Billie K. Hoots v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2017 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any May 25 2017, 9:42 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Victoria L. Bailey Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Marion County Public Defender Agency Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
Lyubov Gore
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Billie K. Hoots, May 25, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A04-1611-CR-2539
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Clayton A.
Appellee-Plaintiff. Graham, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
49G07-1609-CM-37942
Bailey, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] Billie K. Hoots (“Hoots”) appeals his conviction for Public Intoxication, as a
Class B misdemeanor,1 raising for our review the sole issue of whether there
was sufficient evidence of intoxication to sustain the conviction.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] On September 26, 2016, at around 3 a.m., Megan Ridley (“Ridley”) was
leaving her job as an emergency department nurse at Eskenazi Hospital in
Indianapolis. Earlier that night, Ridley had been the nurse who performed an
initial check-in of Hoots into the emergency department at the hospital.
[4] As Ridley got into her car, she saw Hoots walking nearby in the parking lot, but
lost sight of him. Soon thereafter, Ridley heard her car’s rear driver-side door
open, and saw Hoots standing outside her car. Frightened, Ridley accelerated
her car and pulled away from the parking space.
[5] Ridley called Deputy Tony Matthews (“Deputy Matthews”), a member of the
security force at Eskenazi Hospital. Deputy Matthews went to the location
Ridley specified in her call and found Hoots standing in the parking lot.
1
Ind. Code § 7.1-5-1-3(a)(4).
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[6] Hoots did not alert to Deputy Matthews’s approach until he tapped Hoots on
the shoulder. Deputy Matthews asked Hoots to consent to a pat-down search,
and Hoots agreed to the search. Deputy Matthews handcuffed Hoots and
performed a search. Soon after this, other security officers arrived, including
Deputy Zachary Dodson (“Deputy Dodson”), who issued Miranda advisements
to Hoots. Hoots indicated that he understood his rights, and, in response to
questions from the officers, stated that he had been a patient at the hospital but
was discharged, and had consumed too much methamphetamine. Hoots was
then arrested.
[7] On September 26, 2016, the State charged Hoots with Unauthorized Entry into
a Vehicle and Public Intoxication, each as Class B misdemeanors.
[8] On November 3, 2016, a jury trial was conducted. Upon Hoots’s motion, the
trial court entered a directed verdict in Hoots’s favor on the charge of
Unauthorized Entry of a Motor Vehicle.2 The jury subsequently found Hoots
guilty of Public Intoxication. Hoots was sentenced to 180 days imprisonment,
with ninety days suspended to probation.
[9] This appeal ensued.
2
I.C. § 35-43-4-2.7(d).
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Discussion and Decision
[10] Hoots’s sole contention on appeal is that there was insufficient evidence of
intoxication to sustain his conviction. Our standard of review for such
challenges is well settled:
This court will not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility
of witnesses. Cox v. State, 774 N.E.2d 1025, 1028 (Ind. Ct. App.
2002). Only the evidence most favorable to the judgment,
together with all reasonable inferences that can be drawn
therefrom will be considered. Id. If a reasonable trier of fact
could have found the defendant guilty based on the probative
evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, then a
conviction will be affirmed. Id. at 1028–29.
Sargent v. State, 875 N.E.2d 762, 767 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
[11] To convict Hoots of Public Intoxication, as charged, the State was required to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Hoots was in a public place or place of
public resort in a state of intoxication caused by Hoots’s use of a controlled
substance, namely, methamphetamine, and that Hoot’s conduct was harassing,
annoying, or alarming to Ridley. See I.C. § 7.1-5-1-3(a)(4); App’x Vol. 2 at 18.
Hoots contends that there was insufficient evidence of his intoxication based
upon the nature of the testimony offered by Deputies Matthews and Dodson.
In the absence of appropriate testimony or other evidence establishing
intoxication, Hoots argues, the only other evidence of his intoxication was his
own nonjudicial post-Miranda admission of methamphetamine use, which was
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insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction under the doctrine of corpus
delecti.
[12] Concerning Deputies Matthews’s and Dodson’s testimonies as insufficient to
sustain the conviction, Hoots argues that the record is “devoid of any evidence
regarding Hoots’s reflexes” or “impaired attention”; that there was no evidence
that Hoots had “watery or bloodshot eyes,” smelled of methamphetamine, or
had failed a field sobriety test. (Appellant’s Br. at 11.) However, it is sufficient
that an officer testifies that it was his opinion “that, based upon his training and
experience,” a defendant was intoxicated. Woodson v. State, 966 N.E.2d 135,
142 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). “The State need not present separate proof of
impairment of action, impairment of thought, and loss of control of faculties to
establish an individual’s intoxication.” Id. Rather, the defendant’s condition is
to be considered “as a whole,” and impairment of any one of the foregoing
abilities is sufficient to sustain a conviction. Id.
[13] Here, Deputy Matthews testified that when he encountered Hoots, Hoots “was
just kind of standing there in almost a daze.” (Tr. at 74.) Deputy Matthews
acknowledged that Hoots was compliant with instructions and indicated that he
understood his Miranda rights, but, when Deputy Matthews asked Hoots why
he was in a parking lot instead of waiting at the Emergency Room entrance for
his ride, Hoots stated that “he couldn’t really remember.” (Tr. at 77.) Deputy
Matthews further testified on cross-examination that he had both training and
experience in identifying intoxicated persons, that Hoots’s “actions were out-of-
sorts,” and that Hoots “showed a level of impairment as well.” (Tr. at 118.)
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[14] Deputy Dodson offered similar testimony. He characterized Hoots’s demeanor
as “kind of scared, manic,” and stated that “I could just tell from [Hoots’s]
behavior, from training and experience or other situations I’ve dealt with, I
believed it was something to do with … some kind of amphetamine, how he
was acting.” (Tr. at 139.) Deputy Dodson further testified that Hoots “kept
apologizing, saying he was sorry” and asking that they not arrest him “because
he wouldn’t see his son again.” (Tr. at 140.)
[15] Hoots draws our attention to the lack of an expert-introduced list of signs of
methamphetamine intoxication. Our case law already addresses the need for
such specific information, and has held that it is not necessary. See Woodson,
966 N.E.2d at 142 (stating that a non-expert’s training and experience is
sufficient to establish evidence of intoxication). The testimony offered by
Deputies Matthews and Dodson was thus sufficient to establish that Hoots was
intoxicated.3 Taken together with Hoots’s post-Miranda-advisement statement
that he had consumed methamphetamine, there was sufficient evidence to
sustain the conviction.
[16] Affirmed.
Vaidik, C.J., and Robb, J., concur.
3
Because we conclude there was evidence other than Hoots’s own extrajudicial statement, the doctrine of
corpus delecti is inapposite here.
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