Mark Keaton v. Christine L. Zook ( 2014 )


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  • Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
    Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
    Jul 29 2014, 6:25 am
    precedent or cited before any court except for
    the purpose of establishing the defense of res
    judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the
    case.
    APPELLANT PRO SE:                                  ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
    MARK KEATON                                        DAVID L. FERGUSON
    Fort Wayne, Indiana                                Ferguson & Ferguson
    Bloomington, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    MARK KEATON,                                       )
    )
    Appellant-Plaintiff,                        )
    )
    vs.                                  )        No. 53A01-1401-PL-38
    )
    CHRISTINE L. ZOOK,                                 )
    )
    Appellee-Defendant.                         )
    APPEAL FROM THE MONROE CIRCUIT COURT
    The Honorable E. Michael Hoff, Judge
    Cause No. 53C01-1202-PL-363
    July 29, 2014
    MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    GARRARD, Senior Judge
    Mark Keaton appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Christine L.
    Zook. We affirm.
    Keaton sued Zook, alleging malicious prosecution and abuse of process. Zook
    filed a motion for summary judgment. Keaton moved for an extension of his deadline to
    respond, and the trial court granted him an extension to and including July 31, 2013.
    Keaton experienced problems with his printer and did not mail his response to the
    trial court or Zook on July 31. On the morning of August 1, Keaton e-mailed Zook to ask
    whether she would object to a one-day extension. After a further exchange of e-mails,
    Zook stated she would not object. Later that day, Keaton mailed the court, via overnight
    delivery, a motion for extension of time and a summary judgment response.
    On August 2, Zook filed a motion to strike Keaton’s summary judgment response.
    Three days later, the court granted Keaton’s motion for extension of time and deemed his
    summary judgment response filed as of August 1.
    Zook filed a motion to reconsider. The parties filed additional documents and the
    court held a hearing. Next, the court granted Zook’s motion to reconsider and motion to
    strike, concluding:
    It is therefore ordered that the Plaintiff’s Designation of Evidence
    Submitted in Opposition to Defendant Christine Zook’s Motion for
    Summary Judgment; his Brief in Opposition to Defendant Christine Zook’s
    Motion for Summary Judgment; and his Affidavit of R. Mark Keaton
    Submitted in Opposition to Defendant Christine Zook’s Motion for
    Summary Judgment are stricken. Plaintiff may submit a brief in the next 21
    days that does not refer to designated evidence that has been stricken from
    the summary judgment record.
    2
    Appellant’s App. p. 16. Keaton did not submit a brief, and both parties waived a
    summary judgment hearing. The court subsequently granted Zook’s motion for summary
    judgment on all of Keaton’s claims. Keaton filed a motion to correct error, which the
    court denied. This appeal followed.
    Keaton claims the trial court erred in striking his response to Zook’s motion for
    summary judgment. Zook contends on cross-appeal that this appeal should be dismissed
    because Keaton failed to timely file his Appellant’s Brief. We disagree and address the
    merits of Keaton’s claim.
    In general, a trial court’s order on a motion to strike is reviewed for an abuse of
    discretion. Williams v. Tharp, 
    914 N.E.2d 756
    , 769 (Ind. 2009). However, our supreme
    court has established a “bright-line rule” that a party responding to a motion for summary
    judgment must file the response, or a request for a continuance, within thirty days of
    service of the motion. Mitchell v. 10th and The Bypass, LLC, 
    3 N.E.3d 967
    , 972-73 (Ind.
    2014). If the party fails to file either the response or a request for a continuance within
    that period, the trial court cannot consider summary judgment materials that are filed
    after the period elapses. 
    Id. at 972;
    see also Starks Mech., Inc. v. New Albany-Floyd
    Cnty. Consol. Sch. Corp., 
    854 N.E.2d 936
    , 940 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (trial court “had no
    discretion” to accept a summary judgment response and designated evidence that the
    party submitted one day late). If a court grants an enlargement of time to file a summary
    judgment response, the response must be filed within the additional period granted by the
    court. Miller v. Yedlowski, 
    916 N.E.2d 246
    , 251 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied.
    3
    Here, the parties agree that Keaton did not mail his summary judgment response to
    the court until the day after the filing deadline had expired. Keaton failed to comply with
    the bright-line rule, and the trial court did not err in striking his summary judgment
    materials. See 
    id. Keaton argues
    that under Trial Rule 56(C), the operative deadline is the date of
    service of the summary judgment response on an opposing party, not the date of filing
    with the trial court. His argument is contradicted by precedent. See 
    Mitchell, 3 N.E.3d at 972
    (the “late filing” of summary judgment responses is precluded); Monroe Guar. Ins.
    Co. v. Magwerks Corp., 
    829 N.E.2d 968
    , 974 (Ind. 2005) (trial court may not consider a
    response that is “filed” after the thirty-day period).
    In any event, Keaton did not serve his summary judgment response on Zook until
    after the deadline expired. In addition, he did not ask whether she would object to a
    continuance of the deadline until after the deadline expired. These belated acts did not
    bring Keaton into compliance with the rule stated in Mitchell. Further, Zook’s agreement
    to a one-day continuance after the deadline expired did not excuse Keaton’s failure to
    timely file his summary judgment response or to timely file a request for a second
    continuance. See Booher v. Sheeram, LLC, 
    937 N.E.2d 392
    , 394-95 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010)
    (opponent’s lack of objection to an extension of time did not give the court discretion to
    accept late-filed summary judgment documents where the party requesting the extension
    failed to timely file the request), trans. denied.
    Keaton’s challenge to the trial court’s grant of summary judgment is based upon
    his conclusion that the trial court erred in striking his summary judgment response. The
    4
    trial court did not err in striking the response, so Keaton’s appeal of the summary
    judgment order must also fail.
    For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    Affirmed.
    NAJAM, J., and BROWN, J., concur.
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