Bryan Burton v. City of Franklin (mem. dec.) ( 2018 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Dec 14 2018, 8:48 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Jeffrey S. McQuary William W. Barrett
TOMPKINS LAW Daniel J. Layden
Indianapolis, Indiana WILLIAMS BARRETT &
WILKOWSKI, LLP
Greenwood, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Bryan Burton, December 14, 2018
Appellant-Petitioner, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-MI-1358
v. Appeal from the Johnson Superior
Court
City of Franklin, The Honorable Marla K. Clark,
Appellee-Respondent. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
41D04-1705-MI-106
Bailey, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-MI-1358 | December 14, 2018 Page 1 of 10
Case Summary
[1] City of Franklin Chief of Police Tim O’Sullivan (“Chief O’Sullivan”)
recommended the termination of Bryan Burton (“Burton”) from the City of
Franklin police force following Burton’s arrest for domestic violence. The
Franklin Police Merit Commission (“the Commission”) conducted a hearing
and terminated Burton’s employment. The termination decision was affirmed
by the trial court and Burton now appeals. We affirm.
Issues
[2] Burton presents two consolidated and restated issues for our review:
I. Whether the termination decision is reversible because
Burton was deprived of procedural due process; and
II. Whether the termination decision is unsupported by
substantial evidence.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] On October 23, 2016, Burton’s fourteen-year-old stepson called 9-1-1 and
reported that Burton and his wife, Jordan Burton (“Jordan”), were arguing
about their youngest child and that, during the argument, Burton had grabbed
Jordan’s arm. Franklin Police Officers Jason Hyneman, Bryan Goldfarb, and
Sergeant Lucas responded. Jordan appeared to be upset and displayed her arm,
which had three lineal red lines on it. She reported that Burton had grabbed
her. She also expressed some concern about bias among Burton’s fellow police
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officers; in response, the supervising officer made the decision to turn the
investigation over to the Johnson County Sheriff’s Department.
[4] Sheriff’s Deputy Evan Preston arrived on the scene shortly thereafter and began
to interview the Burtons and their teenaged children. He observed an injury to
Jordan’s arm. Burton denied having grabbed Jordan. One of the teenagers
reported that Burton had grabbed Jordan and interfered with the operation of
her vehicle. Another teenager reported that Jordan had struck him in the face.
Both Jordan and Burton were arrested.1
[5] That same evening, Chief O’Sullivan was informed about Burton’s arrest. On
October 24, 2016, Chief O’Sullivan met with Burton and issued him a five-day
suspension letter. On October 25, 2016, Chief O’Sullivan preferred charges
against Burton, alleging that he had engaged in conduct unbecoming an officer
and conduct injurious to the public peace and welfare. The first charge was
related to the conduct underlying the arrest for felony battery and the second
charge was related to Burton’s alleged untruthfulness on October 19, 2016,
when discussing the state of his marriage in a conference with Chief O’Sullivan.
[6] At Burton’s request, the Commission conducted an evidentiary hearing on
April 19, 2017. The Commission found that Burton had engaged in both
unbecoming and injurious conduct; it approved Chief O’Sullivan’s
recommendation that Burton’s employment be terminated. Burton sought
1
Ultimately, a special prosecutor declined to bring criminal charges against either of the Burtons.
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judicial review of the disciplinary decision, pursuant to Indiana Code Section 4-
21.5-1-1. On March 7, 2018, the trial court heard argument of counsel. On
May 15, 2018, the trial court issued its decision affirming the Commission’s
disciplinary decision. Burton now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
Standard of Review
[7] Indiana Code Section 36-8-3.5-17(b) provides in relevant part that a police
department member may be disciplined if “the commission finds the member
guilty of a breach of discipline, including: … (G) conduct injurious to the public
peace or welfare; [or] (H) conduct unbecoming a member[.]” The discipline
may include suspension, demotion, or dismissal. See id. Pursuant to subsection
(h), the misconduct is to be established by a preponderance of the evidence. A
member who is aggrieved by a decision of the commission to dismiss him may
appeal to the circuit or superior court of the county in which the unit is located.
I.C. § 36-8-3.5-18.
[8] Our review of an administrative action is very limited. Gray v. Cty. of Starke, 82
N.E.3d 913, 917 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). We give deference to the expertise of the
administrative body, which includes a police merit commission. Id. We will
not reverse its discretionary decision absent a showing that the decision was
arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with the law. Id. Our review is limited to determining whether the
administrative body adhered to proper legal procedure and made a finding
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based upon substantial evidence in accordance with appropriate constitutional
and statutory provisions. Id. We will not substitute our judgment for that of
the administrative body, and we will not modify a penalty imposed in a
disciplinary action, absent a showing that the action was arbitrary and
capricious. Id.[9] “An arbitrary and capricious decision, which the challenging party bears the
burden of proving, is a decision which is willful and unreasonable, made
without any consideration of the facts and in total disregard of the
circumstances, and lacks any basis which might lead a reasonable and honest
person to the same decision.” Bird v. Cty. of Allen, 639 N.E.2d 320, 328 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1994). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as being adequate to support a conclusion. Id. We will not
reweigh the evidence upon review. Id.[10] In addition, “[t]he discipline of police officers is within the province of the
executive branch of government, not the judicial branch. For this reason, we
will not substitute our judgment for that of the administrative body when no
compelling circumstances are present.” Winters v. City of Evansville, 29 N.E.3d
773, 781 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (citation omitted).
Procedural Due Process
[11] At the hearing, Burton argued that Chief O’Sullivan failed to adequately
investigate the domestic incident before preferring charges. Specifically, he
contended that Chief O’Sullivan should have initiated an internal investigation
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independent of that undertaken by the Johnson County Sheriff’s Department.
In his deposition, Chief O’Sullivan had agreed that, although he had the power
to convene an internal review panel, he had declined to do so. Having
knowledge of Burton’s disciplinary history, Chief O’Sullivan opined that “the
arrest was enough.” (App. Vol. II, pg. 25.)
[12] Burton now asserts that Chief O’Sullivan “violated [I.C. § 36-8-3.5-14] that
required him to conduct an investigation before preferring charges.” Brief of
Appellant at 20. Burton directs our attention to the language of Indiana Code
Section 36-8-3.5-14(c):
If the chief of the department, after an investigation within the
department, prefers charges against a member of the department
for an alleged breach of discipline … a hearing shall be
conducted upon the request of the member.
With emphasis upon the phrase “after an investigation within the department,”
Burton argues that the disciplinary statute mandates an internal departmental
investigation before preferring charges. The interpretation of a statute is purely
a question of law. B.K.C. v. State, 781 N.E.2d 1157, 1167 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
Our purpose is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature and if
the text is clear and unambiguous, we merely apply the plain meaning of the
statute. Id. We will interpret ambiguous text using established principles of
statutory construction; that is, we will construe the statute in accordance with
its purpose and the statutory scheme of which it is a part. Id. We presume that
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the legislature intends for us to apply language in a logical manner consistent
with the statute’s underlying policy and goals. Id.[13] The City of Franklin contends that the purpose and objective of subsection (c) is
that the accused officer possesses the right to a hearing, upon request. We
agree. Although the language contemplates that an investigation precedes the
preferring of charges, no means or manner is described and the statutory
objective – right to a hearing – is not conditioned upon a departmental
investigation. Moreover, the Legislature could not logically have intended to
prevent a department from deferring investigation to another department in the
case of a potential conflict of interest.
[14] That said, the record reveals that Chief O’Sullivan did not prefer charges in a
vacuum. He received and reviewed the reports of the three first-responding
City of Franklin police officers. He also reviewed the 9-1-1 dispatcher’s
comments. He conferred with his deputy chief of police and with members of
the Johnson County Sheriff’s Department, who had taken over the
investigation. In sum, charges were not preferred absent investigation.
[15] Burton suggests that, had Chief O’Sullivan personally and adequately
investigated, he would have learned that no criminal charges were filed against
Burton in connection with the alleged battery upon Jordan. But Chief
O’Sullivan’s ability to pursue disciplinary action was not contingent upon the
filing of criminal charges by the Johnson County Prosecutor. We have
observed, “[f]rom the very nature of a policeman’s duties, his conduct in the
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community on and off duty must be above reproach.” Pope v. Marion Cty.
Sheriff’s Merit Board, 157 Ind. App. 636, 301 N.E.2d 386, 391 (1973). Consistent
therewith, Indiana Code Section 36-8-3.5-17 does not require the pursuit of
criminal charges to support the imposition of police discipline.
[16] Burton also argues that the Commission president, John Shafer (“Shafer”),
“violated due process by not recusing himself despite bias against Burton.”
Appellant’s Brief at 24. Shafer acknowledged that he had, in disciplinary
proceedings conducted in 2015, asked Burton whether he had a drug or alcohol
problem. Those disciplinary proceedings did not involve an allegation of
substance abuse. Shafer did not recall the exact words he used, but he did recall
his motivation as a desire to assist Burton. Burton argues that Shafer
demonstrated a bias against Burton, that is, a long-standing belief that Burton
was unfit to serve as a police officer.
[17] “Due process in administrative hearings requires that all hearings be conducted
before an impartial body.” Ripley Cty. Bd. of Zoning v. Rumpke of Indiana, 663
N.E.2d 198, 209 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). This dictates that agency members may
not be swayed in their decisions by preconceived biases and prejudices. Id. We
presume, however, that administrative agencies will act properly with or
without recusal of allegedly biased members. Id. A mere allegation of bias is
insufficient; a reviewing court will not interfere with the administrative process
absent a demonstration of actual bias. New Trend Beauty Sch., Inc. v. Indiana
State Bd. of Beauty Culturist Examiners, 518 N.E.2d 1101, 1105 (Ind. Ct. App.
1988).
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[18] As Burton observes, in Ripley, a panel of this Court did not find clear error in
the trial court’s determination that a member of an administrative body was
biased where he had made comments highly critical of a person who later
appeared before that board. 663 N.E.2d at 209. There, a board of zoning
appeals member owned land near the petitioner’s landfill, and had complained
about the landfill operations, had led an effort to enforce a 300-foot setback
against the petitioner, and had made comments including that “if he could run
Rumpke out of Ripley County he would.” Id. at 210. The instant
circumstances are not akin to those in Ripley. Shafer had interjected into prior
disciplinary proceedings the idea that Burton might benefit from substance
abuse therapy. Although the offer of assistance may have been misguided,
there is no indication that Shafer had personal animus against Burton or a
potential for personal gain. Burton has not shown that he was deprived of a
hearing before an impartial body.
Substantial Evidence
[19] At the administrative hearing, photographic and testimonial evidence was
introduced regarding Jordan’s injuries. Burton does not challenge the
Commission’s finding that, more probably than not, Burton touched his wife on
October 23, 2016, in a rude, insolent or angry manner, and caused injury.
However, he argues at some length that he was not deceptive in communicating
with Chief O’Sullivan on October 19, 2016, regarding the state of the Burton
marriage.
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[20] The Commission heard evidence suggesting that Burton’s marriage had been
troubled for some time and he had complained at work. However, on October
19, 2016, he assured Chief O’Sullivan that things were “perfect, great, or
couldn’t be better.” (App. Vol. III, pg. 40.) This reassurance deprived the chief
of the opportunity to refer Burton to an employee assistance program. A few
days later, after the domestic incident, Burton wrote out a six-page statement in
which he acknowledged that he and Jordan had experienced marital difficulties
over some time. His current insistence that marriages have good days and bad
days and his comments should refer to an isolated time frame, a good day, is a
request to reweigh evidence. We have already observed, substantial evidence is
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as being adequate to
support a conclusion, and we will not reweigh evidence upon review. Bird, 639
N.E.2d at 328. The Commission did not enter an arbitrary and capricious
decision unsupported by substantial evidence.
Conclusion
[21] Burton was not denied procedural due process. Substantial evidence supports
the Commission’s findings. The trial court properly declined to overturn the
disciplinary decision of the Commission.
[22] Affirmed.
Bradford, J., and Brown, J., concur.
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