Roderick Williams v. Robert Gill and South Bend Public Transportation Corporation (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Jul 30 2019, 9:24 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
Chad M. Buell Jamie C. Woods
Schiller Law Offices, LLC Phillip A. Garrett
Carmel, Indiana Thorne Grodnik, LLP
Mishawaka, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Roderick Williams, July 30, 2019
Appellant-Plaintiff, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-CT-3056
v. Appeal from the St. Joseph
Superior Court
Robert Gill and South Bend The Honorable Jenny Pitts Manier,
Public Transportation Judge
Corporation,
Appellees-Defendants. Trial Court Cause No.
71D05-1703-CT-125
Bradford, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] On June 30, 2015, Roderick Williams was involved in an automobile accident
with Robert Gill. At the time of the accident, Gill was driving a bus in the
course of his employment as a driver for the South Bend Transportation
Corporation (“SBTC”). Williams allegedly suffered both property damage and
personal injury as a result of the accident and filed a claim for damages against
Gill and the SBTC (collectively, “Appellees”). On August 7, 2015, Williams
signed a “Release of Claim” (“the Release”) in exchange for $1733.06. The
Release indicated that Williams was releasing Appellees from liability for any
and all claims arising from or relating to the June 30, 2015 accident. Williams
subsequently filed suit against Appellees, arguing that he believed that the
Release only applied to his property damage claims and not his personal injury
claims. During discovery, Williams failed to answer certain requests for
admissions, resulting in the admissions being conclusively established pursuant
to Indiana Trial Rule 36. Williams later filed an affidavit in which he
attempted to contradict his prior admissions. The trial court rejected Williams’s
subsequent attempts to withdraw these admissions and to amend his affidavit
and granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees.
[2] Concluding that the Release was unambiguous and clearly stated that Williams
intended to release Appellees from liability for any and all claims arising from
the accident, we conclude that the award of summary judgment in favor of
Appellees was not erroneous. We further conclude that given the unambiguous
nature of the Release, any potential error committed by the trial court in
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denying Williams’s requests to withdraw his admissions or to amend his
designated evidence was at most harmless because the trial court could not have
considered any extrinsic evidence relating to the parties’ intent. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] On June 30, 2015, Gill was employed by the SBTC and was driving a bus
owned by the SBTC when he was involved in an automobile accident with
Williams in South Bend. On August 7, 2015, Williams signed the Release
releasing Appellees from liability for any and all claims arising out of the
accident in exchange for $1733.06.
[4] On March 17, 2017, Williams filed a lawsuit against Appellees, alleging that the
Release only applied to property damage sustained in the accident and seeking
additional damages for claimed personal injuries sustained as a result of the
accident. During discovery, Appellees mailed, via certified mail, a First
Request for Admissions on January 29, 2018. The document indicated that
Williams was “to admit or deny the following Request for Admission in
writing, on or before the 26th day of February, 2018.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II
p. 55. Appellees mailed, via certified mail, a Second Request for Admissions
on February 9, 2018. This document indicated that Williams was “to admit or
deny the following Request for Admissions in writing, on or before the 10th day
of March, 2018.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 57. Williams failed to answer any
of the requests for admissions. As a result, the admissions were conclusively
established pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 36.
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[5] On March 21, 2018, Appellees filed a motion requesting a status conference
and for the trial court to reset the scheduled trial date. Appellees included the
Release, a copy of the check for $1733.06 made payable to Williams, and the
First and Second Requests for Admissions as exhibits to the motion. A few
weeks later, on April 6, 2018, Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment.
On July 13, 2016, Williams filed a motion to withdraw his admissions and a
response in opposition to Appellees’ motion for summary judgment. Williams
included an affidavit, signed on Williams’s behalf by his counsel, in his
designated materials in which he attempted to contradict his prior admissions.
On July 16, 2018, Appellees filed a motion to strike Williams’s affidavit and
Williams sought permission to amend his affidavit to include a copy signed by
Williams.
[6] The trial court conducted a hearing on all pending motions on August 23, 2018.
After taking the matter under consideration, on September 4, 2018, the trial
court issued an order in which it denied Williams’s motion to withdraw
admissions, granted Appellees’ motion to strike Williams’s affidavit, denied
Williams’s motion to amend his designated materials, and granted Appellees’
motion for summary judgment. Williams’s motion to correct error was deemed
denied on November 19, 2018.
Discussion and Decision
[7] Williams raises numerous contentions on appeal which we restate as whether
the trial court (1) erred by granting Appellees’ motion for summary judgment or
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(2) abused its discretion by denying his requests to amend his designated
evidence and to withdraw certain admissions.1
I. Summary Judgment
[8] Williams contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in
favor of Appellees.
[S]ummary judgment is appropriate only where the evidence
shows there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. All facts and
reasonable inferences drawn from those facts are construed in
favor of the non-moving party. The review of a summary
judgment motion is limited to those materials designated to the
trial court. We review decisions on summary judgment motions
carefully to ensure that the parties were not improperly denied
their day in court.
Midwest Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Stroup, 730 N.E.2d 163, 165 (Ind. 2000) (internal
citations omitted).
[9] Williams argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to
Appellees because an issue of material fact remains as to whether the parties
intended for the Release to apply to both his property damage and personal
injury claims or to only his property damage claim. For their part, Appellees
1
To the extent that Williams also argues on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to rule
on his motion to correct error, we note that Williams has failed to provide any cogent argument or citation to
relevant authority in support of this argument. He has therefore waived this argument for appellate review.
See Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 264 (Ind. 2014) (providing that appellant waived claim on appeal
because he failed to support it with cogent argument or citation to relevant authority).
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argue that the Release is unambiguous and the clear language of the Release
indicates that the parties intended for it to apply to any and all claims arising
out of/relating to the accident. We agree with Appellees.
[10] The Release is a settlement agreement, i.e., an agreement to release Appellees
from future liability in exchange for $1733.06. “Indiana strongly favors
settlement agreements.” Sands v. Helen HCI, LLC, 945 N.E.2d 176, 180 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2011). “Settlement agreements are governed by the same general
principles of contract law as other agreements.” Id.; see also Evan v. Poe &
Assocs., Inc., 873 N.E.2d 92, 98 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (“A release, as with any
contract, should be interpreted according to the standard rules of contract
law.”).
The goal of contract interpretation is to determine the intent of
the parties when they made the agreement. This court must
examine the plain language of the contract, read it in context
and, whenever possible, construe it so as to render every word,
phrase, and term meaningful, unambiguous, and harmonious
with the whole. Construction of the terms of a written contract
generally is a pure question of law. If, however, a contract is
ambiguous, the parties may introduce extrinsic evidence of its
meaning, and the interpretation becomes a question of fact. A
word or phrase is ambiguous if reasonable people could differ as
to its meaning. A term is not ambiguous solely because the
parties disagree about its meaning.
Celadon Trucking Servs., Inc. v. Wilmoth, 70 N.E.3d 833, 839 (Ind. Ct. App.
2017), trans. denied.
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[11] If contract language is deemed ambiguous, “the contract terms must be
construed to determine and give effect to the intent of the parties when they
entered into the contract.” Id.Courts may properly consider all relevant evidence to resolve an
ambiguity. Extrinsic evidence is evidence relating to a contract
but not appearing on the face of the contract because it comes
from other sources, such as statements between the parties or the
circumstances surrounding the agreement. An ambiguous
contract should be construed against the party who furnished and
drafted the agreement.
Id. “A contract is ambiguous only if a reasonable person could find its terms
susceptible to more than one interpretation.” Evan, 873 N.E.2d at 98.
[12] However, “[i]f contract language is unambiguous, this court may not look to
extrinsic evidence to expand, vary, or explain the instrument but must
determine the parties’ intent from the four corners of the instrument.” Wilmoth,
70 N.E.3d at 839. Stated differently, “[w]here a contract is unambiguous, the
intent of the parties should be determined by the language employed in the
document.” Evan, 873 N.E.2d at 98 (internal quotation omitted).
Thus, if the contract is unambiguous, we give effect to the
intentions of the parties as expressed in the four corners of the
document. We will neither construe clear and unambiguous
provisions nor add provisions not agreed upon by the parties.
The meaning of a contract is to be determined from an
examination of all of its provisions, not from a consideration of
individual words, phrases, or even paragraphs read alone.
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Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). “Unambiguous contracts must
be specifically enforced as written without any additions or deletions by the
court.” Perfect v. McAndrew, 798 N.E.2d 470, 479 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
[13] In interpreting a settlement agreement, “[t]he primary purpose in construing a
document is to ascertain and give effect to the parties’ mutual intent.” Id. “The
intent relevant in contract matters is not the parties’ subjective intents but their
outward manifestation of it.” Zimmerman v. McColley, 826 N.E.2d 71, 77 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2005) (citing Centennial Mortgage, Inc. v. Blumenfeld, 745 N.E.2d 268,
277 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001)). “The cardinal rule of contract interpretation is to
ascertain the intention of the parties’ from their expression of it.” Blumenfeld,
745 N.E.2d at 277. “A court does not examine the hidden intentions secreted
in the heart of a person; rather it should examine the final expression found in
conduct.” Id.[14] In this case, the Release signed by the parties reads as follows:
The Undersigned, being of lawful age, for sole consideration of
one thousand seven hundred thirty three dollars and six cents
($1,733.06) to be paid to Roderick Williams do/does and for
your/your heirs, executors, administrators, successors and
assigns release, acquit and forever discharge Transpo and his, her,
their, or its agents, servants, successors, heirs, executors,
administrators, and all other persons, firms, corporations [ ] or
partnerships of and from any and all claims, actions, course of action,
demands, rights, damages, costs, loss of services, expenses, and
compensation whatsoever, which thus undersigned now has/have or
which may hereafter accrue on account of us or any way growing out of
any and all known and unknown, foreseen and unforeseen damages and
the consequences thereof resulting or to result from the accident, casualty
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or event which occurred on or about the 30th day of June 2015, at or
near Eddy Street & Jefferson Blvd. in South Bend, IN. It is
understood and agreed that this settlement is the compromise of
a claim, and that the payment made is not to be considered as an
admission of liability on the part of the party or parties hereby
released nor as a contribution toward any bodily injury or
medical related expense of any kind.
The Undersigned further declare(s) and represent(s) that no
promise, inducement or agreement not herein expressed has been
made to the Undersigned, and that this Release serves as the
entire agreement between the parties hereto, and that the terms of
this release are contractual and not a mere recital.
THE UNDERSIGNED HAS READ THE FOREGOING
RELEASE AND FULLY UNDERSTANDS IT.
Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 59 (emphases added). Upon review, we do not
believe that a reasonable person could find the terms of the Release susceptible
to more than one interpretation. As such, we conclude that the Release is
unambiguous. We will therefore confine our review of the parties’ intent to the
four corners of the document and will enforce the terms as written.
[15] The Release clearly states that, in exchange for $1733.06, Williams agreed to
“release, acquit and forever discharge” Appellees “from any and all claims,
actions, course of action, demands, rights, damages, costs, loss of services,
expenses, and compensation whatsoever … resulting or to result from the
accident.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 59. This language clearly indicates that
by signing the Release, Williams intended to release Appellees from all claims
arising from the accident. Williams cannot subsequently circumvent the clear
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language used in the Release by stating on appeal that he believed it meant
something else. See Zimmerman, 826 N.E.2d at 77 (providing that the parties’
outward manifestation of intent, not their subjective intents, is relevant in
contract matters).
[16] The clear language of the Release supports the trial court’s determination that
Appellees were entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Given that the
Release is unambiguous, it would have been improper for the trial court to
consider any contrary extrinsic evidence relating to the parties’ intent when
ruling on the summary judgment motion. See Wilmoth, 70 N.E.3d at 839;
Perfect, 798 N.E.2d at 479. As such, we conclude that the trial court did not err
in granting Appellees’ motion for summary judgment.2
II. Motion to Amended Designated Evidence
[17] Williams also contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his
motion to amend his designated evidence, specifically to amend his affidavit.
In requesting permission to file an amended affidavit, Williams’s counsel
explicitly states that the only change in the amended document is that it is
2
We are unpersuaded by Williams’s counsel’s assertion that the entry of summary judgment should be
reversed because Williams apparently signed the release without first discussing the matter with counsel,
whom he had retained prior to signing the Release. See generally Waterfield v. Waterfield, 61 N.E.3d 314, 319–
20, 326 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (denying a respect to set aside a settlement agreement when the party entered
into the agreement despite her attorney’s warnings and cautions). We are also unpersuaded by Williams’s
claim that the Release did not apply to his personal injury claims merely because he filed those claims under
a different claim number than his property damage claim. Williams’s attempt to circumvent the Release by
filing his claims under different claim numbers does not change the fact that both the property damage and
personal injury claims resulted from the accident.
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signed by Williams rather than the original which was signed by Williams’s
counsel on Williams’s behalf. Counsel states that “[o]therwise, the substance,
form, and content of the Amended Designation of Materials is exactly the same
as the previously filed Designation of Materials filed by Plaintiff on
7/13/2018.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 178.
[18] In challenging the trial court’s denial of his motion to amend his designated
evidence, Williams argues that his affidavit, in both its original and amended
form, presented statements sufficient to create an issue of material fact as to
intent. However, given our conclusion above that the language of the Release
was unambiguous, the trial court could not have properly considered this
extrinsic evidence when determining the parties’ intent. See Wilmoth, 70 N.E.3d
at 839; Perfect, 798 N.E.2d at 479. Thus, even if the trial court had allowed
Williams to amend his designated evidence to include a copy of his affidavit
that was signed by him, the amended affidavit would have had no bearing on
the trial court’s summary judgment ruling as the trial court could not have
considered it as evidence of intent. The trial court, therefore, did not abuse its
discretion in this regard.
III. Withdrawal of Admissions
[19] Williams last contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his
request to withdraw certain admissions. In raising this contention, Williams
argues that he should have been permitted to withdraw his admissions because
without the admissions, he could have presented evidence that would have
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created an issue of material fact as to intent that would have, in turn, precluded
the award of summary judgment for Appellees. Given our conclusion above
that the trial court could not have considered any extrinsic evidence regarding
to intent because the Release was clear and unambiguous, we conclude that
even if the trial court erred by denying Williams’s request to withdraw his
admissions, such error could, at most, be found to be harmless as it would have
had no bearing on the trial court’s summary judgment determination. The trial
court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in this regard.
[20] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Vaidik, C.J., and Riley, J., concur.
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