Louis Timothy Whyde v. Black Diamond Construction, LLC ( 2014 )


Menu:
  • Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
    Memorandum Decision shall not be
    regarded as precedent or cited before any
    Jul 09 2014, 9:55 am
    court except for the purpose of establishing
    the defense of res judicata, collateral
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT:                       ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
    TIMOTHY F. DEVEREUX                            TIMOTHY W. DEGROOTE
    MARK C. LADENDORF                              ANDREW S. WILLIAMS
    LANCE R. LADENDORF                             ERIC M. WILKINS
    Ladendorf Law                                  Hunt Suedhoff Kalamaros, LLP
    Indianapolis, Indiana                          Fort Wayne, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    LOUIS TIMOTHY WHYDE,                           )
    )
    Appellant-Plaintiff,                     )
    )
    vs.                               )     No. 02A04-1402-CT-64
    )
    BLACK DIAMOND CONSTRUCTION, LLC,               )
    )
    Appellee-Defendant.                      )
    APPEAL FROM THE ALLEN SUPERIOR COURT
    The Honorable David J. Avery, Judge
    Cause No. 02D01-1111-CT-559
    July 9, 2014
    MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    GARRARD, Senior Judge
    Louis Timothy Whyde was seriously injured while working for a subcontractor on
    a roofing project. He appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the
    project’s general contractor, Black Diamond Construction, LLC. We affirm.
    In 2011, an apartment company hired Black Diamond to perform roof replacement
    work at an apartment complex in Fort Wayne.          Black Diamond’s owner and sole
    employee at that time, Charlie Duffin, selected Michael Green as the subcontractor for
    the project. Black Diamond and Green did not have a written contract. Instead, they
    agreed that Green would locate workers. Further, Black Diamond would pay Green
    when the project was over, and Green would in turn pay his workers.
    Green contacted several workers, including Whyde.          Black Diamond ordered
    construction materials and a dumpster and arranged for them to be delivered to the site,
    but Green and the workers brought their own ladders and tools.
    Duffin did not discuss worksite safety with Green or provide safety equipment.
    Duffin visited the site during construction, but he did not hold any meetings or instruct
    Green or anyone else on how to perform the work.
    Whyde worked on the roof of a three-story building at the complex, and on June 8,
    2011, he fell to the ground and was paralyzed from the chest down. Whyde sued Black
    Diamond, alleging that it negligently failed to ensure a safe work site. Black Diamond
    filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion after oral
    argument, and this appeal followed.
    2
    ISSUE
    The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in granting Black
    Diamond’s motion for summary judgment.
    DISCUSSION AND DECISION
    We review a summary judgment order de novo. Bules v. Marshall Cnty., 
    920 N.E.2d 247
    , 250 (Ind. 2010). Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine
    issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
    Ind. Trial Rule 56. We construe all facts and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a
    light most favorable to the non-moving party.       McSwane v. Bloomington Hosp. &
    Healthcare Sys., 
    916 N.E.2d 906
    , 909 (Ind. 2009).
    A plaintiff seeking damages for negligence must establish (1) a duty owed to the
    plaintiff by the defendant, (2) a breach of the duty, and (3) an injury proximately caused
    by the breach of the duty. Pfenning v. Lineman, 
    947 N.E.2d 392
    , 398 (Ind. 2011).
    The key question in this case is whether Black Diamond owed a duty to Whyde to
    ensure his safety on the worksite. The determination of whether a duty exists is generally
    an issue of law to be decided by the court. 
    Id.
    For over one hundred years, Indiana has followed the general rule that a principal
    is not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor. Bagley v. Insight Commc’ns
    Co., L.P., 
    658 N.E.2d 584
    , 586 (Ind. 1995) (citing Prest-O-Lite Co. v. Skeel, 
    182 Ind. 593
    , 597, 
    106 N.E. 365
    , 367 (1914)). The rationale behind this rule is that a principal
    typically exercises little, if any, control over the means or manner of the work of its
    contractors and requires only that the completed work meet the specifications of the
    3
    owner in its agreement with the principal. Shawnee Constr. & Eng’g, Inc. v. Stanley, 
    962 N.E.2d 76
    , 81 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied. Thus, despite Whyde’s argument to
    the contrary, this has been the public policy of Indiana for many years.
    The Indiana Supreme Court has recognized five exceptions to the general rule: (1)
    where the contract requires the performance of intrinsically dangerous work, (2) where
    the principal is by law or contract charged with performing the specific duty, (3) where
    the act will create a nuisance, (4) where the act to be performed will probably cause
    injury to others unless due precaution is taken, and (5) where the act to be performed is
    illegal. Bagley, 658 N.E.2d at 586. A principal who employs an independent contractor
    may be subject to liability for personal injuries caused by the principal’s failure to
    exercise reasonable care to employ a competent and careful contractor only if one of
    these five exceptions is applicable. Id. at 587.
    In this case, the parties’ arguments focus on the second exception—whether the
    principal was by law or contract charged with the duty of maintaining a safe worksite.
    This exception to the general rule of non-liability is not triggered merely because a
    general contractor may have a right to inspect the work, approve the work, or require a
    subcontractor to follow safety rules. Shawnee Constr., 
    962 N.E.2d at 82
    . Rather, for this
    exception to apply, either law or a contract must provide for a specific duty of care. 
    Id.
    Black Diamond’s agreement with the apartment complex owner did not contain
    any provisions assigning responsibility for workplace safety.          Furthermore, Black
    Diamond and Green did not have a written contract. Instead, Duffin and Green orally
    agreed that Green would hire workers and Duffin would pay him “per square,” or per unit
    4
    of shingles installed. Appellant’s App. p. 133. Black Diamond ordered construction
    materials and a dumpster and arranged for them to be delivered to the site, but Green and
    the workers brought their own ladders and tools.
    Duffin did not discuss worksite safety with Green or provide safety equipment.
    Duffin visited the site during the roofing project, but he did not hold any meetings or
    instruct Green or anyone else on the work.         After the project was finished, Black
    Diamond issued a check to Green, and Green paid the workers out of his check.
    Whyde argues that Black Diamond had overall control over the project and
    managed communications with the apartment complex’s owner, but those are typical
    tasks for a general contractor.     Such activities do not give rise to a duty to a
    subcontractor’s employee. Shawnee Constr., 
    962 N.E.2d at 82
    . Viewing the facts in the
    light most favorable to Whyde, we cannot conclude as a matter of law that Black
    Diamond owed Whyde a duty to ensure a safe worksite. The trial court did not err in
    granting Black Diamond’s motion for summary judgment. See 
    id. at 86
     (a general
    contractor was entitled to summary judgment because the contractor did not agree to be
    responsible for the safety of a subcontractor’s employees).
    CONCLUSION
    For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    Affirmed.
    BRADFORD, J., and BROWN, J., concur.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 02A04-1402-CT-64

Filed Date: 7/9/2014

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021