Steven Eble v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2018 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),                                          FILED
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                    Aug 09 2018, 8:59 am
    regarded as precedent or cited before any
    CLERK
    court except for the purpose of establishing                              Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                        and Tax Court
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Karen M. Heard                                           Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Vanderburgh County Public Defender’s                     Attorney General
    Office
    Evansville, Indiana                                      Matthew B. Mackenzie
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Steven Eble,                                             August 9, 2018
    Appellant-Defendant,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
    18A-CR-650
    v.                                               Appeal from the Vanderburgh
    Superior Court
    State of Indiana,                                        The Honorable Robert J. Pigman,
    Appellee-Plaintiff                                       Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    82D03-1710-F5-6727
    Crone, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-650 | August 9, 2018                     Page 1 of 6
    Case Summary
    [1]   Steven Eble appeals his conviction for level 6 felony theft following a jury trial.
    Eble argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction and
    that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him. Finding the
    evidence sufficient and that the court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [2]   The evidence most favorable to the verdict shows that on February 27, 2018,
    after arriving home from work, Alan Folz found the two locks that were used to
    lock his outbuildings on the ground. Realizing that some of his tools were
    missing from his outbuildings, including a Hitachi drill and a Makita saw, Folz
    called the police. Folz provided the police with a description of the missing
    tools, and two speed wrenches were found in the alley behind Folz’s residence
    when the police searched the premises.
    [3]   The following day, the police responded to a trespass at an abandoned property
    a few blocks away from Folz’s house, where they found Eble, Terry Kellems,
    and an unidentified female. A search of the property uncovered some of the
    missing tools. The police arrested Kellems because he had a warrant out for his
    arrest, but Eble was allowed to leave.
    [4]   Following the trespass incident, Folz visited a pawn shop that was located only
    a few blocks from his residence and identified some of his missing tools,
    specifically the Hitachi drill and the Makita saw. The pawn shop records
    indicated that Eble had sold the tools to the pawn shop on the same day that
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-650 | August 9, 2018   Page 2 of 6
    Folz realized the tools were stolen. Eble had signed the seller’s bill of sale
    acknowledging a phrase that indicated he owned the merchandise he was
    selling, and his thumbprint was found on the back.
    [5]   The State charged Eble with level 5 felony burglary and level 6 felony theft
    based on a prior theft conviction. At trial, Eble testified that he did not know
    the tools were stolen, and he merely pawned the tools for Kellems, whom he
    believed was the rightful owner. The jury found Eble guilty of theft, but not
    burglary, and he admitted to his prior conviction. The trial court sentenced him
    to 810 days, which is more than eight months longer than the advisory sentence
    for a level 6 felony. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7. This appeal ensued.
    Discussion and Decision
    Section 1 – The evidence presented supports Eble’s theft
    conviction.
    [6]   Eble challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction.
    “When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence needed to support a criminal
    conviction, we neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility.” Bailey v.
    State, 
    907 N.E.2d 1003
    , 1005 (Ind. 2009). Instead, we consider only the
    evidence supporting the verdict and any reasonable inferences that arise
    therefrom. 
    Id. It is
    unnecessary that evidence “overcome every reasonable
    hypothesis of innocence.” Moore v. State, 
    652 N.E.2d 53
    , 55 (Ind. 1995). “[T]he
    evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support
    the verdict.” Pickens v. State, 
    751 N.E.2d 331
    , 334 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). “We
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-650 | August 9, 2018   Page 3 of 6
    will affirm if there is substantial evidence of probative value such that a
    reasonable trier of fact could have concluded the defendant was guilty beyond a
    reasonable doubt.” 
    Bailey, 907 N.E.2d at 1005
    .
    [7]   Eble maintains that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for
    theft. Indiana Code Section 35-43-4-2(a) provides in pertinent part that a
    person who knowingly or intentionally exerts unauthorized control over
    property of another person with the intention of depriving the other person of
    any part of its value or use commits theft. To convict Eble of theft, the State
    had to prove these elements, and also that Eble knew that the property was
    stolen, which may be established by circumstantial evidence. See Stone v. State,
    
    555 N.E.2d 475
    , 477 (Ind. 1990).
    [8]   Eble concedes that he possessed the stolen property. However, he argues that
    the evidence does not show he knew the property was stolen. “The test of
    knowledge is not whether a reasonable person would have known that the
    [property] had been the subject of theft but whether, from the circumstances
    surrounding his possession of the [property, Eble] knew that it had been the
    subject of theft.” Gibson v. State, 
    643 N.E.2d 885
    , 888 (Ind. 1994). The mere
    unexplained possession of recently stolen property standing alone does not
    automatically support a theft conviction. Holloway v. State, 
    983 N.E.2d 1175
    ,
    1179 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). “The fact of possession and all the surrounding
    evidence about the possession must be assessed to determine whether any
    rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”
    
    Id. Court of
    Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-650 | August 9, 2018   Page 4 of 6
    [9]    In this case, Eble contends that he did not know the tools were stolen, and
    therefore the evidence was insufficient to support the theft conviction. At trial,
    Eble claimed that Kellems told him that the tools belonged to Kellems and that
    Kellems asked Eble to take the tools to the pawn shop because he had lost his
    
    ID. Eble points
    out that he did not try to conceal his possession of the tools,
    and he even used his ID and fingerprint when he sold the tools to the pawn
    shop. However, the evidence presented shows that Eble pawned the tools taken
    from Folz’s home on the same day the tools were taken and knowingly signed a
    bill of sale indicating that the property was his when he knew this not to be
    true.1 A reasonable inference to be drawn from this evidence is that Eble knew
    that the property was stolen. Therefore, we affirm his conviction.
    Section 2 – The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
    sentencing Eble.
    [10]   The trial court made the following statement pertaining to Eble’s sentence
    enhancement: “The court selects an aggravated sentence based on [Eble’s] prior
    criminal record, particularly the kinds of offenses he was convicted for here.”
    Tr. Vol. 2 at 122. Eble argues that the trial court improperly used a material
    element of the offense, namely his prior theft conviction, as an aggravating
    circumstance to enhance his sentence. See Gomillia v. State, 
    13 N.E.3d 846
    , 852
    1
    We are unpersuaded by Eble’s reliance on Fortson v. State, 
    919 N.E.2d 1136
    (Ind. 2010), because the
    defendant in that case never claimed that the truck he allegedly stole was his.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-650 | August 9, 2018                    Page 5 of 6
    (Ind. 2014) (finding that the use of a material element of a crime as an
    aggravating factor is improper under some circumstances).
    [11]   “[S]entencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and
    are reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion.” Anglemyer v. State, 
    868 N.E.2d 482
    , 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g 
    875 N.E.2d 218
    . “An abuse of
    discretion occurs if the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts
    and circumstances before the court.” Webb v. State, 
    941 N.E.2d 1082
    , 1088
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied. Trial courts “may abuse [their] discretion by
    issuing an inadequate sentencing statement, finding aggravating or mitigating
    factors that are not supported by the record, omitting factors that are clearly
    supported by the record and advanced for consideration, or by finding factors
    that are improper as a matter of law.” 
    Id. [12] We
    find no abuse of discretion here. The trial court did not single out Eble’s
    prior theft conviction that was used to elevate his current conviction to a level 6
    felony, but instead considered his entire criminal record, which includes a
    multitude of theft, trespass, and drug-related convictions. Therefore, we affirm
    Eble’s sentence.
    [13]   Affirmed.
    Najam, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-650 | August 9, 2018   Page 6 of 6