Sarah L. Thompson v. State of Indiana ( 2012 )

Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before FILED
any court except for the purpose of Sep 17 2012, 8:49 am
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the CLERK
of the supreme court,
case. court of appeals and
tax court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
JEFFREY G. RAFF GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Deputy Public Defender Attorney General of Indiana
Fort Wayne, Indiana
NICOLE M. SCHUSTER
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
SARAH L. THOMPSON, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 02A04-1204-CR-176
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE ALLEN SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Frances C. Gull, Judge
Cause No. 02D05-1109-FC-281
September 17, 2012
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
BROWN, Judge
Sarah L. Thompson appeals her conviction for battery as a class C felony. 1
Thompson raises one issue which we revise and restate as whether the evidence is
sufficient to support her conviction. We affirm.
The facts most favorable to the conviction follow. On May 10, 2011, Patricia
Newmon woke up at approximately 6:30 a.m. to the sound of Thompson’s lawn mower.
Newmon made breakfast and went out to her porch to sit on her porch steps. Newmon
told Thompson that she should not be mowing her yard at 6:30 a.m. Thompson stopped
mowing her yard and headed toward Newmon. Newmon put her head down for a minute
because she thought “well here she comes” and had no idea that Thompson was going to
put her hands on Newmon. Transcript at 23. Thompson then picked Newmon up and
slammed her down on the concrete which rendered Newmon unconscious. Thompson
then stomped her leg down. When Newmon regained consciousness, someone was trying
to help her up and another neighbor was calling the police.
Newmon suffered a broken hip as a result of the incident which required surgery
and she remained in the hospital for six days. After Newmon returned home, she heard
Thompson state to an individual that she “kicked [Newmon’s] f------ ass.” Id. at 30.
On September 28, 2011, the State charged Thompson with battery as a class C
felony. At trial, Newmon and Keith Maydwell, a passerby, testified to the foregoing
facts. Maydwell testified that he was in the area and “saw a little lady sittin [sic] a [sic]
porch and then [he] saw [Thompson] come across and snatch her off the porch and the
[sic] were having words and, and she kinda put a stomp move down on her and cut back
1
Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1 (Supp. 2009) (subsequently amended by Pub. L. No. 114-2012, § 137
(eff. July 1, 2012)).
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through the yard.” Id. at 50. Maydwell also testified that Thompson was the aggressor
and that Newmon “looked like kinda [sic] got her by surprise or whatever but it didn’t
look like she was aggressive.” Id. at 59.
Thompson testified that at one point she called the police to ask them if there was
a certain time that she needed to cut her grass in the morning because if she “didn’t call
and [she] cut[s] her grass it’s gonna be a problem,” and the police told her “usually
between seven (7) or sometime eight (8) o’clock.” Id. at 66. According to Thompson’s
testimony, she had a conversation with a police officer regarding a complaint of the noise
level involved in mowing her lawn and the officer told her to wait to mow. Thompson
then went over to Newmon and said: “[W]hy would you call the Police on me? Who
does that? You need to mind yourself [sic] own business.” Id. at 71. Newmon called
Thompson “n-----s and b-----s.” Id. Thompson also testified that she leaned into
Newmon to ask a question, that Newmon stood up and pushed her, and that she then
pushed Newmon back and went into her house.
The jury found Thompson guilty as charged. The court sentenced Thompson to
four years in the Department of Correction.
The issue is whether the evidence presented was sufficient to support Thompson’s
conviction. When reviewing claims of insufficiency of the evidence, we do not reweigh
the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. Jordan v. State, 656 N.E.2d 816, 817
(Ind. 1995), reh’g denied. Rather, we look to the evidence and the reasonable inferences
therefrom that support the verdict. Id. We will affirm the conviction if there exists
evidence of probative value from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant
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guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. The uncorroborated testimony of one witness is
sufficient to sustain a conviction. Ferrell v. State, 565 N.E.2d 1070, 1072-1073 (Ind.
1991). “Because intent is a mental function and usually must be determined from a
person’s conduct and resulting reasonable inferences, the element of intent may properly
be inferred from circumstantial evidence.” Beatty v. State, 567 N.E.2d 1134, 1139 (Ind.
1991).
The offense of battery as a class C felony is governed by Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1,
which provides that “[a] person who knowingly or intentionally touches another person in
a rude, insolent, or angry manner commits battery, a Class B misdemeanor. However,
the offense is . . . a Class C felony if it results in serious bodily injury to any other person
. . . .” According to Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2, a person “engages in conduct ‘intentionally’
if, when he engages in the conduct, it is his conscious objective to do so,” and a person
“engages in conduct ‘knowingly’ if, when he engages in the conduct, he is aware of a
high probability that he is doing so.” Thus, to convict Thompson of battery as a class C
felony, the State needed to prove that Thompson knowingly or intentionally touched
Newmon in a rude, insolent, or angry manner, and that Newmon suffered serious bodily
injury.
Thompson points to her own testimony and argues that “[t]here is no indication
that Thompson intended to hurt Newmon” and that “Thompson pushed [Newmon] in
response to being pushed herself and the evidence is insufficient to establish that she
knowingly or intentionally battered Newmon.” Appellant’s Brief at 4. The State argues
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the nature of the attack sufficiently demonstrates that Thompson knowingly battered
Newmon.
With respect to Thompson’s argument regarding intent, the record reveals that
Newmon had her head down and had no idea that Thompson was going to put her hands
on Newmon, that Thompson picked Newmon up and slammed her down on the concrete
rendering Newmon unconscious, and that Thompson then stomped her leg down. Based
upon our review of the record, we conclude that evidence of probative value exists from
which the jury could have found Thompson possessed the requisite intent. See Mann v.
State, 895 N.E.2d 119, 121-122 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that a reasonable jury
could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted knowingly
when he kicked the victim while the victim was lying on the floor).
To the extent that Thompson argues that she acted in self-defense, we observe that
self-defense is governed by Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2. A valid claim of self-defense is legal
justification for an otherwise criminal act. Wilson v. State, 770 N.E.2d 799, 800 (Ind.
2002). In order to prevail on a self-defense claim, a defendant must demonstrate he was
in a place he had a right to be; did not provoke, instigate, or participate willingly in the
violence; and had a reasonable fear of death or great bodily harm. Id. The amount of
force a person may use to protect herself depends on the urgency of the situation.
Harmon v. State, 849 N.E.2d 726, 730-731 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). However, if a person
uses “more force than is reasonably necessary under the circumstances,” her self-defense
claim will fail. Id. at 731; see also Hollowell v. State, 707 N.E.2d 1014, 1021 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1999) (“Where a person has used more force than necessary to repel an attack the
5
right to self-defense is extinguished, and the ultimate result is that the victim then
becomes the perpetrator.”).
When a defendant claims self-defense, the State has the burden of disproving at
least one of the elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Wilson, 770 N.E.2d at 800. If a
defendant is convicted despite her claim of self-defense, we will reverse only if no
reasonable person could say that self-defense was negated by the State beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id. at 800-801. A mutual combatant, whether or not the initial
aggressor, must declare an armistice before he or she may claim self-defense. Id. at 801
(citing Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(e)(3) (“[A] person is not justified in using force if . . . the
person has entered into combat with another person or is the initial aggressor unless the
person withdraws from the encounter and communicates to the other person the intent to
do so and the other person nevertheless continues or threatens to continue unlawful
action.”)).2 The standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to
rebut a claim of self-defense is the same as the standard for any sufficiency of the
evidence claim. Id. We neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of
witnesses. Id. If there is sufficient evidence of probative value to support the conclusion
of the trier of fact, then the verdict will not be disturbed. Id.
Based upon Newmon’s testimony, Thompson was the initial and only aggressor.
Likewise, Maydwell, the passerby, testified that Thompson snatched Newmon off the
porch, that Thompson was the aggressor, and that Newmon looked like she was surprised
and did not look aggressive. Based upon the record, we conclude that the State presented
2
Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2 was subsequently amended. See Pub. L. No. 161-2012, § 1 (eff. March
20, 2012).
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evidence of a probative nature from which a reasonable trier of fact could have found that
Thompson did not validly act in self-defense and that she was guilty of battery as a class
C felony. See Rodriguez v. State, 714 N.E.2d 667, 670-671 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999)
(holding that sufficient evidence existed to rebut the defendant’s claim of self-defense),
trans. denied.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Thompson’s conviction for battery as a class
C felony.
Affirmed.
FRIEDLANDER, J., and PYLE, J., concur.
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