Lakila Jackson v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2018 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Dec 21 2018, 10:32 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK
court except for the purpose of establishing Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
the defense of res judicata, collateral and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Timothy J. Burns Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
James B. Martin
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Lakila Jackson, December 21, 2018
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-CR-823
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Clayton A.
Appellee-Plaintiff. Graham, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
49G07-1709-CM-37403
Riley, Judge.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[1] Appellant-Defendant, Lakila Jackson (Jackson), appeals her conviction for
battery, Class A misdemeanor, Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(d)(1).
[2] We affirm.
ISSUE
[3] Jackson presents one issue on appeal, which we restate as: Whether the
evidence was sufficient to sustain her conviction for battery and rebut her claim
of self-defense.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[4] In August of 2017, Charniqua Alexander (Alexander) lived in an apartment
complex in Indianapolis, Indiana. Alexander also worked in the apartment’s
leasing office. On the morning of August 17, 2017, Alexander escorted her
daughter to the bus stop to catch the school bus. While waiting for the bus,
Alexander approached Jackson, introduced herself, and mentioned that she
worked in the leasing office. Recognizing a boy that was “straggling behind,”
Alexander asked Jackson if the child was her son. (Transcript Vol. II, p. 7).
Jackson confirmed that he was, and at that point, Alexander stated, “it has been
brought to our attention in the office that [your] son, . . . [has] been one of the
kids in the apartment complex that had been causing trouble.” (Tr. Vol. II, p.
8). Upset with the statement, Jackson’s “tone and demeanor” changed, and she
became confrontational. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 8). To remove herself from the
situation, Alexander walked away and proceeded to her apartment to retrieve
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her wallet since she wanted to go to the gas station and fuel her car. When she
exited her apartment, she met Jackson standing outside her door. Having no
prior interactions with Jackson, Alexander was “kind of in shock,” as to how
Jackson knew where she lived. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 12). Alexander ignored Jackson
and walked toward her vehicle, but Jackson followed her yelling insults such as
the “B-word.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 12). Jackson also threatened to beat Alexander.
When Alexander got inside her vehicle, Jackson blocked her exit. After
honking her car horn for a sustained period, Jackson finally got out of the way.
On her way out of the apartment complex, Alexander flagged the complexes’
security officer and informed him of the verbal altercation she had just had with
Jackson. Knowing that Jackson was not a resident at the complex, Alexander
ordered the security officer to evict Jackson upon sight. After issuing the
instructions and before proceeding to the gas station, Alexander drove by her
apartment to ensure that Jackson was not causing more trouble.
[5] On her way out of the apartment complex, Alexander saw Jackson outside the
leasing office “waving her hands like she was explaining something to the
maintenance supervisor.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 14). Alexander pulled in to the
leasing office driveway, parked her vehicle, and exited. Upon seeing
Alexander, Jackson began “saying things,” but Alexander ignored Jackson’s
statements. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 15). As Alexander reached for the leasing door
handle, Jackson “grabbed” Alexander’s “long braids” which caused Alexander
to fall on the concrete pavement. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 15). Jackson then jumped on
Alexander, and the two wrestled. When the fight was over, Alexander realized
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that her head was bleeding. Alexander went to the emergency room for
treatment. From the altercation, Alexander had sustained a head laceration
and several cuts on her body. Also, Alexander had a large patch of hair missing
from the back of her scalp. At the hospital, law enforcement officers spoke with
Alexander, and she reported the incident.
[6] On September 28, 2017, the State filed an Information, charging Jackson with
battery, a Class A misdemeanor. On March 8, 2018, a bench trial was
conducted. At the close of the evidence, the trial court found Jackson guilty as
charged. The same day, the trial court sentenced Jackson to 365 days with 349
days suspended to non-reporting probation. Also, the trial court ordered
restitution in the amount of $2,018.25 to cover Alexander’s medical expenses,
and a no-contact order against Jackson for 349 days.
[7] Jackson now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
[8] Jackson contends that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to sustain
her conviction and to rebut her claim of self-defense. When a defendant
challenges the State’s sufficiency of the evidence to rebut a claim of self-defense,
the standard of review remains the same as for any sufficiency of the evidence
claim. Miller v. State, 720 N.E.2d 696, 699 (Ind. 1999). When reviewing the
sufficiency of the evidence needed to support a criminal conviction, we neither
reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility. Bailey v. State, 907 N.E.2d
1005, 1005 (Ind. 2009). “We consider only the evidence supporting the
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judgment and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn from such
evidence.” Id. We will affirm if there is substantial evidence of probative value
such that a reasonable trier of fact could have concluded the defendant was
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. The evidence need not be so
overwhelming as to overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Drane
v. Scott, 867 N.E.2d 144, 147 (Ind. 2007). The trier of fact is entitled to
determine which version of the incident to credit and is the sole judge of the
effect that any discrepancies or contradictions might have on the outcome of the
case. Scott v. State, 867 N.E.2d 690, 695 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied.
[9] To convict Jackson of battery as a Class A misdemeanor, the State was required
to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Jackson knowingly or intentionally
touched Alexander in a rude, insolent, or angry manner and that such touching
resulted in bodily injury. See I.C. § 35-42-2-1(d)(1). Jackson does not argue that
the State failed to prove any of the requisite statutory elements of the battery
charge; rather, she contends that the State failed to disprove her claim of self-
defense.
[10] Self-defense is a legal justification for what would otherwise be a criminal act.
Tharpe v. State, 955 N.E.2d 836, 844 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied. To
prevail on a claim of self-defense, Jackson must present evidence that she: (1)
was in a place she had a right to be, (2) did not provoke, instigate, or participate
willingly in the violence, and (3) had a reasonable fear of death or great bodily
harm.” Id. When a defendant claims they acted in self-defense, the State has
the burden to disprove at least one of these elements beyond a reasonable
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doubt. See id. The State may meet this burden by rebutting the defense directly,
by affirmatively showing the defendant did not act in self-defense, or by simply
relying upon the sufficiency of its evidence in chief. See Miller, 720 N.E.2d at
700.
[11] In support of her argument, Jackson relies on the testimony she gave at her
bench trial. Specifically, Jackson testified that after the confrontations at the
school bus stop and outside Alexander’s apartment, she went to the leasing
office to complain about Alexander’s inappropriate behavior. Jackson claimed
that while she was waiting outside the leasing office, Alexander pulled into the
leasing driveway and walked toward her yelling epithets. Jackson then asserted
that Alexander “struck” her in her “gut” and tried to “strike” her in the left eye.
(Tr. Vol. II, p. 33). In her appellate brief, Jackson argues, “[w]hy would [she]
start a fight with an employee of the complex right in front of security? It is far
more likely that [Alexander] started the fight.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 10).
[12] Notwithstanding Jackson’s argument, we find that the situation presented
before us is a classic ‘she said – she said’ scenario in which we only have two
witnesses—Alexander and Jackson—who describe two completely different
events. The trial court heard each woman’s narrative of the altercation, and
based on the evidence, the trial court chose to believe Alexander over Jackson.
“It is for the trier of fact to resolve conflicts in the evidence and to decide which
witnesses to believe or disbelieve.” Ferrell v. State, 746 N.E.2d 48, 51 (Ind.
2001). By finding Jackson guilty after hearing all the evidence, the trial court
credited Alexander’s testimony, and Jackson’s claim of self-defense was
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therefore refuted. As such, we decline to disturb the verdict and affirm
Jackson’s conviction.
CONCLUSION
[13] For the reasons stated, we hold that the State presented sufficient evidence
beyond a reasonable doubt to support Jackson’s battery conviction and to rebut
her claim of self-defense.
[14] Affirmed.
[15] Vaidik, C. J. and Kirsch, J. concur
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