeals her conviction for theft, as a Class D felony, following a
    bench trial. Stephens raises one issue on appeal, namely, whether the State
    presented sufficient evidence to support her conviction. We affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [2]   On October 19, 2013, Stephens was working as a member of a probation work
    crew clearing brush and trees from a Hamilton County park. Probation Officers
    C.J. Miller and Breanne Lewis were supervising the work crew. At the end of
    the day, Officer Lewis and a probationer took the final load of cleared brush to
    an off-site “burn pile,” and Officer Miller waited with the other nine
    probationers in the work group, including Stephens, who sat in and around a
    fifteen-passenger community corrections van.
    [3]   After a probationer informed him that Stephens had taken items from Officer
    Lewis’ purse, Officer Miller approached the van and saw Stephens putting
    things into the purse, which Officer Lewis had left beneath the front seat of the
    van. Stephens attempted to zip the purse shut and shove it under the seat in
    front of her and, when confronted, told Officer Miller that the purse had fallen
    down and that some items had fallen out of it.
    [4]   When Officer Lewis returned, Officer Miller described what had happened and
    suggested that they search Stephens. Officer Lewis looked around Stephens in
    the van to see if she had anything of hers, and Officer Lewis asked Stephens to
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 29A04-1409-CR-453| April 21, 2015   Page 2 of 6
    take off a sweatshirt that she was wearing. Officer Lewis then took Stephens to
    a women’s restroom at the park to search Stephens. Stephens brought the
    sweatshirt with her. In the restroom, Stephens dropped the sweatshirt on the
    floor. When Stephens bent to pick it up, Officer Lewis noticed a clutch
    belonging to Officer Lewis on the ground beneath the sweatshirt. Officer Lewis
    then searched Stephens and found a bottle of prescription medication, which
    also belonged to Officer Lewis and had been in the clutch.
    [5]   Stephens apologized and asked the officers not to call police, but they called
    Cicero Police Department Officer Kyle Comer to the scene. When Officer
    Comer asked Stephens why she had Officer Lewis’ prescription bottle, Stephens
    said that she had noticed that it had fallen out of Officer Lewis’ purse and she
    had attempted to put the bottle back in the purse. Stephens explained that she
    panicked when confronted by Officer Miller and hid the bottle instead of
    returning it to the purse.
    [6]   The State initially charged Stephens with possession of a controlled substance
    and theft, both as Class D felonies. However, the State dropped the possession
    charge and amended the theft charge to read: “On or about October 19, 2013,
    Mary Kathryn Stephens did knowingly exert unauthorized control over the
    property of Breanne Lewis, to-wit, [a] purse, with the intent to deprive said
    person of any part of the use or value of the property.” Appellant’s App. at 27.
    [7]   Following a bench trial, the trial court found Stephens guilty as charged and
    sentenced her to 730 days, with ninety days executed in the Hamilton County
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 29A04-1409-CR-453| April 21, 2015   Page 3 of 6
    Jail, 275 days executed on home monitoring, and 365 days suspended. This
    appeal ensued.
    Discussion and Decision
    [8]   Stephens contends that the State presented insufficient evidence to support her
    conviction. Our supreme court has held that when there is substantial evidence
    of probative value to support a conviction, it will not be set aside. Jones v. State,
    
    783 N.E.2d 1132
    , 1139 (Ind. 2003). When reviewing the sufficiency of the
    evidence to support a conviction, we must consider only the probative evidence
    and reasonable inferences supporting the conviction. See Dallaly v. State, 
    916 N.E.2d 945
    , 950 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). We do not assess witness credibility or
    reweigh the evidence. 
    Id.
     We consider conflicting evidence most favorably to
    the trial court’s ruling. 
    Id.
     We affirm the conviction unless “no reasonable fact
    finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”
    
    Id.
     (quoting Jenkins v. State, 
    726 N.E.2d 268
    , 270 (Ind. 2000)). It is not
    necessary that the evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis of
    innocence. 
    Id.
     Rather, the evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably
    be drawn from it to support the conviction. 
    Id.
    [9]   To prove theft, as a Class D felony, the State was required to show that
    Stephens knowingly exerted unauthorized control over Probation Officer
    Lewis’ purse with the intent to deprive Officer Lewis of any part of the use or
    value thereof. Stephens’ sole contention on appeal is that the State’s
    presentation of evidence misled the trial court regarding whether she was
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 29A04-1409-CR-453| April 21, 2015   Page 4 of 6
    charged with having stolen a purse or a clutch, or smaller purse, contained
    within a larger purse.1 In particular, Stephens maintains that the State charged
    her with theft of a purse, not items kept in the purse. And, she asserts, because
    there was no evidence that she stole a purse, her conviction cannot stand.
    [10]   In support of her contention, Stephens directs us to the following colloquy
    during cross-examination of Officer Comer:
    Defense Counsel: Do you know, [sic] personal knowledge, whether
    anything was stolen out of the clutch?
    Deputy Prosecuting Attorney: Objection. Relevance. The charging
    information and the charge here is that she took the purse[,] not items
    from inside the purse. It specifically says the purse.
    Defense Counsel: I think it says property, Judge, on the amended
    information.
    Deputy Prosecutor: It says, to wit, purse[,] not items inside.
    The Court: So the State is just charging theft of the purse?
    Deputy Prosecutor: That’s right.
    The Court: Sustain the objection.
    Tr. at 30.
    [11]   But Officer Comer then explained that one of the items Stephens had stolen
    from inside the bigger purse was a clutch. And Officer Comer described a
    1
    We note that Stephens makes no contention that her conviction cannot stand because of a fatal variance
    between the charging information and the proof at trial. See, e.g., Mitchem v. State, 
    685 N.E.2d 671
     (Ind.
    1997).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 29A04-1409-CR-453| April 21, 2015               Page 5 of 6
    clutch as “a smaller purse or wallet that you would put inside your purse.” Id.
    at 33.
    [12]   A clutch is a purse. The evidence shows that Stephens stole Officer Lewis’
    clutch. The State charged Stephens with theft of a purse. At Stephens’ bench
    trial the trial court, as trier of fact, found her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,
    and we are confident that the court was not confused.
    [13]   Thus, the State presented evidence that Stephens stole a purse from Officer
    Lewis, and the evidence clearly supports the conviction. Stephens’ contentions
    on appeal amount to a request that we reweigh evidence previously evaluated
    by the trial court, which we will not do. The State presented sufficient evidence
    to support Stephens’ theft conviction.
    Affirmed.
    Mathias, J., and Bradford, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 29A04-1409-CR-453| April 21, 2015   Page 6 of 6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 29A04-1409-CR-453

Filed Date: 4/21/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/21/2015