James Sturgel v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2017 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Feb 08 2017, 8:56 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
CLERK
court except for the purpose of establishing Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
the defense of res judicata, collateral and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Leanna Weissmann Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Lawrenceburg, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Michael Gene Worden
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
James Sturgel, February 8, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
15A01-1607-CR-1509
v. Appeal from the Dearborn
Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Sally McLaughlin,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
15D02-1404-FB-24
Bailey, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] James Sturgel (“Sturgel”) was convicted of one count of Class B felony Child
Molesting1 and one count of Class C felony Child Molesting.2 Sturgel now
appeals, contending that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted
evidence that Sturgel had admitted to molesting a different child. We reverse
and remand for a new trial.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Six-year-old J.S. was placed into foster care in October 2006. Her foster parent
was Deborah Chaney (“Chaney”), and J.S. stayed with Chaney until April
2007. A few years later, in 2011, J.S. told her grandmother that she was
molested in foster care, and an investigation ensued. During a forensic
interview, J.S. said the molestation occurred on multiple occasions, and
indicated that the molestation may have occurred twenty-six times. The
investigation led law enforcement to Sturgel, who was related to Chaney.
[3] On April 24, 2014, the State charged Sturgel with four counts of Child
Molesting but later reduced the charges to two counts. On April 13, 2016, the
State notified Sturgel of its intent to introduce evidence under Indiana Evidence
Rule 404(b) regarding, inter alia, Sturgel’s child molesting conviction involving a
1
Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(a).
2
I.C. § 35-42-4-3(b).
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different child. Sturgel filed a motion in limine seeking to prohibit introduction
of such evidence, and the trial court initially granted Sturgel’s motion.
[4] A jury trial commenced on April 19, 2016. Throughout the trial, the State
sought permission to introduce evidence of Sturgel’s conviction but the trial
court sustained Sturgel’s objections. Late in the trial, however, the trial court
permitted testimony regarding Sturgel’s admission to molesting a different child
in Chaney’s care. The trial court allowed the evidence on only the issue of
whether Sturgel had the opportunity to molest J.S. The trial court accordingly
admonished the jury and gave a limiting instruction.
[5] Sturgel was found guilty as charged, and the trial court later sentenced Sturgel.
[6] This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
[7] Sturgel argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence
that he admitted to molesting a child. He urges that admission of the evidence
was contrary to Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b) and that, even if admissible, its
probative value was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect in
violation of Indiana Evidence Rule 403.
[8] “In deciding whether to admit or exclude evidence, we trust trial courts to
exercise sound discretion, and we will reverse such a decision only if we believe
the court abused its discretion, meaning its decision is clearly against the logic
and effect of the facts in the record.” Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1264 (Ind.
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2015). Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b) provides that “[e]vidence of a crime,
wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to
show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the
character.” The evidence, however, “may be admissible for another purpose,
such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Ind. Evidence Rule
404(b)(2). In evaluating the admissibility of 404(b) evidence, “a trial court must
‘(1) determine that the evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is relevant to a
matter at issue other than the defendant’s propensity to commit the charged act
and (2) balance the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect
pursuant to Rule 403.’” Wilson v. State, 765 N.E.2d 1265, 1270 (Ind. 2002)
(quoting Ortiz v. State, 716 N.E.2d 345, 350 (Ind. 1999)).
[9] Here, the State sought to introduce evidence of Sturgel’s prior child molesting
conviction. The trial court was made aware that Sturgel had pleaded guilty to
molesting a child in 2008.3 The molestation apparently occurred while the child
was in Chaney’s care and while others were in the same household.
Throughout the trial, the State made a number of arguments for admission of
the evidence. Among them, the State argued that the evidence spoke to
Sturgel’s opportunity to molest J.S. The State focused on three moments in
Chaney’s testimony. First, when Sturgel asked Chaney whether she saw him
3
The trial court reviewed certified copies of the judgment of conviction, probable cause affidavit, and other
documents relating to Sturgel’s 2008 conviction. These documents were identified as Exhibits A(1) and A(2),
but they are not in the appellate record.
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and J.S. wrestling around, Chaney said that “would have been inappropriate.”
(Tr. Vol. I at 220.) Second, when the State asked Chaney whether Sturgel
could have tickled J.S., Chaney responded, “With three (3) adults sitting in the
house?” (Tr. Vol. I at 224.) Last, when the State asked Chaney about her
reaction to the instant investigation in 2011, Chaney said she “couldn’t believe
this was happening.” (Tr. Vol. I at 238.)
[10] In ultimately deciding to allow evidence of Sturgel’s act on the issue of
opportunity, the trial court referred to Chaney’s testimony, which the State had
characterized as indignant at times. The trial court felt that Chaney’s responses
left the impression “that [Chaney] is a completely appropriate foster parent.”
(Tr. Vol. II at 79.) The trial court reasoned that “[t]he evidence presented by
the foster parent is there’s always other people around . . . so there is still the
issue of opportunity, and I think that’s what makes this evidence probative.”
(Tr. Vol. II at 79.) The trial court further explained that the probative value
substantially outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice because “it [was] unfair
for the jury to make a decision thinking that this could never happen; that it
would be shocking in 2011 when it was reported to the foster parent that this
happened, when the foster parent was aware [that] the exact type of situation
did happen under her care.” (Tr. Vol. II at 80-81.)
[11] To address the “prejudicial nature” of the evidence, the trial court said it would
“limit how this is presented to the jury” (Tr. Vol. II at 81), and gave an example
of the line of questioning it would permit, which the State modeled:
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Q: Ms. Chaney, yesterday you told the jury that in 2011 when
the police came to question you that you were shocked . . .
[b]y the allegations, isn’t that correct?
A: Yes.
Q: You also said that you had discussed with Brenda Sturgel
that you couldn’t believe this was happening, correct?
A: Yes.
Q: Yet weren’t you aware at the time you were questioned by
the police that in 2008[,] [Sturgel] . . . admitted to
molesting a five (5) year old under your care at the home
of Brenda Sturgel, while others [were] present in your
home?
A: Yes.
(Tr. Vol. II at 84-85.) Following the admission of the evidence, the trial court
informed the jury that the evidence was received solely on the issue of
opportunity, and the trial court also later gave a limiting instruction.
[12] The State argues that Sturgel “opened the door” to the introduction of the
evidence. “[O]therwise inadmissible evidence may become admissible if a
party ‘opens the door’ to questioning on that evidence in order to correct a
‘deceptively incomplete disclosure.’” Hall v. State, 36 N.E.3d 459, 471 (Ind.
2015) (quoting Gilliam v. State, 270 Ind. 71, 383 N.E.2d 297, 301 (1978)). The
evidence that “opened the door” must leave the trier of fact with a false or
misleading impression of the facts related. Id. Sturgel did state in his opening
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argument that the alleged acts “could not have happened” (Tr. Vol. I at 76),
noting that he was in Oregon during much of the relevant timeframe and that
others were present on the few occasions J.S. and Sturgel were in the same
home. Yet, Sturgel’s argument and later lines of questioning seemed to focus
on challenging J.S.’s credibility as to the number of occasions, in that J.S. had
posited that the molestation may have occurred twenty-six times. The State
also points out that Sturgel asked Chaney whether Chaney saw him tickle J.S.,
and Sturgel evidently tickled the other child before molesting her. But we
cannot say that Sturgel’s question to the State’s witness, or Sturgel’s other
remarks at trial, generated a false or misleading impression of the facts such that
would warrant evidence that he admitted to molesting a different child.
[13] As to admissibility under Rule 404(b), the evidence that Sturgel molested a
different child in Chaney’s care is at best marginally relevant to the issue of
opportunity—Sturgel acknowledged in his opening statement that he and J.S.
were in the same household on more than one occasion, and the evidence
indicated as much. Nonetheless, as the trial court reasoned, Chaney’s
responses did suggest that Sturgel would have had a limited opportunity to
harm a child in her care because others were present. Even if relevant,
however, the evidence’s probative value with respect to opportunity must not be
substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice. Evid. R. 403. We
review the trial court’s Rule 403 balancing under an abuse of discretion
standard. Hicks v. State, 690 N.E.2d 215, 223 (Ind. 1997).
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[14] Here, the trial court seemingly admitted the evidence for two purposes. First,
the trial court admitted the evidence because the evidence shed light on whether
a child in Chaney’s care could have been molested while others were in the
home. The trial court also admitted the evidence because it called Chaney’s
credibility into question, refuting her suggestion that she was an appropriate
foster parent and that she was shocked by the investigation. However, evidence
that someone—anyone—had molested a child in Chaney’s care, with others in
the home, would have served both purposes. Yet, the admitted evidence
identified Sturgel as the molester and identified the victim as of a similar age to
J.S.’s. The evidence went too far. Neither Sturgel’s identity nor the victim’s
age necessarily related to the stated purposes for admission of the evidence. See
Thompson v. State, 690 N.E.2d 224, 236 (Ind. 1997) (“Unnecessary and
inflammatory detail may require reversal.”). Moreover, the extraneous
information admitted here was plainly prejudicial. Indeed, even if the
challenged evidence was relevant and otherwise admissible, the prejudice from
the “forbidden inference” Wickizer v. State, 626 N.E.2d 795, 797 (Ind. 1993)
substantially outweighed its probative value, in relation to the “opportunity to
commit the crime” rationale given for its admission.
[15] We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence that
Sturgel admitted to molesting a different child. Nonetheless, the erroneous
admission of evidence only warrants reversal for a new trial where the
admission affected the substantial rights of the party. Evid. R. 103(a); Ind. Trial
Rule 61; Buchanan v. State, 767 N.E.2d 967, 970 (Ind. 2002). “In determining
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whether the introduction of this evidence warrants reversal, we must assess the
probable impact of the evidence upon the jury.” Lannan v. State, 600 N.E.2d
1334, 1341 (Ind. 1992). “The improper admission is harmless error if the
conviction is supported by substantial independent evidence of guilt satisfying
the reviewing court there is no substantial likelihood the challenged evidence
contributed to the conviction.” Hoglund v. State, 962 N.E.2d 1230, 1238 (Ind.
2012).
[16] Here, the only independent evidence of Sturgel’s guilt consisted of J.S.’s
testimony. Further, shortly after the trial court admitted the challenged
evidence, the trial court received a jury question inquiring about Sturgel’s arrest
history and requesting a copy of his charges. The question was telling; we
cannot say the error here was harmless.
Conclusion
[17] The trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence that Sturgel had
admitted to molesting a child.
[18] Reversed.
Najam, J., and May, J., concur.
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