Tyler R. Browder v. State of Indiana , 77 N.E.3d 1209 ( 2017 )

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Megan Shipley Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Marion County Public Defender Agency Attorney General of Indiana FILED
Indianapolis, Indiana Justin F. Roebel May 22 2017, 8:49 am
Deputy Attorney General CLERK
Indianapolis, Indiana Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Tyler R. Browder May 22, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A04-1608-CR-1857
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Linda E. Brown,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
49G10-1412-CM-53390
Mathias, Judge.
[1] Tyler Browder (“Browder”) appeals his conviction for Class A misdemeanor
possession of paraphernalia. Browder argues that the Marion Superior Court
abused its discretion by admitting into evidence the paraphernalia discovered
when a police officer searched his vehicle during a traffic stop. Browder
specifically claims that the police officer unreasonably extended the length of
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the traffic stop in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and Article One, Section Eleven of the Indiana Constitution.1
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] On November 11, 2014, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Officer Brady Ball
(“Officer Ball” “Ball,” or “the officer”) was working “pro-active patrol” on the
south side of Indianapolis in a high crime area. Tr. p. 5. Officer Ball was tasked
with traffic enforcement in the area.
[4] At approximately 11:40 p.m., Officer Ball came to a stop at a traffic light and
ran the license plate of the Pontiac vehicle stopped in front of him. The license
plate was registered to a silver Audi. Therefore, Ball initiated a traffic stop to
investigate the improperly plated vehicle.
[5] Browder, the driver and only occupant of the vehicle, pulled the car over into a
nearby gas station parking lot. Officer Ball asked Browder about the license
plate and Browder replied that
it was he and his [wife’s] vehicle that they had purchased it and
that they, um, were under the impression that a license plate –a
transfer plate could be placed on the vehicle.
1
We held oral argument in this case at Cathedral High School in Indianapolis, Indiana on April 26, 2017.
We thank the faculty, staff, and students for their gracious hospitality. We also wish to congratulate the
school’s We the People team for their third place finish at the national We the People competition held in
Washington D.C. in April.
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Tr. p. 6. Ball told Browder that he was correct but that “they needed to have a
bill of sale or title to go along with that transfer plate.” Id. Browder, who stated
that he had purchased the car for approximately one week prior, was not able to
produce any paperwork for the vehicle.
[6] Ball requested Browder’s driver’s license and ran it through his computer. From
the information returned, the officer discovered that Browder had a criminal
history, including a reference to an auto theft. The officer also could not find a
registration for the Pontiac under Browder’s name. In addition, Browder’s
name was not listed on the registration for the license plate registered to the
silver Audi. Ball was in his patrol car for several minutes running computer
checks to obtain this information.
[7] Approximately fifteen minutes after the stop was initiated, and after Officer Ball
reviewed Browder’s driver’s license records and criminal history and could not
find a Pontiac registered to Browder, Ball was still suspicious that the Pontiac
was possibly a stolen vehicle, and he decided to investigate further. He asked
Browder to step out of the vehicle and about his prior arrest record. When Ball
asked about the auto theft, Browder replied that he was arrested as a juvenile
but had not been arrested for a stealing a car.
[8] The officer continued to question Browder about paperwork related to the sale
of the vehicle and its previous owner. Browder stated that the license plate on
the Pontiac belonged to him and to his wife, Kayla Lanahan. When asked
about the different last names, Browder explained that they were married but
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that his wife had not changed her last name. Browder told Officer Ball that
there was no paperwork from the prior owner in the vehicle. The officer asked
for specific details about the recent purchase of the vehicle. Browder stated that
the car was a 1992 or 1996 Pontiac model that they purchased for $700.
Browder told the officer that he had been driving to Taco Bell, and the officer
questioned Browder about his choice of a circuitous route to the restaurant.
[9] Finally, approximately seventeen minutes into the stop, Officer Ball asked
Browder if anything illegal was inside the vehicle. Browder said there was not
and told the officer he could search the vehicle. Tr. p. 19. Browder’s statement
surprised Officer Ball, and he gave Browder a Pirtle warning.2 Tr. p. 13. Officer
Ball also told Browder that when individuals allow officers to search “illegal
stuff” can be found. Id. Browder replied that he had “nothing to hide.” Id. After
the advisements and warnings, Browder continued to consent to the vehicle
search.
[10] As he searched the vehicle, Officer Ball found the vehicle’s VIN number and
discovered it was a 2001 Pontiac. The officer also found a glass pipe used to
smoke marijuana in an insert in the center console, which later tested positive
for THC residue. The officer then arrested Browder and read him his Miranda
2
In Pirtle v. State, 263 Ind. 16, 29, 323 N.E.2d 634, 640 (1975), our supreme court held that a person held in
police custody is entitled to the presence and advice of counsel prior to consenting to a search. Officer Ball’s
Pirtle warning was incomplete and lacked the advisement that an attorney would be provided to Browder if
he could not afford one, but the officer was not required to give the warning because Browder was not in
custody when he told the officer that he could search the car.
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rights. Browder told Officer Ball that the pipe was not his and that a friend must
have left it in the vehicle.
[11] A bench trial was held on March 7 and July 20, 2016. Browder filed a motion
to suppress the pipe found in the vehicle. The trial court denied the motion and
found Browder guilty of Class A misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia. He
was then ordered to serve 365 days, with 349 days suspended to probation and
16 days credit for time served. The State declined to prosecute the infraction for
operating a vehicle on a transferred plate for more than thirty-one days.
Browder now appeals.
Standard of Review
[12] Our review of a denied motion to suppress, when following a trial at which the
challenged evidence was admitted, is properly a review of the trial court’s
decision to admit the evidence. Carpenter v. State, 18 N.E.3d 998, 1001 (Ind.
2014). We review the trial court's ruling on admissibility for abuse of discretion,
reversing only if the ruling is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts, and
the error effects substantial rights. Id. The constitutionality of a search or
seizure is a pure question of law we review de novo. Id. Browder argues that the
traffic stop and subsequent search violated both the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution and Article One, Section Eleven of the Indiana
Constitution.
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Fourth Amendment
[13] Browder argues that Officer Ball unreasonably prolonged the traffic stop in
violation of the Fourth Amendment, which provides in pertinent part that
“[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”
“The overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal
privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State.” Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).
[14] A traffic stop of a vehicle and temporary detention of its occupants constitutes a
“seizure” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Whren v. United States,
517 U.S. 806, 809-10 (1996)). However, “[i]t is unequivocal under our
jurisprudence that even a minor traffic violation is sufficient to give an officer
probable cause to stop the driver of a vehicle.” Austin v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1027,
1034 (Ind. 2013). Browder properly concedes that the initial traffic stop was
valid because the license plate on his car was not registered to that vehicle.
[15] However, Browder argues that Officer Ball unreasonably prolonged the traffic
stop and that the stop should have ended after the officer completed his check
of Browder’s driver’s license and the license plate approximately fifteen minutes
after the stop began.
A lawful roadside stop begins when a vehicle is pulled over for
investigation of a traffic violation. The temporary seizure of
driver and passengers ordinarily continues, and remains
reasonable, for the duration of the stop. Normally, the stop ends
when the police have no further need to control the scene, and
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inform the driver and passengers they are free to leave. An
officer’s inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for
the traffic stop, this Court has made plain, do not convert the
encounter into something other than a lawful seizure, so long as
those inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the
stop.
Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009); see also Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S.
405, 407 (2005) (“It is nevertheless clear that a seizure that is lawful at its
inception can violate the Fourth Amendment if its manner of execution
unreasonably infringes interests protected by the Constitution.”).
[16] The United States Supreme Court recently re-emphasized that a police officer
cannot “incremental[ly]” lengthen a traffic stop by even a de minimis amount
beyond the time needed to complete the mission of the stop. Rodriguez v. United
States, ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1616 (2015). Tasks that an officer may
undertake related to the traffic stop typically “involve checking the driver’s
license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver,
and inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of insurance.” Id., –––
U.S. at ––––, 135 S. Ct. at 1615.
[17] Whether the officer has unreasonably prolonged a traffic stop is a fact-sensitive
determination. In United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985), the United States
Supreme Court observed that
our cases impose no rigid time limitation on Terry stops. While it
is clear that “the brevity of the invasion of the individual’s Fourth
Amendment interests is an important factor in determining
whether the seizure is so minimally intrusive as to be justifiable
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on reasonable suspicion,” we have emphasized the need to
consider the law enforcement purposes to be served by the stop as
well as the time reasonably needed to effectuate those purposes.
Much as a “bright line” rule would be desirable, in evaluating
whether an investigative detention is unreasonable, common
sense and ordinary human experience must govern over rigid
criteria.
Id. at 685 (internal citations omitted). The Court also explained that it is
appropriate “to examine whether the police diligently pursued a means of
investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during
which time it was necessary to detain the defendant.” Id. at 686. Courts “should
take care to consider whether the police are acting in a swiftly developing
situation, and in such cases the court should not indulge in unrealistic second-
guessing.” See id.
[18] The Rodriguez Court reemphasized that “[a]n officer, … may conduct certain
unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop. But … he may not do
so in a way that prolongs the stop, absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily
demanded to justify detaining an individual.” 135 S. Ct. at 1615.
Beyond determining whether to issue a traffic ticket, an officer's
mission includes “ordinary inquiries incident to [the traffic]
stop.” Typically such inquiries involve checking the driver's
license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants
against the driver, and inspecting the automobile's registration
and proof of insurance. These checks serve the same objective as
enforcement of the traffic code: ensuring that vehicles on the road
are operated safely and responsibly.
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Id. (internal citations omitted).
[19] In this case, Officer Ball needed to determine why the Pontiac was not properly
plated, to whom the vehicle was registered, and whether it was possibly stolen.
Browder gave his explanation for the transferred plate to Officer Browder and
provided his driver’s license. The officer requested a check of Browder’s license
and criminal history and ran a records check on the vehicle. Browder argues
that once these tasks were completed, approximately fifteen minutes into the
stop, the purpose for the traffic stop was complete. In response, the State argues
that Officer Ball’s continued questioning of Browder was related to the purpose
of the stop, i.e., that the license plate was not registered to the vehicle, Browder
had no paperwork establishing that he owned the vehicle, and the officer could
not find any registration records for the Pontiac.
[20] Any delay beyond the fifteen-minute period, which Browder accepts as
reasonable, was due to Officer Ball’s suspicion that Browder was not in lawful
possession of the vehicle. If his suspicion that Browder was engaged in criminal
activity was reasonable, the prolonged detention does not violate the Fourth
Amendment. See State v. Gray, 997 N.E.2d 1147, 1153 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013),
trans. denied.
“Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than
probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than
preponderance of the evidence, but it still requires at least a
minimal level of objective justification and more than an
inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch’ of criminal
activity.” “Thus, a reviewing court must examine the totality of
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circumstances of each case to see whether the detaining officer
has a particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal
wrongdoing.”
Id. (citations omitted). See also United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002)
(stating “[w]hen discussing how reviewing courts should make reasonable
suspicion determinations, we have said repeatedly that they must look at the
“totality of the circumstances” of each case to see whether the detaining officer
has a ‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing”)
(citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981)).
[21] Browder and the State disagree whether the totality of the following
circumstances gave rise to reasonable suspicion that Browder did not legally
possess the Pontiac. These include 1) Officer Ball’s suspicion that the vehicle
was stolen because of the transferred plate and lack of paperwork,3 2) Browder’s
prior drug arrests and a reference to an auto theft in the criminal records check,
3) that Browder was driving through a high crime area near midnight, and 4)
Browder’s inability to recall whether the vehicle was a 1992 or 1996 model,4
3
Browder extensively discusses statutory requirements for transferred plates in his brief. Specifically, the
statute in effect on the date of the traffic stop required the “registrant” to have the bill of sale or other
paperwork establishing ownership in his or her possession. See Ind. Code § 9-18-6-5. Browder argues that he
was not the registrant, his wife was, and therefore, he was not required to have any paperwork in his
possession. A new version of the statute went into effect on January 1, 2017 that requires the vehicle operator
to have documents in that person’s possession establishing ownership of the vehicle if the vehicle is not yet
registered and the person “displays a valid and unexpired transferred plate.” See Ind. Code 9-18.1-2-8. Officer
Ball’s misunderstanding of the law on the date of the stop is of limited relevance to the outcome of this
appeal given his valid concern over the mismatched license plate and whether the vehicle was possibly stolen.
4
As a result of the search, Officer Ball obtained the VIN number and determined that the Pontiac was a 2001
model.
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and 5) Browder’s claim that he was driving to a nearby Taco Bell because the
street Browder was travelling on was not a direct route between the restaurant
and Browder’s observed exit from a residential area.
[22] Because no paperwork was in the vehicle documenting the sale to Browder or
his wife (even though Browder may not have been required by statute to keep
the paperwork in his possession), and the license plate on the vehicle was
registered to a different vehicle whose owner did not share Browder’s name, we
conclude that Officer Ball had reasonable suspicion to continue investigating
who owned the Pontiac. Browder’s criminal history, albeit limited but with a
reference to an auto theft, also supports our conclusion that the officer had
reasonable suspicion that the vehicle might be stolen. Therefore, prolonging the
traffic stop an additional two to three minutes did not violate the Fourth
Amendment.
[23] Approximately three minutes after the officer resumed his questioning of
Browder (seventeen minutes into the stop), Browder told Officer Ball that he
could search the Pontiac. A warrantless search based on lawful consent is
consistent with both the Indiana and Federal Constitutions. Campos v. State, 885
N.E.2d 590, 600 (Ind. 2008) (citing Perry v. State, 638 N.E.2d 1236, 1240 (Ind.
1994); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973)).
The theory underlying this exception is that, when an individual
gives the State permission to search either his person or property,
the governmental intrusion is presumably reasonable. When the
State relies upon consent to justify a warrantless search, it has the
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burden of proving that the consent was, in fact, freely and
voluntarily given.
Ammons v. State, 770 N.E.2d 927, 933 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied
(citations omitted). “A consent to search is valid except where it is procured by
fraud, duress, fear, intimidation, or where it is merely a submission to the
supremacy of the law.” Navarro v. State, 855 N.E.2d 671, 675 (Ind. Ct. App.
2006). “Knowledge of the right to refuse a search is one factor which indicates
voluntariness.” Id.
[24] Whether consent to search was voluntary is a question of fact determined from
the totality of the circumstances. Id. These include, but are not limited to,
(1) whether the defendant was advised of his Miranda rights prior
to the request to search; (2) the defendant’s degree of education
and intelligence; (3) whether the defendant was advised of his
right not to consent; (4) whether the detainee has previous
encounters with law enforcement; (5) whether the officer made
any express or implied claims of authority to search without
consent; (6) whether the officer was engaged in any illegal action
prior to the request; (7) whether the defendant was cooperative
previously; and (8) whether the officer was deceptive as to his
true identity or the purpose of the search.
Id. (citation omitted).
[25] In this case, after Officer Ball asked Browder if anything illegal was in the
vehicle, Browder offered to allow Ball to search the car. Officer Ball had not
requested permission to search the car, and he warned Browder that when
individuals allow officers to search “illegal stuff” can be found. Tr. p. 13. The
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officer also told Browder that he had a right to the presence and advice of
counsel before he consented to the search. Browder then continued to consent
to the search of the vehicle. Under the totality of these circumstances,
Browder’s consent to search was voluntary, and the warrantless search did not
violate the Fourth Amendment. For all of these reasons, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion when it admitted the paraphernalia into evidence.
Article I, Section 11
[26] The Fourth Amendment analysis focuses on a criminal defendant’s expectation
of privacy, but under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution, the focus
is upon the actions of the police officer and whether his or her actions were
reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. Austin v. State, 997 N.E.2d
1027, 1034 (Ind. 2013). This analysis requires us to balance: “‘the degree of
concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred, 2) the degree of
intrusion the method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen’s ordinary
activities, and 3) the extent of law enforcement needs.’” Id. (quoting Litchfield v.
State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 361 (Ind. 2005)). The State has the burden of proving
that police intrusion into privacy was reasonable under the totality of the
circumstances. Id.
[27] Browder argues that the degree of suspicion that the car was stolen was low
because he gave a reasonable explanation for the transferred license plate. He
contends that the degree of intrusion, which is evaluated from his point of
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view,5 was high because the officer prolonged the length of the traffic stop and
searched the car after ordering Browder out of his vehicle and questioning him
while he stood in the bright lights of the patrol car. Finally, Browder argues that
the extent of law enforcement needs was minimal because the vehicle was not
reported stolen. He also argues the officer had “several less-intrusive
alternatives available to him.” Appellant’s Br. at 36. Specifically, Browder
claims the officer had all of Browder’s identifying information; therefore, if
subsequent investigation established that the car was stolen, the officer could
have obtained a warrant. He also argues that the officer could have taken the
car into custody until Browder was able to provide the paperwork establishing
vehicle ownership.
[28] Officer Ball had a valid concern that the Pontiac was possibly a stolen vehicle.
The license plate was not registered to the Pontiac. Also, the name listed on the
registration did not establish any relation to Browder because it was registered
to Browder’s wife, Kayla Lanahan. Browder did not give the officer his wife’s
name until after Officer Ball had completed his records checks. Finally, during
the records check, Officer Ball learned that Browder had possibly been involved
in a prior auto theft.
[29] After the records check was complete, Officer Ball continued to ask Browder
questions about the auto theft reference that the officer found during the records
check, details surrounding Browder’s purchase of the Pontiac, whether Browder
5
See Litchfield, 824 N.E.2d at 360
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and Lanahan were married, and Browder’s circuitous route to Taco Bell. The
continued questioning was minimally intrusive because it was related to the
reason for the traffic stop. However, Officer Ball’s decision to remove Browder
from the vehicle did increase the level of intrusiveness.
[30] Finally, the extent of law enforcement needs was not as minimal as Browder
claims. Officer Ball had good reason for investigating who owned the Pontiac
and needed to be certain it was not stolen. Browder suggests that Officer Ball
did not need to prolong the traffic stop because he could have obtained a
warrant if he eventually determined that the Pontiac was actually a stolen
vehicle or the officer could have taken the car into custody. However, the brief
three-minute detention (before Browder offered to allow the officer to search the
vehicle) was less intrusive than Browder’s claimed alternatives. In fact, when
the officer later considered seizing the vehicle, Browder asked the officer not to
do so because his wife needed the car.
[31] Considering the totality of the circumstances in light of the factors established
in Litchfield, we conclude that Officer Ball reasonably decided to prolong the
traffic stop to continue his investigation of whether Browder was legally in
possession of the Pontiac.
[32] After questioning Browder for an additional three minutes, Browder offered to
allow Officer Ball to search the vehicle. As we discussed above, Officer Ball
warned Browder about the possible consequences of allowing the officer to
search the car and informed him that he was entitled to consult with an
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attorney before allowing a search. Browder continued to consent to the search,
and therefore, the warrantless search of the vehicle did not violate Article I,
Section 11. See Campos, 885 N.E.2d at 600.
Conclusion
[33] We conclude that Officer Ball’s decision to prolong the traffic stop did not
violate the Fourth Amendment or Article 1, Section 11. Also, Browder’s
consent to search the vehicle was voluntary. For these reasons, Browder has not
established a federal or state constitutional violation, and the trial court did not
abuse its discretion when it admitted into evidence the paraphernalia discovered
during the warrantless vehicle search. We therefore affirm Browder’s Class A
misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia conviction.
[34] Affirmed.
Kirsch, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
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