Shane Weedling v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2017 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), May 18 2017, 10:04 am
this Memorandum Decision shall not be CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
regarded as precedent or cited before any Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Alexander L. Hoover Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Nappanee, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Caryn N. Szyper
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Shane E. Weedling, May 18, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
50A03-1611-CR-2544
v. Appeal from the Marshall Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Robert O. Bowen,
Appellee-Plaintiff Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
50D01-1509-F1-9
Altice, Judge.
Case Summary
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[1] Shane E. Weedling appeals the sixty-five-year sentence imposed after he pled
guilty to murder. He argues that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the
nature of the offense and his character.
[2] We affirm.
Facts & Procedural History
[3] In September 2015, Weedling and his girlfriend, Krysti LaVanway, were living
at a motel in Plymouth, Indiana with LaVanway’s two-year-old daughter from
a previous relationship, S.W. On September 18, 2015, LaVanway left S.W. in
Weedling’s care when she went to work. Between 9:18 and 10:07 a.m.,
Weedling and LaVanway exchanged a number of Facebook messages. In the
messages, Weedling indicated that he was angry because S.W. had wet the bed
and told LaVanway that S.W. needed to go live somewhere else because he was
“done wit [sic] her.” Exhibit Volume.1 Weedling warned LaVanway that S.W.
had been beaten and that the longer LaVanway took to get home, the “moor
[S.W. would] get beat [sic]”. Id.
[4] When LaVanway returned home at 11:45 a.m., she found S.W. unconscious
with a bloody face and nose. Weedling told LaVanway to let S.W. sleep and
not to take her to the hospital. Weedling also told LaVanway to say that S.W.
had fallen in the shower and stated he could not go to the hospital because he
1
We note that exhibits submitted by the State in advance of sentencing were not separately identified by
exhibit number, nor is the Exhibit Volume paginated.
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would be arrested. Hours later, LaVanway asked a neighbor for a ride to the
hospital. S.W. arrived at the hospital at 2:21 p.m.
[5] Within ten minutes of S.W.’s arrival at the hospital, police were dispatched to
investigate suspected child abuse. The doctor who examined S.W. informed
Detective Leo Mangus of the Plymouth Police Department that S.W. was
unconscious and in critical condition with bleeding on the brain that could lead
to death. The doctor further stated that there were older bruises on S.W.’s
body. Detective Mangus observed numerous injuries on S.W.’s body, including
heavy bruising on her buttocks, bruising in the shape of fingers on her ribs,
bruising on her legs and arms, a bloody injury on her head, and bleeding from
her nose.
[6] LaVanway initially told Detective Mangus that S.W. had fallen in the shower
and that Weedling was not home when the injury occurred. LaVanway
consented to a search of her motel room, and upon his arrival at the room,
Detective Mangus found Weedling asleep on the bed and a bag of marijuana on
the nightstand. After some difficulty waking Weedling, Detective Mangus
asked him what had happened. Weedling stated that he was in the other room
when S.W. fell in the shower. Weedling and LaVanway were both transported
to the police department for questioning, where they gave police conflicting
accounts of what had happened to S.W. LaVanway eventually admitted that
she was at work when S.W. was injured and that she had lied to try to protect
Weedling. She also stated that Weedling told her that he had spanked S.W.
with a hairbrush until it broke, and she believed that was how S.W. sustained
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the bruising on her buttocks. During a search of the motel room, police located
a broken hair brush and numerous bloodstained items, including a child’s shirt
with a large amount of blood on the front.
[7] S.W. never regained consciousness and died the next day as a result of
devastating brain injuries. An autopsy indicated that S.W.’s death was a
homicide as a result of multiple blunt force injuries to her head. S.W. had
significant bruising all over her body in different stages of healing and massive
bruising on the left side of her face causing her eye to hemorrhage and her
retina to detach. S.W. had injuries to her buttocks, her forehead, her left cheek
and ear, her mouth, her abdomen, her back, her wrist, her pelvic area, both of
her knees, and her right foot. Her injuries were not consistent with a fall in the
shower.
[8] On September 23, 2015, the State charged Weedling with Level 1 felony
aggravated battery, Level 1 felony neglect of a dependent resulting in death, and
Level 6 felony possession of marijuana. On October 29, 2015, the State
amended the charging information to add a murder charge. On September 13,
2016, Weedling pled guilty to murder and the remaining charges were
dismissed.2 A sentencing hearing was held on October 6, 2016, at the
conclusion of which the trial court imposed the maximum sentence of sixty-five
2
LaVanway pled guilty to Level 1 felony neglect of a dependent. See LaVanway v. State, 59 N.E.3d 1100
(Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (memorandum decision), trans. denied.
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years executed. Weedling now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as
necessary.
Discussion & Decision
[9] Weedling seeks appellate revision of his sentence. Article 7, section 4 of the
Indiana Constitution grants our Supreme Court the power to review and revise
criminal sentences. See Knapp v. State, 9 N.E.3d 1274, 1292 (Ind. 2014), cert.
denied, 135 S. Ct. 978 (2015). Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 7, the Supreme
Court authorized this court to perform the same task. Cardwell v. State, 895
N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008). Per App. R. 7(B), we may revise a sentence “if
after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, the Court finds that the
sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character
of the offender.” Inman v. State, 4 N.E.3d 190, 203 (Ind. 2014) (quoting App. R.
7). “Sentencing review under Appellate Rule 7(B) is very deferential to the trial
court.” Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864, 876 (Ind. 2012). “Such deference
should prevail unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive
light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and
lack of brutality) and the defendant’s character (such as substantial virtuous
traits or persistent examples of good character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d
111, 122 (Ind. 2015).
[10] The determination of whether we regard a sentence as inappropriate “turns on
our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the
damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given
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case.” Bethea v. State, 983 N.E.2d 1134, 1145 (Ind. 2013) (quoting Cardwell, 895
N.E.2d at 1224). Moreover, “[t]he principal role of such review is to attempt to
leaven the outliers.” Chambers v. State, 989 N.E.2d 1257, 1259 (Ind. 2013). It is
not our goal in this endeavor to achieve the perceived “correct” sentence in
each case. Knapp, 9 N.E.3d at 1292. Accordingly, “the question under
Appellate Rule 7(B) is not whether another sentence is more appropriate; rather,
the question is whether the sentence imposed is inappropriate.” King v. State,
894 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (emphasis in original).
[11] In order to assess the appropriateness of a sentence, we first look to the
statutory range established for the classification of the relevant offense. The
sentencing range for murder is forty-five to sixty-five years, with an advisory
sentence of fifty-five years. Weedling received the maximum sentence of sixty-
five years. Our Supreme Court has explained that while “the maximum
possible sentences are generally most appropriate for the worst offenders,” this
is not “a guideline to determine whether a worse offender could be imagined”
as “it will always be possible to identify or hypothesize a significantly more
despicable scenario.” Buchanan v. State, 767 N.E.2d 967, 973 (Ind. 2002)
(citations and quotation marks omitted). Thus, in reviewing a maximum
sentence, “[w]e concentrate less on comparing the facts of this case to others . . .
and more on focusing on the nature, extent, and depravity of the offense . . .
and what it reveals about the defendant’s character.” Wells v. State, 904 N.E.2d
265, 274 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied.
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[12] The nature of Weedling’s offense is abhorrent. He brutally beat a defenseless
two-year-old girl to death for wetting the bed. Weedling took a break from
beating S.W. to send LaVanway Facebook messages telling her that he had
beaten S.W. and would continue to do so until LaVanway came home. S.W.’s
injuries were extensive, obvious, and devastating, but Weedling did not seek
medical attention for her and tried to prevent LaVanway from doing so.
Weedling also concocted a story about S.W. falling in the shower in an attempt
to explain S.W.’s injuries. Moreover, S.W. had bruises in various states of
healing, suggesting a pattern of ongoing abuse. Weedling’s argument that
“there was no clear evidence in the record that Weedling had knowledge or
intent to murder S.W.” is puzzling, given that Weedling pled guilty to
knowingly killing S.W. Appellant’s Brief at 11. See also Appellant’s Appendix at 41
(information for murder charging Weedling with “knowingly kill[ing] another
human being, to-wit: S.W.”). There is ample evidence in the record to support
a reasonable inference that Weedling knowingly killed S.W. To the extent that
Weedling suggests that he committed the crime because he was under the
influence of drugs, we note that he was lucid enough to send Facebook
messages to LaVanway expressing his anger and his intent to continue beating
S.W. until LaVanway got home and to fabricate a story in an attempt to hide
his crime. In sum, the nature of the offense in this case supports the sentence
imposed.
[13] Nor do we find anything significantly redeeming about Weedling’s character.
The crime itself speaks volumes about Weedling’s character. Moreover,
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Weedling has a significant criminal history. Weedling was twenty-three years
old at the time of the murder, but he had already been convicted of three
felonies: class D felony theft, class D felony possession of marijuana, and class
B felony burglary. Weedling also had misdemeanor convictions for possession
of marijuana and false informing and juvenile adjudications for possession of an
alcoholic beverage, leaving home without parental permission, and public
indecency. Weedling suggests that his struggles with substance abuse support
revision of his sentence, but we note that substance abuse may properly be
considered an aggravating circumstance. See, e.g., Bryant v. State, 802 N.E.2d
486, 501 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (concluding that eighteen-year-old defendant’s
history of substance abuse was properly considered to be an aggravating
circumstance where the defendant had taken no positive steps to treat his
addiction), trans. denied. Weedling told the probation officer who prepared his
Pre-Sentence Investigation Report (PSI) that he had been referred for substance
abuse treatment in the past, but felt that “drug and alcohol classes are
pointless.” Appellant’s Appendix at 120. When asked whether he would attend
substance abuse treatment, Weedling responded, “no, God has delivered me.”
Id. We do not see how Weedling’s substance abuse reflects positively on his
character, particularly in light of his continuing refusal to accept treatment.
[14] Finally, Weedling directs out attention to a letter his parents sent to the trial
court indicating that Weedling had been participating in religious programming
while incarcerated. According to Weedling, his “dedication to religious
introspection” indicates that he “is attempting to come to grips with the
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enormity of what happened while also attempting to make himself a better
human being.” Appellant’s Brief at 11. However, our review of the record
indicates that Weedling continued to minimize the seriousness of his offense
even after his guilty plea. In a letter sent to the trial court on September 26,
2016, Weedling complained about the demeanor of the probation officer who
prepared his PSI and indicated that he believed his charge should have been
dropped to involuntary manslaughter because he never meant for any of it to
happen. We note further that when asked how he felt about his crime,
Weedling responded “horrible, [but] at the same time content cause God has
forgiven me.” Appellant’s Appendix at 120. For all of these reasons, we cannot
say that Weedling’s sixty-five-year sentence is inappropriate.
[15] Judgment affirmed.
[16] Kirsch, J. and Mathias, J., concur.
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