Amari D. Lyons v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),                                         FILED
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                                Jul 25 2019, 10:11 am
    court except for the purpose of establishing                                   CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                      Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Michael C. Borschel                                       Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Indianapolis, Indiana                                     Attorney General of Indiana
    Caryn N. Szyper
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Amari D. Lyons,                                           July 25, 2019
    Appellant-Defendant,                                      Court of Appeals Case No.
    19A-CR-254
    v.                                                Appeal from the Marion Superior
    Court
    State of Indiana,                                         The Honorable Lisa F. Borges,
    Appellee-Plaintiff                                        Judge
    The Honorable Anne Flannelly,
    Magistrate
    Trial Court Cause No.
    49G04-1709-F5-37350
    Altice, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-254 | July 25, 2019                      Page 1 of 9
    Case Summary
    [1]   Amari D. Lyons appeals his conviction for carrying a handgun without a
    license, a Level 5 felony. Lyons contends that the trial court committed
    reversible error by admitting evidence obtained during a warrantless search.
    We affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [2]   On the evening of September 27, 2017, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police
    Department (IMPD) officers responded to a report of an attempted robbery
    with a firearm at an apartment complex. IMPD Officers Mollie
    Johannigsmeier and John Dicicco arrived at about the same time in their
    marked police vehicles. Zane Dickson, the 911 caller, had been involved in a
    meetup for sale of goods to another individual arranged on the website OfferUp
    when the attempted robbery occurred. Dickson ran up to the officers and
    frantically told them that a black male had pointed a rifle at him in the parking
    lot. According to Dickson, the suspect then fled toward the apartment building.
    Dickson directed the officers to speak with Lyons, a possible witness, who was
    in the parking lot.
    [3]   Lyons informed Officer Johannigsmeier that he had seen someone running
    away from the apartment building but had no further information. After
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-254 | July 25, 2019   Page 2 of 9
    speaking briefly with Lyons, the officers moved Dickson to the apartment
    leasing office to calm him down and question him further. While moving
    Dickson, the officers noticed Lyons driving a silver Chevy Impala towards the
    complex exit. As Lyons drove off, Dickson told Officer Johannigsmeier that
    after the attempted robbery, the suspect had tried to enter the silver Impala.
    [4]   Five minutes later, Lyons returned to the parking lot in the silver Impala.
    When Lyons got out of his car, Officer Dicicco approached and said he needed
    to speak with him. Officer Johanningsmeier joined Officer Dicicco and asked
    Lyons for additional information about the robbery. Lyons told Officer
    Johanningsmeier that he knew the suspect’s name, that the suspect often spent
    time in the area, and that the suspect had run off immediately after the
    attempted robbery.
    [5]   While Officer Johanningsmeier spoke with Lyons, Officer Dicicco shined a
    flashlight through the windows of the Impala and saw a handgun on the driver-
    side floorboard as well as a loaded magazine in the cupholder. He alerted
    Officer Johanningsmeier, who placed Lyons in handcuffs. A pat-down revealed
    an empty firearm holster on Lyons’s hip and a tactical light for a handgun in his
    pocket. Reading the serial number of the firearm through the passenger
    window, officers ran checks on both the gun and Lyons and found that he did
    not have a valid handgun license and that he had a previous conviction for
    carrying a handgun without a license. IMPD Officers Nicholas Rainbolt and
    Christopher Dian, who had arrived to assist, retrieved the weapon and searched
    Lyons’s car. The handgun was a loaded Glock 19 pistol with a 30-round
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-254 | July 25, 2019   Page 3 of 9
    magazine. The officers also found a rifle magazine in the glove box, a 15-round
    magazine in one of the cupholders, and a mask in the trunk.
    [6]   Lyons was charged with carrying a handgun without a license, a Class A
    misdemeanor, and carrying a handgun without a license while having a prior
    conviction for the same offense, a Level 5 Felony. Following a bifurcated trial,
    Lyons was convicted of the Level 5 Felony and sentenced to four years in
    Marion County Community Corrections’ work release program.
    Discussion and Decision
    [7]   On appeal, Lyons argues that the trial court abused its discretion and
    committed reversible error by admitting evidence in violation of the Fourth
    Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the
    Indiana Constitution. Specifically, he contends the trial court erred in
    admitting the handgun discovered in the vehicle in violation of his rights
    against unreasonable searches and seizures.
    Standard of Review
    [8]   Lyons’s appeal comes after the completion of his trial; therefore, it is properly
    viewed as an admission of evidence issue rather than an appeal of the denial of
    his motion to suppress. Our review here is based on a standard similar to that
    used in other sufficiency of evidence issues. Litchfield v. State, 
    824 N.E.2d 356
    ,
    358 (Ind. 2005). We will not reweigh the evidence and “we will consider the
    evidence favorable to the trial court’s ruling, as well as substantial
    uncontradicted evidence to the contrary, to decide whether the evidence is
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-254 | July 25, 2019   Page 4 of 9
    sufficient to support the ruling.” Holder v. State, 
    847 N.E.2d 930
    , 935 (2006).
    We will reverse only “if a ruling is clearly against the logic and effect of the
    facts and circumstances and the error affects a party’s substantial rights.”
    Carpenter v. State, 
    18 N.E.3d 998
    , 1001 (Ind. 2014).
    Fourth Amendment Analysis
    [9]    The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects individuals
    against unreasonable searches and seizures by government agents. “A search
    without a warrant requires the State to prove an exception to the warrant
    requirement applicable at the time of the search.” Holder, 
    847 N.E.2d at 935
    .
    [10]   Not all encounters between police and individuals implicate Fourth
    Amendment protections. “Consensual encounters in which a citizen
    voluntarily interacts with an officer do not compel Fourth Amendment
    analysis.” Clark v. State, 
    994 N.E.2d 252
    , 261 (Ind. 2013). A stop remains at the
    consensual level based on whether a reasonable person would have felt they
    were free to leave. State v. Calmes, 
    894 N.E.2d 199
    , 202 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
    Factors to be considered in determining whether a reasonable person felt free to
    leave include “(1) the threatening presence of several officers, (2) the display of
    a weapon by an officer, (3) the physical touching of the person, or (4) the use of
    language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officers request
    might be compelled.” 
    Id.
    [11]   Nonconsensual encounters typically fall into one of two categories, brief
    investigative stops and full arrests. 
    Id.
     With respect to the former, the Supreme
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-254 | July 25, 2019   Page 5 of 9
    Court has held that a police officer can briefly detain an individual for
    investigative purposes if the officer has reasonable suspicion that criminal
    activity is afoot. Terry v. Ohio, 
    392 U.S. 1
     (1968). A full arrest, in which the
    individual is detained for longer than a short time, requires probable cause. 
    Id.
    [12]   Lyons argues that his second interaction with police constituted a
    nonconsensual encounter. We disagree with Lyons as to the nature of the
    encounter at that point. That is, during this second encounter, police sought
    further information from Lyons after Dickson informed them that the suspect
    had tried to enter the silver Impala that Lyons was seen driving. The
    conversation prior to the discovery of the handgun pertained to Lyons’s status
    as a potential witness. Nothing about the nature of the second encounter differs
    from Lyons’s first conversation, which he agrees was consensual. The number
    of police present did not increase, nor did the police display their weapons,
    physically touch him, or restrain his movement. Officer Dicicco said that he
    needed to speak with Lyons, but gave no reasonable indication that Lyons was
    under any form of detention, only that he wanted to ask more questions about
    what Lyons may have seen.
    [13]   Only after Officer Dicicco spotted a firearm in open view 1 in the car Lyons had
    been driving did the encounter evolve into a Terry stop. Considering Dickson’s
    1
    The “open view” principle applies when “a police officer sees contraband from an area that is not
    constitutionally protected” in an area that is protected, such as a home or a vehicle. Sayre v. State, 
    471 N.E.2d 708
    , 712 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984). For a police officer to lawfully seize contraband in open view, either a
    search warrant or a justifiable exception to warrantless seizure is required. 
    Id.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-254 | July 25, 2019                       Page 6 of 9
    account that the suspect was armed and had tried to enter the Impala, Officers
    Dicicco and Johanningsmeier then acted on reasonable suspicion that Lyons
    may have been involved in the attempted robbery. The officers’ brief detention
    of Lyons while they searched his person and ran a check on the firearm was
    acceptable under Terry as part of their investigation.
    [14]   The subsequent search of the vehicle and seizure of the handgun fell within the
    automobile exception. “If a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to
    believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment thus permits police to
    search the vehicle without more.” Pennsylvania v. Labron, 
    518 U.S. 938
    , 940
    (1996). With regards to the “readily mobile” component, the Indiana Supreme
    Court has held “a vehicle that is temporarily in police control or otherwise
    confined is generally considered to be readily mobile and subject to the
    automobile exception to the warrant requirement if probable cause is present.”
    Myers v. State, 
    839 N.E.2d 1146
    , 1152 (Ind. 2005). Police did not seize the
    handgun until it was determined that Lyons did not have a license for it and
    that he had a prior conviction for illegally possessing a firearm, thereby giving
    them the requisite probable cause. As such, the seizure of the firearm from
    inside the vehicle did not violate Lyons’s Fourth Amendment rights.
    Article 1 Section 11 Analysis
    [15]   Although Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution contains identical
    language to the Fourth Amendment, we interpret the language independently
    and separately. Litchfield, 824 N.E.2d at 359. Our interpretation is based on an
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-254 | July 25, 2019   Page 7 of 9
    assessment of the reasonableness of the actions of the police officer when the
    totality of the circumstances are considered. Id. Reasonableness is determined
    by balancing: “1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a
    violation has occurred, 2) the degree of intrusion the method of the search or
    seizure imposes on the citizen’s ordinary activities, and 3) the extent of law
    enforcement needs.” Id. Indiana courts have held that the Fourth Amendment
    automobile exception applies during an Article 1, Section 11 analysis. Myers v.
    State, 
    839 N.E.2d 1146
    , 1154 (Ind. 2005).
    [16]   Regarding the Litchfield factors, the police on the scene had a high degree of
    concern and suspicion that an armed robbery had occurred and they had been
    told by Dickson that the suspect had attempted to enter Lyons’s vehicle.
    Lyons’s interaction with police was minimally intrusive up until the handgun
    was discovered, when he was handcuffed and briefly detained as a suspect. The
    seizure of the handgun from Lyons’s car falls within the established automobile
    exception. The totality of the circumstances shows that the actions taken by
    police were based on the pressing need to investigate an attempted armed
    robbery and recover the potential weapon or weapons used in the crime, which
    outweighed the intrusion into Lyons’s activities. Therefore, the seizure of the
    handgun from the vehicle did not violate Lyons’s rights under Article 1, Section
    11 of the Indiana Constitution.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-254 | July 25, 2019   Page 8 of 9
    Conclusion
    [17]   The warrantless search of Lyons’s vehicle did not violate the search and seizure
    provisions of either the Fourth Amendment or Article 1, Section 11 of the
    Indiana Constitution. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting
    the handgun into evidence.
    Judgment affirmed.
    Kirsch, J. and Vaidik C.J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-254 | July 25, 2019   Page 9 of 9