Quinton A. Rush v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any FILED
court except for the purpose of establishing Dec 10 2019, 10:46 am
the defense of res judicata, collateral CLERK
estoppel, or the law of the case. Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Steven Knecht Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Vonderheide & Knecht, P.C. Attorney General of Indiana
Lafayette, Indiana
Justin F. Roebel
Supervising Deputy Attorney
General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Quinton A. Rush, December 10, 2019
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-CR-697
v. Appeal from the White Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Robert B. Mrzlack,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
91D01-1602-F2-72
Bradford, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] In April of 2016, White County Sheriff’s Deputy Matthew White initiated a
traffic stop of a vehicle being driven by Quinton Rush after observing multiple
traffic infractions. A search of the vehicle led to the discovery of plastic baggies,
a handgun, large amounts of cash, electronic scales, 920.29 grams of marijuana,
and 26.82 grams of cocaine. The State charged Rush with, inter alia, Level 2
felony cocaine dealing, Level 6 felony marijuana dealing, and Class C
misdemeanor operating a vehicle with a controlled substance in the body. In
March of 2018, a jury trial was held, after which Rush was found guilty as
charged. Rush contends that the trial court erroneously admitted evidence
obtained from the search of his vehicle because Deputy White lacked
reasonable suspicion to stop Rush’s vehicle. Rush also contends that the trial
court erroneously admitted the statements he made to Deputy White during the
traffic stop because they were obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. We
affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] At approximately 2:31 a.m. on April 10, 2016, Deputy White was assisting
Deputy Josh Shoemaker on a traffic stop when he observed a northbound
vehicle being driven by Rush. As Deputy White left the traffic stop and began
following Rush’s vehicle, he noticed the rear right-side taillight had a lightbulb
that was not illuminated. Deputy White radioed dispatch in order to have it run
Rush’s vehicle registration. Dispatch confirmed that the vehicle was a black
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2011 Ford Fusion, registered to Quinton Rush. Deputy White asked dispatch to
confirm that the vehicle registration stated that the vehicle was black, because
the vehicle he was following was “bright electric blue.” Tr. p. 149. Dispatch
confirmed that the vehicle was registered as black in color. At trial, Deputy
White testified that “as I’m looking at this vehicle, it’s a bright electric blue. It is
the middle of the night, but it’s not – I like to give people the benefit of the
doubt, but it’s not a dark navy blue color, it’s bright electric blue[.]” Tr. p. 149.
Deputy White initiated a traffic stop and approached the driver’s side of Rush’s
vehicle. The moment that the driver’s-side window was rolled down, Deputy
White smelled burnt marijuana. Deputy White asked Rush why he smelled
marijuana, to which Rush replied that he had “just smoked a joint earlier.” Tr.
p. 151. Deputy White also explained to Rush that he had stopped him because
of the color discrepancy of his vehicle, and Rush indicated that the vehicle color
had never been changed. At that point, Deputy White had Rush and his
passenger Tameka Thomas exit the vehicle and called Deputy Shoemaker for
assistance. Before Deputy Shoemaker arrived, Deputy White patted down Rush
for officer safety and located a roll of cash in his pants pocket.
[3] Upon Deputy Shoemaker’s arrival, Deputy White conducted a search of Rush’s
vehicle. In the center console, Deputy White located a pipe with burnt residue
that smelled like marijuana, a loaded handgun, and a loaded magazine. In the
backseat of the vehicle, Deputy White found a bag containing a smoking device
which contained a brown and green leafy substance that he believed to be
marijuana and a jacket containing a large roll of cash. After searching the inside
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of the vehicle, Deputy White began to search the trunk. Deputy White
discovered a blue duffel bag containing two one-gallon plastic baggies and
inside the baggies were stacks of smaller plastic baggies. Deputy White also
discovered a glass jar full of marijuana and marijuana buds.
[4] After finding the marijuana, Deputy White explained to both Rush and
Thomas that he would be taking both of them to jail because they were both
within reach of the two pipes found in the vehicle. Thomas asked why they
were both going to jail, and Deputy White again stated that it was due to both
Rush and her being in proximity to the pipes. Rush stated, “I guess I’ll take it.”
Ex. 20.
[5] Once Rush was placed into custody, Deputy White completed the search of the
vehicle. After resuming his search of the trunk, Deputy White found two scales,
marijuana, and a jar containing a white powdery substance that field-tested
positive for cocaine. Subsequent testing confirmed that Deputy White
discovered an aggregate of 920.29 grams of marijuana and 26.82 grams of
cocaine from Rush’s vehicle.
[6] On May 17, 2016, the State charged Rush with Level 2 felony cocaine dealing
and Level 6 felony marijuana dealing. On August 2, 2016, Rush moved to
suppress both the evidence discovered during the search of his vehicle and the
statements he made to police, both of which motions were denied. On April 12,
2017, the State also charged Rush with Level 4 felony possession of cocaine,
Class C misdemeanor operating a vehicle with a controlled substance in the
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body, Class B misdemeanor marijuana possession, and Level 6 felony
marijuana possession. On March 13 and 14, 2018, a jury trial was held, after
which Rush was found guilty as charged. The trial court merged the possession
convictions with the dealing convictions. On February 27, 2019, the trial court
sentenced Rush to seventeen and one-half years for the cocaine-dealing
conviction, one year for the marijuana-dealing conviction, and sixty days for
the operating-a-vehicle-with-a-controlled-substance-in-the-body conviction, all
to be served concurrently.
Discussion and Decision
[7] Rush contends that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence the items
seized from his vehicle during the traffic stop and the statements he made to
police. We review the trial court’s decision to admit evidence for an abuse of
discretion. Ware v. State, 816 N.E.2d 1167, 1175 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). The trial
court’s decision is an abuse of discretion if it is clearly against the logic and
effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. Id.I. Traffic Stop
[8] Rush contends that because the police lacked reasonable suspicion to stop his
vehicle pursuant to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
and Article 1, Section 11, of the Indiana Constitution, the trial court
erroneously admitted the items seized by police during the search of his vehicle.
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Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
a seizure in the form of a traffic stop is permissible if an officer
has at least reasonable suspicion that a traffic law, or other law
has been violated. Whether reasonable suspicion for a seizure
existed requires examination of the totality of the circumstances
to determine whether the detaining officer had a particularized
and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing. The
reasonable suspicion requirement is met where the facts known
to the officer, together with the reasonable inferences arising
from such facts, would cause an ordinarily prudent person to
believe illegal activity has occurred or is about to occur.
Johnson v. State, 992 N.E.2d 955, 957–58 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.
[9] When a defendant also challenges an investigatory stop under Article 1, Section
11, of the Indiana Constitution, the burden falls on the State to establish that
the police conduct was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances.
Marshall v. State, 117 N.E.3d 1254, 1262 (Ind. 2019). Although police may stop
a vehicle when they observe minor traffic law violations, they still must do so in
accordance with Article 1, Section 11. Id. To determine whether a traffic stop
was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances we evaluate: (1) the
degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred; (2) the
degree of intrusion the method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen’s
ordinary activities; and (3) the extent of law enforcement needs. Id.[10] Indiana Code subsection 9-18.1-3-1(a) provides that a person who desires to
register a vehicle must provided certain information in his application to the
Bureau of Motor Vehicles, including, inter alia, a “brief description of the
vehicle to be registered, including the identification number and the color of the
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vehicle.” (emphasis added). Indiana Code subsection 9-18.1-3-1(d) provides that
a “person that makes a false statement in an application to register a vehicle
under this article commits a Class C infraction.” Deputy White observed
Rush’s vehicle to be bright electric blue, but the vehicle was registered as black;
therefore, we conclude that pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, Deputy White
had a reasonable suspicion that Rush had committed a Class C infraction, at
the very least. See Smith v. State, 713 N.E.2d 338, 343 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999)
(concluding that a police officer had reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic
stop upon observing that the license plate on defendant’s blue and white vehicle
was registered to a yellow vehicle.), trans. denied.
[11] Moreover, we conclude that Deputy White’s traffic stop was reasonable
pursuant to Article 1, Section 11, of the Indiana Constitution. First, based on
the color discrepancy, Deputy White had a high degree of suspicion that Rush
had committed a Class C infraction. Second, the degree of intrusion that the
traffic stop cause to Rush’s ordinary activities was minute. This was a routine
traffic stop for a traffic infraction which only turned into a prolonged procedure
once Deputy White smelled the odor of marijuana emanating from inside
Rush’s vehicle. If this traffic stop was intrusive to Rush in any way, it was
caused by his own criminal wrongdoing. Third, as our Indiana Supreme Court
has acknowledged, “law enforcement has at least a legitimate, if not a
compelling, need to enforce traffic-safety law[.]” Marshall, 117 N.E.3d at 1262.
[12] Rush directs our attention to U.S. v. Uribe, 709 F.3d 646 (7th Cir. 2013) in
support of his argument that a color discrepancy of a vehicle, alone, is
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insufficient to provide reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop. Uribe, however, is
easily distinguishable from this matter. In Uribe, the court concluded that color
discrepancy, alone, was insufficient to provide reasonable suspicion that a
vehicle was stolen. 709 F.3d at 654. The court, however, did not reach a
conclusion as to whether an Indiana registered vehicle’s color discrepancy
could provide reasonable suspicion of a violation of Indiana’s vehicle
registration statute. Rather, the court noted that the government had not shown
that the Indiana statute applied in the case before it, because Uribe was driving
a vehicle registered in Utah. Id. at 653. The court noted that “since the
[Indiana] registration provision asserted by the government does not apply to
the Utah-registered vehicle Uribe was driving, a suspected violation of it could
not be the criminal activity at the heart of the objective reasonable suspicion
analysis.” Id. at 654. Here, however, we are being asked to determine whether
the color discrepancy of a vehicle registered in Indiana provides a reasonable
suspicion that a violation of Indiana law has occurred, and we conclude that it
does. Deputy White had reasonable suspicion that Rush was in violation of
Indiana Code section 9-18.1-3-1, a Class C infraction. The trial court did not
abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence obtained as a result of the traffic
stop.1
1
Because we conclude that the color discrepancy was sufficient to provide a reasonable suspicion for the
traffic stop, we need not address Deputy White’s second reason for stopping Rush, which was an
unilluminated taillight, a reason which Rush argues is contrary to the police officer’s body camera footage.
Moreover, we need not address whether Rush’s admission regarding the taillight was obtained in violation of
his Miranda rights.
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II. Miranda
[13] Rush contends that because the statements he made to Deputy White were
obtained in violation of his Miranda rights, the trial court erroneously admitted
them into evidence. Given the overwhelming evidence of guilt, we conclude
that any Miranda violation in this case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Not every error in the admission of evidence requires a reversal. Carr v. State,
934 N.E.2d 1096, 1107 (Ind. 2010). “And before a federal constitutional error
can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (internal quotations and citations
omitted). “The improper admission of evidence is harmless error when the
reviewing court is satisfied that the conviction is supported by substantial
independent evidence of guilt so that there is no substantial likelihood that the
challenged evidence contributed to the conviction.” Meadows v. State, 785
N.E.2d 1112, 1122 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied.
[14] In this matter, Rush’s statements aside, the evidence of guilt is overwhelming.
Upon first contact with Rush’s vehicle, Deputy White smelled burnt marijuana
emanating from inside. A search of Rush’s vehicle led to the discovery of pipes,
plastic baggies, a handgun, electric scales, large amounts of cash, 920.29 grams
of marijuana, and 26.82 grams of cocaine. Moreover, it is undisputed that Rush
was the driver of the vehicle and that it was registered in his name. This
evidence, alone, overwhelmingly supports Rush’s convictions.
[15] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
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Vaidik, C.J., and Riley, J., concur.
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