Michael Kimes v. State of Indiana ( 2014 )

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be
Mar 31 2014, 6:31 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
RUTH JOHNSON GREGORY F. ZOELLER
MATTHEW D. ANGLEMEYER Attorney General of Indiana
Marion County Public Defender Agency
Appellate Division
Indianapolis, Indiana
KARL M. SCHARNBERG
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
MICHAEL KIMES, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 49A04-1309-CR-440
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Mark D. Stoner, Judge
Cause No. 49G06-1303-FA-14982
March 31, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
KIRSCH, Judge
Michael Kimes was found guilty of child molesting1 as a Class A felony and was
sentenced to thirty years with six years suspended, three of those years on sex offender
probation. He appeals, raising the following restated issues for our review:
I. Whether the State committed fundamental error by engaging in
prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments;
II. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing Kimes
because it failed to consider his mental and physical health conditions
as a mitigating circumstance; and
III. Whether Kimes’s sentence was inappropriate in light if the nature of
the offense and the character of the offender.
We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY2
During the time period of 2010 to 2011, Chassidy Kimes (“Chassidy”) was working
as a receptionist at a pediatric dental clinic on the north side of Indianapolis, Indiana. At
first, her normal work hours included every other Saturday from 9:00 a.m. until 1:00 p.m.
Chassidy had two daughters, A.G. and. A.L. The children’s father watched them every
other Saturday while Chassidy worked. At some point, Chassidy’s hours changed, and she
was required to work every Saturday. She was forced to make other arrangements for
childcare on the weekends because the children’s father could not take every Saturday off.
1
See Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3.
2
The record on appeal in this case was prepared pursuant to the Indiana Supreme Court’s “Order
Establishing the Indiana Court Reporting Pilot Project for Exploring the Use of an Audio/Visual Record on
Appeal[,]” issued on September 18, 2012, and effective on July 1, 2012. See In Re Pilot Project For
Audio/Visual Recordings In Lieu of Paper Transcripts In the Preparation of the Record and Briefing on
Appeal, 976 N.E.2d 1218 (Ind. 2012). We are grateful for the ongoing cooperation of the Honorable Mark
D. Stoner of Marion Superior Court, the Marion County Public Defender Agency, and the Office of the
Indiana Attorney General in the execution of this pilot project.
2
Chassidy asked her father, Kimes, if he would watch the girls on Saturdays, and Kimes
agreed.
Because Kimes lived on the south side of Indianapolis, Chassidy lived on the east
side, and her place of employment was on the north side, Chassidy would drop the girls off
at Kimes’s house on Friday evening and return on Saturday afternoon to pick them up. At
Kimes’s house, the girls basically “slept where they fell,” sometimes on the living room
floor, sometimes on a pallet in Kimes’s room, and sometimes in Chassidy’s sixteen-year-
old brother’s bedroom. A/V Recording of 7/29/13 at 3:33:35-54.3
One night, while A.G. was sleeping in Kimes’s bedroom on the floor, she woke up
because Kimes was touching her “bad part,” which is what she called her vagina. A/V
Recording of 7/29/13 at 2:09:20, 2:10:51, 2:11:57. She saw Kimes’s mouth on her bad
part and felt him put his tongue inside of her vagina. She said that, “it felt icky and slimy.”
A/V Recording of 7/29/13 at 2:14:57. A.G. pretended that she needed to use the bathroom
and asked Kimes to get off of her. She instead went downstairs to sleep in the living room.
A.G. also related with less specificity other incidents that she alleged happened between
her and Kimes. A/V Recording of 7/29/13 at 2:17:43, 2:17:48, 2:18:07-16, 1:20:05-26,
2:24:15-20, 2:24:57-25:04, 2:35:52-36:10, 2:38:20-25.
At one point in 2011, when Chassidy had picked up the girls from Kimes’s house,
A.G. told Chassidy that Kimes had touched her. Chassidy asked if it was a good touch or
a bad touch, and A.G. pointed to her leg. Chassidy demonstrated the difference between a
3
Because there is no paper transcript, our citations reflect the location of the information on the
DVD.
3
good touch and a bad touch, and although A.G. seemed confused, A.G. told Chassidy the
touch was more like a good touch. A/V Recording of 7/29/13 at 3:41:10. However, around
that time, the girls said that they did not want to stay with Kimes anymore, so Chassidy
made other arrangements.
About a year later on a Friday in February, Chassidy and A.G. were out running
errands when they drove past a jail. A.G. asked Chassidy what kind of people went to jail,
and Chassidy told her that bad people who do not follow the laws go to jail. A.G. then said
that Kimes needed to go to jail because he was a bad man. Chassidy asked a few questions,
but did not know how to handle the disclosure. They went home, and Chassidy spoke with
A.G.’s father, who then had a conversation with A.G. about the allegations. Chassidy
researched online how to handle an allegation of child molesting, found the Child
Advocacy Center’s website, and determined that she and A.G.’s father should not speak to
A.G. about the incident further. She called the Child Advocacy Center on Monday morning
and set up an appointment for A.G. to go in and be interviewed the following Friday.
On March 5, 2012, the State charged Kimes with two counts of Class A felony child
molesting. A jury trial was conducted on July 29, 2013. During closing arguments in
rebuttal, the State referred to a practice in Jewish neighborhoods during World War II to
leave doors open during air raids so that children could seek shelter in any nearby house.
A/V Recording of 7/29/13 at 5:18:35-19:32. Kimes objected, claiming this statement
constituted misconduct. The State responded that it was explaining why Indiana would
have a rule that allows a conviction to rest on a single witness’s testimony and likened the
open-door rule’s concern for children to the law that allows the testimony of only one
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eyewitness to be sufficient for a conviction. A/V Recording of 7/29/13 at 5:20:22-31. The
trial court overruled Kimes’s objection. Kimes did not request an admonishment or
mistrial. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Kimes guilty of one count of Class
A felony child molesting and acquitted him of the other count of child molesting. Kimes
was sentenced to thirty years, with six of those years suspended and three of those
suspended years to be on sex offender probation. Kimes now appeals.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
I. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Generally, in order to properly preserve a claim of prosecutorial misconduct for
appeal, a defendant must not only raise a contemporaneous objection, but he must also
request an admonishment; if the admonishment is not given or is insufficient to cure the
error, then he must request a mistrial. Cooper v. State, 854 N.E.2d 831, 835 (Ind. 2006).
Failure to request an admonishment or to move for mistrial results in waiver. Id. Kimes
concedes that, although he objected to the State’s comments, he did not request an
admonishment or move for a mistrial and, therefore, did not properly preserve his claim.
To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct where the misconduct has not
been properly preserved, the defendant must establish not only the grounds for the
prosecutorial misconduct, but also the additional grounds for fundamental error. Id. In
reviewing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, we determine (1) whether the prosecutor
engaged in misconduct, and if so, (2) whether the misconduct, under all of the
circumstances, placed the defendant in a position of grave peril to which he or she would
not have been subjected. Nichols v. State, 974 N.E.2d 531, 535 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). We
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determine whether a prosecutor’s argument constitutes misconduct by referring to case law
and the Rules of Professional Conduct. Id. “‘The gravity of peril is measured by the
probable persuasive effect of the misconduct on the jury’s decision rather than the degree
of impropriety of the conduct.’” Id. (quoting Cooper, 854 N.E.2d at 835).
Fundamental error is an extremely narrow exception to the contemporaneous
objection rule that allows a defendant to avoid waiver of an issue. Id. “For a claim of
prosecutorial misconduct to rise to the level of fundamental error, it must ‘make a fair trial
impossible or constitute clearly blatant violations of basic and elementary principles of due
process and present an undeniable and substantial potential for harm.’” Id. (quoting Booher
v. State, 773 N.E.2d 814, 817 (Ind. 2002)).
Kimes argues that the State’s comments during its closing argument were
prosecutorial misconduct because the State encouraged the jury to convict Kimes out of its
care and concern for children in general and for A.G. in particular. He further contends
that the State’s comments suggested that the jury had a duty to help A.G. rather than
determine Kimes’s guilt or innocence. Kimes asserts that this misconduct constituted
fundamental error because it was “a clearly blatant violation of basic and elementary
principles of due process, presented an undeniable and substantial potential for harm, and
made a fair trial impossible.” Appellant’s Br. at 16.
During its rebuttal of Kimes’s closing argument, the State made the following
argument:
Between the time period when this happened to [A.G.] and when she told her
mother and talked to the authorities, she urinated, she defecated, she bathed,
she showered, she wiped, her mother did laundry. And oh, by the way, it
6
was saliva to begin with. Which isn’t gonna stand the test of time the way
other materials are going to. So what? So we don’t care? So that’s what
we’re gonna say to [A.G.]? We don’t care. You should have told that next
day. You should have never wiped, you should have never bathed. We don’t
care? Is that what we’re here to do today? Kids, we don’t care. This is your
fault. I understand the question. I get it. It would have been great if she told
us that day so we could get that stuff. Don’t think I don’t want it. But the
reason for the law of a single eyewitness is because of stuff like this. Because
in World War II there was a rule for Jewish kids, when they heard the sirens
going off . . .
A/V Recording of 7/29/13 at 5:18:35-19:32. Kimes then objected, claiming that the State’s
argument was misconduct. The objection was overruled at that time, and the State
continued as follows:
There was a rule that people would keep their doors open so that when sirens
went off, kids could run into your home. And it didn’t have to be their home.
They could run into your home. And the reason for that is because as a
society, we care about kids, we do.
A/V Recording of 7/29/13 at 5:20:00-15. Kimes again objected, stating that “this is a call
to a law and order and not the evidence in this case.” A/V Recording of 7/29/13 at 5:20:15-
21. The State responded that it was explaining why Indiana has a rule that allows a
conviction to rest on a single witness’s testimony and likened the open-door rule’s concern
for children to the law that allows the testimony of only one eyewitness to be sufficient for
a conviction. A/V Recording of 7/29/13 at 5:20:22-31. The trial court overruled Kimes’s
objection and admonished the jury:
I’ll overrule the objection, ladies and gentlemen, and again remind you of the
court’s instruction that the lawyers, neither one of them, are presenting
evidence. They are presenting argument in an attempt to persuade you. You
can either accept or reject. They are free to argue by analogy. And I’ll
overrule the objection at this point.
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State: Because the people that we voted for care about kids. And it’s for
stuff like this.
A/V Recording of 7/29/13 at 5:20:31-56. Kimes did not request an admonishment or move
for a mistrial. Kimes also points to further argument by the State in its rebuttal in which
the State said the following:
We tell our children to tell us the truth about what happened and we will take
care of it and she has done that. She told her mother; she told her father.
They acted appropriately. And she told [the Department of Child Services]
and law enforcement. She told us and she has come in here, and in front of
him [pointing to Kimes], after being warned repeatedly she would be
punished if she lied, she has told you. We tell them that we will help them.
I am asking you to help her and find him guilty on both counts.
A/V Recording of 7/29/13 at 5:27:40-5:28:16. Kimes made no objection to this statement.
Assuming without deciding that these arguments were misconduct, we find that they
do not rise to the level of fundamental error. For a claim of prosecutorial misconduct to
constitute fundamental error, it must make a fair trial impossible or constitute clearly
blatant violations of basic and elementary principles of due process and present an
undeniable and substantial potential for harm. Nichols, 974 N.E.2d at 535. Here, the jury
heard testimony by A.G. that while she was sleeping in Kimes’s bedroom on the floor, she
woke up because Kimes was touching her “bad part,” which is what she called her vagina.
A/V Recording of 7/29/13 at 2:09:20, 2:10:51, 2:11:57. A.G. saw Kimes’s mouth on her
bad part and felt him put his tongue inside of her vagina. She said that, “it felt icky and
slimy.” A/V Recording of 7/29/13 at 2:14:57. At some point later in 2011, the girls no
longer wanted to stay with Kimes anymore. About a year later, A.G. told her mother what
Kimes had done. Although A.G.’s testimony may have varied on some of the details
8
surrounding the molestation, she consistently told her mother, father, law enforcement, and
the jury that Kimes molested her.
Additionally, the trial court instructed the jury as follows: “When the evidence is
completed the attorneys may make final arguments. These final arguments are not
evidence. The attorneys are permitted to characterize the evidence, discuss the law and
attempt to persuade you to a particular verdict. You may accept or reject those arguments
as you see fit.” Appellant’s App. at 62. Then later, after Kimes objected to the State’s
arguments, the trial court admonished the jury that, “I’ll overrule the objection, ladies and
gentlemen, and again remind you of the court’s instruction that the lawyers, neither one of
them, are presenting evidence. They are presenting argument in an attempt to persuade
you. You can either accept or reject. They are free to argue by analogy.” A/V Recording
of 7/29/13 at 5:20:31-46. In light of the trial court’s instruction and later statement that
arguments made by attorneys are not evidence and that the members of the jury may accept
or reject those arguments as they see fit and in light of the evidence presented at the trial,
we conclude that although the State’s comments may have constituted prosecutorial
misconduct, such misconduct did not amount to fundamental error. See, e.g., McCann v.
State, 742 N.E.2d 998, 1003 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (“While considered as a whole the
prosecutor’s closing statements may have pushed the bounds of zealous advocacy, we find
nothing about the statements to be so egregious as to rise to fundamental error.”),
summarily aff’d in pertinent part by McCann v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1116 (Ind. 2001).
9
II. Mitigating Factor
Trial courts are required to enter sentencing statements whenever imposing sentence
for a felony offense. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on
reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). The statement must include a reasonably detailed
recitation of the trial court’s reasons for imposing a particular sentence. Id. If the recitation
includes a finding of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, then the statement must
identify all significant mitigating and aggravating circumstances and explain why each
circumstance has been determined to be mitigating or aggravating. Id. Sentencing
decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and are reviewed on appeal only
for an abuse of discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is “clearly
against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the
reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Id.A trial court may abuse its discretion by entering a sentencing statement that omits
mitigating factors that are clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration.
Id. at 490-91. Because the trial court no longer has any obligation to “weigh” aggravating
and mitigating factors against each other when imposing a sentence, a trial court cannot
now be said to have abused its discretion in failing to “properly weigh” such factors. Id.
at 491. Once the trial court has entered a sentencing statement, which may or may not
include the existence of aggravating and mitigating factors, it may then “impose any
sentence that is . . . authorized by statute; and . . . permissible under the Constitution of the
State of Indiana.” Ind. Code § 35-38-1-7.1(d).
10
The finding of mitigating factors is not mandatory and rests within the trial court’s
discretion. Storey v. State, 875 N.E.2d 243, 252 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. “The
trial court is not obligated to accept the defendant’s arguments as to what constitutes a
mitigating factor.” Id. Additionally, the trial court is not required to attribute the same
weight to proffered mitigating factors as the defendant does. Id. Nonetheless, the trial
court may not ignore factors in the record that would mitigate an offense. Id. To fail to
find mitigating circumstances that are clearly supported by the record may imply that the
trial court did not consider those circumstances. Id. In order to prevail upon appeal, the
defendant must establish that the mitigating evidence is both significant and clearly
supported by the record. Id.Kimes argues that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him. He
contends that the trial court failed to include a mitigating factor that was clearly supported
by the record and advanced for consideration. He asserts that the trial court should have
taken into consideration that he had significant mental health problems and physical
problems and that incarceration would likely cause a “great downturn in his physical and
mental condition.” Appellant’s Br. at 19.
In the present case during sentencing, the trial court cited Kimes’s limited criminal
history and mental health needs as mitigating circumstances. A/V Recording of 8.15.13 at
10:42:07, 10:42:51-43:00. The trial court recommended that Kimes receive mental health
treatment while incarcerated. A/V Recording of 8/15/13 at 10:42:58. The trial court also
noted that whether Kimes would be able to pay probation fees after serving his executed
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time would be subject to how he is physically and mentally upon his release. A/V
Recording of 8/15/13 at 10:44:45-45:20.
The trial court clearly and specifically mentioned Kimes’s mental and physical
health when it sentenced him. We, therefore, cannot conclude that the trial court abused
its discretion in failing to consider those factors in sentencing Kimes. Kimes’s argument
seems to be a request for this court to assess whether the trial court gave proper weight to
this mitigating circumstance. However, because the trial court no longer has any obligation
to weigh aggravating and mitigating factors against each other when imposing a sentence,
it cannot be said to have abused its discretion in failing to properly weigh such factors.
Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing
Kimes.
III. Inappropriate Sentence
Appellate courts may revise a sentence after careful review of the trial court’s
decision if they conclude that the sentence is inappropriate based on the nature of the
offense and the character of the offender. Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B). Even if the trial court
followed the appropriate procedure in arriving at its sentence, the appellate court still
maintains a constitutional power to revise a sentence it finds inappropriate. Hope v. State,
834 N.E.2d 713, 718 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). The defendant has the burden of persuading
the appellate court that his sentence is inappropriate. King v. State, 894 N.E.2d 265, 267
(Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
Kimes argues that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense
and the character of the offender. He contends that the facts of the present offense make it
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less egregious than other molestations in that he did not threaten or use deadly force, was
not armed with a deadly weapon, did no physical harm to the victim, and did not facilitate
the offense by giving the victim drugs. He further claims that his sentence should be
reduced in light of his character because he had a minimal criminal history, he was abused
by relatives in the past, he had poor mental health, he was a recovering alcoholic, and he
was low risk for reoffending.
Kimes was convicted of one count of Class A felony child molesting. A person who
commits a Class A felony shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between twenty and fifty
years with the advisory sentence being thirty years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4. The trial court
sentenced Kimes to a term of thirty years in the Indiana Department of Correction with six
years suspended. As to the nature of the offense, Kimes was in a position of trust over his
granddaughter, who he was caring for on the weekends, when the offense occurred.
Additionally, A.G. was much younger than was necessary to elevate Kimes’s conviction
to a Class A felony; she was between the ages of three to five years old when Kimes
molested her. As to Kimes’s character, he did have a minimal criminal history, consisting
of two misdemeanor convictions from many years prior. The trial court also noted that
Kimes suffered mental health problems. We do not believe that Kimes’s sentence of thirty
years, with six years suspended, is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and
the character of the defendant.
Affirmed.
MAY, J., and BRADFORD, J., concur.
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