Deon Liggans v. State of Indiana ( 2012 )

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before FILED
any court except for the purpose of Sep 06 2012, 9:27 am
establishing the defense of res judicata,
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ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
TIMOTHY J. BURNS GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
GARY R. ROM
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
DEON LIGGANS, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 49A04-1111-CR-616
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Linda E. Brown, Judge
Cause No. 49F10-1008-CM-61963
September 6, 2012
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
BARTEAU, Senior Judge
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Deon Liggans appeals his conviction of resisting law enforcement, a Class A
misdemeanor. Ind. Code Ann. § 35-44-3-3 (West 2012). We affirm.
ISSUE
Liggans raises one issue, which we restate as: whether the evidence is sufficient
to sustain his conviction.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 9, 2012, Officer Dale Disney of the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police
Department was dispatched to an address to investigate a disturbance. Disney was on
patrol in uniform, in a fully marked police car. The dispatcher advised Disney that a
suspect was driving away from the address in a green Dodge Neon. As Disney
approached the address, he saw a person driving away in a Dodge Neon.
Disney stopped the Neon and approached it on foot. A person later identified as
Liggans was sitting in the driver’s seat shouting at someone on his cell phone. Liggans
failed to comply with Disney’s requests to hang up his phone or to fully roll down his car
window, so Disney opened the car door and asked Liggans to get out of the car. Liggans
was still talking on his cell phone as he got out, so Disney took the phone away from him
and put it on top of Liggans’ car.
Disney told Liggans to walk to the back of the car so that they could get out of
traffic. Liggans was angry and shouted at Disney as he moved to the back of the car.
Disney felt unsafe and decided to handcuff Liggans. Liggans cooperated at first by
standing still with his hands behind his back, but after Disney had put a handcuff on one
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of Liggans’ wrists, Liggans “made an abrupt quarter turn on me, and said you better not
put those on tight, and began to pull away.” Tr. p. 40. Disney maneuvered Liggans to
the ground using a front leg sweep. Liggans continued to struggle, so Disney got on top
of Liggans to minimize his movements and finished handcuffing him.
The State charged Liggans with resisting law enforcement. Liggans filed a motion
to suppress, which the trial court denied. Upon Liggans’ request, the trial court certified
its ruling for interlocutory appeal, but this Court declined to accept Liggans’ appeal.
Subsequently, the trial court presided over a bench trial. The trial court determined that
Liggans was guilty and sentenced him accordingly. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
When an appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a
conviction, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses.
Joslyn v. State, 942 N.E.2d 809, 811 (Ind. 2011). We affirm if the probative evidence
and reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence could have allowed a reasonable trier
of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.In order to convict Liggans of resisting law enforcement, the State was required to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) Liggans (2) forcibly resisted, obstructed, or
interfered (3) with Disney (4) while Disney was lawfully engaged in the execution of his
duties. See Ind. Code Ann. § 35-44-3-3 (West 2012).
Liggans contends that there is insufficient evidence that he forcibly resisted
Disney. Our Supreme Court has determined that force is an element of the offense of
resisting law enforcement. Graham v. State, 903 N.E.2d 963, 965 (Ind. 2009). While the
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level of force involved “need not rise to the level of mayhem,” the State must prove that
the defendant used “strong, powerful, violent means” to resist a law enforcement officer.
Id. In Graham, the Court distinguished between a defendant’s mere refusal to present his
or her arms for handcuffing, which would not be sufficient proof of forcible resistance,
and “stiffening” one’s arms when an officer grabs them to position them for handcuffing,
which “would suffice” to establish forcible resistance. Id. at 966.
In this case, when Disney attempted to handcuff Liggans, Liggans cooperated at
first but then turned on Disney and began to pull away. Disney used a leg sweep
maneuver to put Liggans on the ground, where Liggans continued to struggle against
being handcuffed. We conclude that this evidence sufficiently demonstrates that Liggans
forcibly resisted Disney. See Dallaly v. State, 916 N.E.2d 945, 950-51 (Ind. Ct. App.
2009) (determining that sufficient evidence established forcible resistance where Dallaly
at first turned away from the officer and then turned aggressively toward the officer when
told to halt, and resisted being handcuffed); Johnson v. State, 833 N.E.2d 516, 518-19
(Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (determining that sufficient evidence established forcible resistance
where Johnson turned and pushed away from officers as they attempted to search him and
then stiffened his body to avoid being placed in a jail transport vehicle). Liggans asserts
that he twisted away from Disney during the handcuffing process because the handcuff
was too tight and caused him pain. This is a request to reweigh the evidence, which we
cannot do. Therefore, Liggans’ challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
his conviction fails.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Affirmed.
FRIEDLANDER, J., and KIRSCH, J., concur.
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