Charlie S. Hines III v. State of Indiana ( 2014 )

Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
May 30 2014, 10:09 am
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before
any court except for the purpose of
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
MARK I. COX GREGORY F. ZOELLER
The Mark I. Cox Law Office, LLC Attorney General of Indiana
Richmond, Indiana
ANGELA N. SANCHEZ
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
CHARLIE S. HINES III, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 89A05-1307-CR-362
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE WAYNE SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Gregory A. Horn, Judge
Cause No. 89D02-1109-FB-84
May 30, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MAY, Judge
Charlie S. Hines, III, was convicted after a jury trial of two counts of dealing cocaine
as Class B felonies.1 As there was sufficient evidence to sustain his conviction, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
R.R. was a confidential informant with the Wayne County Drug Task Force. On July
14, 2011, and July 21, 2011, she bought .46 and .30 grams of cocaine, respectively, from
Hines. Before each buy, R.R. contacted Hines to see if he had drugs available. She then met
with police, and a female officer searched R.R.’s clothes and body for drugs and
paraphernalia. After the search, R.R. was provided with audio and video recording
equipment and cash. Police dropped R.R. off near Hines’ home and recorded her meeting
with him. After the buy, R.R. returned to the police vehicle and gave police the drugs she
bought, and a female officer again searched R.R.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
Hines argues the Task Force did not thoroughly search R.R. and there was no
“delivery” from Hines to R.R. We disagree.
In reviewing sufficiency of evidence, we do not reweigh evidence or assess credibility
of witnesses. Treadway v. State, 924 N.E.2d 621, 639 (Ind. 2010). We look to the evidence
and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom that support the verdict, and we will affirm the
conviction if there is probative evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could have
found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Ind. Code § 35-048-1-11 defines delivery as “an actual or constructive transfer from
1
Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1.
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one person to another” or “the organizing or supervising” of an actual or constructive
transfer. R.R. testified that she purchased cocaine on two occasions from Hines and, during
the transactions, “I gave the money to [Hines] and [Hines] gave the dope to me.” (Tr. at
415.) Her uncorroborated testimony alone is sufficient to sustain Hines’ conviction. See
Toney v. State, 715 N.E.2d 367, 369 (Ind. 1999) (uncorroborated testimony of one witness
may be sufficient by itself to sustain a conviction on appeal). Police officers also testified as
to their procedures and searches of R.R., and there were audio and video recordings of each
buy. Hines’ arguments are invitations to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See
Heyen v. State, 936 N.E.2d 294, 302 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (“Adequacy of control [over a drug
purchase] goes to the weight and credibility of the evidence presented, which we will not
reweigh.”), trans. denied.
Affirmed.
KIRSCH, J., and BAILEY, J., concur.
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