Dale Young v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Jun 06 2019, 9:02 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
the defense of res judicata, collateral and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Susan D. Rayl Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Hand | Ponist Attorney General of Indiana
Horvath Smith & Rayl, LLC
Indianapolis, Indiana Samuel J. Dayton
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Dale Young, June 6, 2019
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-CR-2818
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Steven Rubick,
Appellee-Plaintiff Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No.
49G19-1808-CM-29189
May, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2818 | June 6, 2019 Page 1 of 6
[1] Dale Young appeals his convictions of Class B misdemeanor possession of
marijuana 1 and Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia. 2 Young
argues the State did not present sufficient evidence to prove he constructively
possessed the marijuana and paraphernalia found in a backpack in the locked,
detached garage on his property. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Because of a prior conviction, Young signed a contract with Marion County
Community Corrections (“MCCC”) that “waive[d] his right against search
seizure” and permitted MCCC staff or any law enforcement officer acting on
MCCC’s behalf to “search [his] person, residence, motor vehicle, or any
location where [his] personal property may be found, to insure compliance with
the requirements of community correction” while on probation. (State’s Ex. 1
at 1.) Young was not to possess alcohol or non-prescribed drugs, and he was to
notify Community Corrections of any changes in his home situation. (Id. at 1,
5.)
[3] On August 28, 2018, MCCC case managers, Frankie Piland and Brooklynn
Baker, and Officer Steve Hoffman conducted a home visit with Young to verify
his compliance with the MCCC contract. While investigating, Officer Hoffman
1
Ind. Code § 35-48-4-11 (2018).
2
Ind. Code § 35-48-4-8.3 (2015).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2818 | June 6, 2019 Page 2 of 6
noted Young’s locked, detached garage and obtained the key from Young.
While inside the garage, Officer Hoffman noticed a backpack. Inside the
backpack was a cannabis pipe and a glass mason jar containing marijuana.
[4] Young was arrested and subsequently charged with Class B misdemeanor
possession of marijuana and Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia.
The trial court found Young guilty on both counts and sentenced him to 180
days for possession of marijuana and a sixty-days for possession of
paraphernalia, to be served concurrently.
Discussion and Decision
[5] When reviewing sufficiency of the evidence in support of a conviction, we will
consider only probative evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s
judgment. Binkley v. State, 654 N.E.2d 736, 737 (Ind. 2007), reh’g denied. The
decision comes before us with a presumption of legitimacy, and we will not
substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder. Id. We do not assess the
credibility of the witnesses or reweigh the evidence in determining whether the
evidence is sufficient. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007).
Reversal is appropriate only when no reasonable fact-finder could find the
elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Thus, the
evidence is not required to overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence
and “is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the
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verdict.” Id. at 147 (quoting Pickens v. State, 751 N.E.2d 331, 334 (Ind. Ct. App.
2001)).
[6] Possession can be actual or constructive. Lampkins v. State, 682 N.E.2d 1268,
1275 (Ind. 1997), modified on reh’g on other grounds, 685 N.E.2d 698 (Ind. 1997).
“Actual possession occurs when a defendant has direct physical control over an
item, whereas constructive possession occurs when a person has the intent and
capability to maintain dominion and control over the item.” Griffin v. State, 945
N.E.2d 781, 783 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). We must determine whether the State
proved Young constructively possessed the drugs and paraphernalia when he
did not have direct physical control over the items the police found. “In cases
where the accused has exclusive possession of the premises on which the
contraband is found, an inference is permitted that he or she knew of the
presence of contraband and was capable of controlling it.” Holmes v. State, 785
N.E.2d 658, 661 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). If possession is non-exclusive, the
inference of possession is not permitted unless additional circumstances indicate
“knowledge of the presence of the contraband and the ability to control it.”
Person v. State, 661 N.E.2d 587, 590 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied. Young
argues the State did not provide sufficient evidence he knew the marijuana and
paraphernalia were in the garage. We disagree.
[7] Young maintains that he was not in exclusive possession of the garage because
his part-time roommate had access to the garage. Yet Piland testified that
Young failed to “notify Community Corrections of any changes in [his] home
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situation(s)…” as required by his contract with MCCC, (State’s Ex. 1 at 5), and
Officer Hoffman testified that Young “was the sole occupant of that house.”
(Tr. Vol. II at 12.) Still, Young contends the State failed to include details
useful in determining how many individuals lived in the house—e.g., what
clothing or personal items were in the bedrooms—thus his testimony that he
had a roommate was uncontradicted and should be presumed truthful.
(Appellant’s Br. at 10.) However, the trial court did not find Young’s testimony
credible. (See Tr. Vol. II at 41) (trial court said, “I simply don’t believe your
client’s testimony”). Because we do not assess the credibility of the witnesses or
reweigh the evidence in determining whether the evidence is sufficient, we
cannot rely on the evidence to which Young points.
[8] Because Young had exclusive possession and control over the detached garage,
there was sufficient evidence to infer Young not only knew of the presence of
the marijuana and paraphernalia but was also capable of controlling them.
Young owned and lived in the house and, thus, owned the detached garage.
“[A] house or apartment used as a residence is controlled by the person who
lives in it and that person may be found in control of any drugs discovered
therein, whether he is the owner, tenant, or merely an invitee.” Martin v. State,
372 N.E.2d 1194, 1197 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978). Young possessed the key that
opened the locked, detached garage. Young’s belongings—clippers,
lawnmowers, and tools—were in the garage near the backpack containing the
marijuana and paraphernalia. This evidence is sufficient to support the court’s
conclusion that Young had constructive possession of the marijuana and
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paraphernalia. See Goliday v. State, 708 N.E.2d 4, 6 (Ind. 1999) (defendant
possessed cocaine when he had the key that opened the trunk of the car and his
clothes were near the cocaine).
Conclusion
[9] The State presented sufficient evidence to prove Young possessed the marijuana
and paraphernalia found in his locked, detached garage. Accordingly, we
affirm his convictions.
[10] Affirmed.
Mathias, J., and Brown, J., concur.
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