Denise M. Lechner v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any May 20 2019, 8:45 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Brooke Smith Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Bradley Keffer Attorney General of Indiana
Keffer Barnhart LLP Tiffany A. McCoy
Indianapolis, Indiana Angela Sanchez
Deputy Attorneys General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Denise M. Lechner, May 20, 2019
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-CR-2351
v. Appeal from the Vanderburgh
Circuit Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable David D. Kiely,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
82C01-1509-F2-5907
Mathias, Judge.
[1] Denise Lechner (“Lechner”) pleaded guilty in Vanderburgh Circuit Court to
Level 2 felony conspiracy to commit dealing in methamphetamine and was
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sentenced to eighteen years of incarceration. Lechner appeals and argues that
her sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of her offense and her
character.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] At some point prior to September 23, 2015, Lechner, Thomas Biggs (“Biggs”),
and David Tapia (“Tapia”) agreed to have methamphetamine shipped to
Biggs’s home; Tapia and Lechner then planned to deliver the
methamphetamine to Illinois. Biggs was to receive a portion of the
methamphetamine in consideration for the use of his home.
[4] On September 23, 2015, a United States Marshall apprehended Lechner at
Biggs’s home on outstanding warrants for dealing in methamphetamine and
felony theft. When the Marshall asked if Lechner had anything illegal on her
person, Lechner produced a small amount of methamphetamine. She also told
the Marshall that she was at Biggs’s home to pick up a package containing
approximately five ounces (roughly 141.75 grams) of methamphetamine. While
the Marshall spoke with Lechner, a package arrived at the house addressed to
Veronica Chase, an alias used by Lechner. Inside the package was a lawn
ornament. Inside the ornament was a package of a crystalline substance that
tested positive as methamphetamine. The package was wrapped in black
electrical tape, and a field test of the substance indicated that it weighed 358
grams, significantly more than five ounces.
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[5] Lechner was later interviewed by Vanderburgh County Sheriff’s Department
Deputy James Budde (“Deputy Budde”). Lechner told Deputy Budde that she
was supposed to retrieve the package from Biggs’s home and transport it to a
location in southern Illinois. In exchange for the use of his home, Biggs was to
be given three grams of methamphetamine. She also stated that this was the
third time she had picked up a package containing methamphetamine from
Biggs’s home.
[6] On September 28, 2015, the State charged Lechner with Level 2 felony
conspiracy to commit dealing in methamphetamine in an amount of at least ten
grams. See Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1.1(a)(2), (e)(1); Ind. Code § 35-41-5-2. On
March 2, 2016, Lechner entered into an agreement with the State to plead
guilty to Level 2 felony conspiracy to commit dealing in methamphetamine. On
April 6, 2016, Lechner filed a motion requesting to be released from jail so that
she could attend her stepfather’s funeral the following day. The trial court
granted this request on the condition that Lechner wear a GPS monitor to track
her location. Instead of returning to jail after the funeral, Lechner cut the GPS
monitor off and fled. She was apprehended eleven days later, and her bond was
revoked. The State also moved to withdraw its earlier plea agreement, which
the trial court granted.
[7] On October 20, 2016, Lechner’s counsel informed the trial court that the State
had offered to dismiss charges in two other cases pending against Lechner if she
agreed to an “open” plea of guilty in two other cases, including the present one.
Lechner then pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit Level 2 felony dealing in
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methamphetamine in the present case. At a sentencing hearing held on
November 11, 2016, the trial court accepted Lechner’s plea and sentenced her
to eighteen years of incarceration. Lechner filed a petition for permission to file
a belated notice of appeal on September 4, 2018, which the trial court granted
on September 19, 2018. Lechner then filed her notice of appeal on September
28, 2018, and this appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
[8] Lechner contends that her sentence of eighteen years is inappropriate in light of
the nature of her offense and her character. Even if a trial court acts within its
statutory discretion in imposing a sentence, Article 7, Sections 4 and 6 of the
Indiana Constitution authorize independent appellate review and revision of a
sentence imposed by the trial court. Trainor v. State, 950 N.E.2d 352, 355 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied (citing Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 491 (Ind.
2007)). This authority is implemented through Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B),
which provides that the court on appeal “may revise a sentence authorized by
statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, the Court finds
that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the
character of the offender.”
[9] Although we may revise a sentence on appeal, we still exercise deference to a
trial court’s sentencing decision, as Appellate Rule 7(B) requires us to give “due
consideration” to that decision, and because we understand and recognize the
unique perspective a trial court brings to its sentencing decisions. Trainor, 950
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N.E.2d at 355 (citing Stewart v. State, 866 N.E.2d 858, 866 (Ind. Ct. App.
2007)). The principal role of appellate review should be to attempt to “leaven
the outliers” and identify guiding principles for trial courts and those charged
with improvement of the sentencing statutes, but not to achieve what we
perceive to be a “correct” result in each case. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219,
1225 (Ind. 2008).
[10] Under Appellate Rule 7(B), the appropriate question is not whether we believe
another sentence is more appropriate; rather, the question is whether the
sentence imposed by the trial court is inappropriate. Fonner v. State, 876 N.E.2d
340, 344 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). When we review the appropriateness of a
sentence, we consider “the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the
crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light
in a given case.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1224. The defendant bears the burden
to persuade us that the sentence imposed by the trial court is inappropriate.
Shell v. State, 927 N.E.2d 413, 422 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (citing Anglemyer, 868
N.E.2d at 494).
[11] In the present case, Lechner was convicted of a Level 2 felony, and the
sentencing range for a Level 2 felony is ten to thirty years, with the advisory
being seventeen and one-half years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4.5. Lechner was
sentenced to eighteen years—only six months more than the advisory. Thus,
the burden she bears is higher than if she had been given a more severe
sentence. Cf. Fernbach v. State, 954 N.E.2d 1080, 1089 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)
(noting that the advisory sentence is the starting point our General Assembly
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has selected as an appropriate sentence for the crime committed and that a
defendant therefore bears a particularly heavy burden in persuading us that an
advisory sentence is inappropriate), trans. denied.
[12] With regard to the nature of the offense, Lechner argues that the factual basis
supporting her plea “does not establish any facts beyond what are typically
expected or required for the type of offense.” Appellants Br. at 8; see also
Anderson v. State, 989 N.E.2d 823, 827 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (noting that when
considering the nature of the offense, a court compares the defendant’s actions
with the required showing to sustain a conviction under the charged offense),
trans. denied. This, however, assumes that we are only permitted to look to the
facts established in the factual basis when considering the appropriateness of a
sentence. Lechner, however, provides no authority supporting this assumption.
Here, Lechner admitted to the investigating officers that she had transported
methamphetamine to Illinois twice before. She also admitted that the amount
of methamphetamine in the package was supposed to be five ounces,
significantly more than the ten grams required to elevate the crime to a Level 2
felony. And even if we were to agree with Lechner that we may only consider
the factual basis, it still shows that she conspired to deliver large amounts of
methamphetamine and transport it to Illinois. See Tr. p. 29.
[13] More importantly, Lechner’s character, as evidenced by her lengthy criminal
history, is by itself sufficient to support the trial court’s sentencing decision.
Although Lechner emphasizes that she spent a nine-year period drug free and
without committing any additional criminal offenses, we are unable to overlook
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that she has fourteen prior felony convictions and nine prior misdemeanor
convictions. And many of these prior convictions were for possession of
methamphetamine and other controlled substances. Lechner has been charged
with over fifty crimes in three states. Lechner has also previously violated the
terms of her work release and probation. And in the present case, when the trial
court showed lenience toward Lechner by permitting her to attend her
stepfather’s funeral, she took off her GPS monitor and escaped. Suffice it to say
that none of this reflects well on Lechner’s character.
[14] Given the nature of Lechner’s offense and her character, as reflected in her
continued failure to abide by the law, we are unable to conclude that she has
met her burden of showing that her eighteen-year sentence is inappropriate.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
[15] Affirmed.
Vaidik, C.J., and Crone, J., concur.
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