Garry Moore v. State of Mississippi ( 1996 )


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  •                          IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
    NO. 96-CA-01045-SCT
    GARRY MOORE
    v.
    STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
    THIS OPINION IS NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION AND MAY NOT BE CITED,
    PURSUANT TO M.R.A.P. 35-A
    DATE OF JUDGMENT:                             08/27/96
    TRIAL JUDGE:                                  HON. FRANK G. VOLLOR
    COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:                    MONROE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:                       PRO SE
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:                        OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
    BY: SCOTT STUART
    DISTRICT ATTORNEY:                            TIM ERVIN
    NATURE OF THE CASE:                           CIVIL - POST CONVICTION RELIEF
    DISPOSITION:                                  AFFIRMED - 2/5/98
    MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
    2/23/1998
    MANDATE ISSUED:                               4/16/98
    BEFORE SULLIVAN, P.J., BANKS AND MILLS, JJ.
    SULLIVAN, PRESIDING JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
    Garry Moore was indicted in Cause No. 11,575 during the March, 1983 Term by the Monroe County
    Grand Jury on one count of burglary and larceny of a dwelling and one count of uttering a forged
    check. Moore pled guilty to both charges on June 14, 1983, before Circuit Court Judge Fred Wicker.
    In a July 8, 1983, order, Judge Wicker sentenced Moore to serve ten years on the burglary and
    larceny conviction and ten years on the forgery conviction, both sentences to run concurrently.
    In 1991, the 1983 convictions were used as the basis for Moore's convictions as a habitual offender.
    On February 2, 1993, Moore filed his Motion to Vacate and Set Aside Convictions (PCR motion),
    contending that his guilty pleas in Cause No. 11,575 were involuntary and unknowing, and could not
    be used to enhance his sentence as a habitual offender. He asserted that Judge Wicker failed to
    comply with the requirements of Boykin v. Alabama, 
    395 U.S. 238
    (1969), and Rule 3.03 of the
    Mississippi Uniform Criminal Rules of Circuit Court, requiring that a criminal defendant be advised
    of his rights before pleading guilty. Specifically, Moore claimed that his guilty pleas were rendered
    involuntary, because the court did not inform him that the convictions could be used to enhance his
    sentencing upon further conviction as a habitual offender. Circuit Court Judge Frank Vollor
    dismissed Moore's PCR motion on August 10, 1993, finding that it was time barred.
    On August 20, 1993, Moore filed his Motion to Amend and/or Alter Judgement [sic], seeking relief
    from the August 10 denial of his PCR motion under Miss. R. Civ. P. 59(e). In his supporting brief,
    Moore asserted that the statute of limitations for filing a PCR motion challenging a prior conviction
    should not begin to run until the prior conviction is used for sentencing enhancement. Upon denial of
    the 59(e) motion by Judge Vollor, Moore filed a petition for writ of mandamus, requesting that this
    Court direct Judge Vollor to consider the merits of the motion. This Court denied Moore's petition
    on October 8, 1993. On August 9, 1996, Moore filed his Petitioner's Motion for Relief from
    Judgment or Order under Miss. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6), again requesting the circuit court to vacate its
    order denying him post conviction relief. In this motion, Moore for the first time asserted that his
    guilty pleas in Cause No. 11,575 were involuntary due to the trial court's failure to advise him of the
    minimum penalties and his right against self incrimination. Judge Vollor dismissed this final motion,
    because it was not filed within a reasonable time, and Moore perfected his appeal to this Court.
    STATEMENT OF THE LAW
    I.
    WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING MOTION
    FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT OR ORDER BROUGHT UNDER RULE 60(B)(6) OF
    THE MISSISSIPPI RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
    Moore filed his motion under Miss. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6), which states:
    On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal
    representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:
    ....
    (6) any other reason justifying relief from the judgment.
    The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2) and (3) not more
    than six months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken.
    Miss. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) (emphasis added). In his motion, and on appeal to this Court, Moore argues
    that his original PCR motion was not time barred, based upon Sones v. Hargett, 
    61 F.3d 410
    (5th
    Cir. 1995). Judge Vollor did not address the merits of Moore's 60(b)(6) motion, but denied it because
    it was not timely filed, citing Hinds County Bd. of Supervisors v. Common Cause of Mississippi,
    
    551 So. 2d 107
    (Miss. 1989). In Common Cause, this Court found that a 60(b) motion filed over two
    years after judgment was not filed "within a reasonable time." Common 
    Cause, 551 So. 2d at 119
    .
    This Court's interpretation of the phrase "within a reasonable time" in Common Cause is applicable
    to all 60(b) motions other than those under subsections (1), (2), and (3), which must be filed within
    six months. Since Moore filed his 60(b)(6) motion on August 9, 1996, three years after the order
    denying his PCR motion, it was untimely filed.
    In his 60(b)(6) motion, Moore cites Sones in support of his argument that Judge Vollor erred in
    denying his PCR motion as time barred. Sones filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that
    his attorney exhibited deficient performance by failing to attack his prior conviction at the sentencing
    hearing in which the prior conviction was used to enhance his sentence as a habitual offender. 
    Sones, 61 F.3d at 419
    . Moore relies heavily on a footnote in the opinion, in which the Court stated, "[T]he
    Mississippi Supreme Court has consistently held that an attack on a facially valid prior conviction,
    used either as an aggravating circumstance in capital sentencing or as a basis for a sentence as a
    habitual offender, must be brought after sentencing in a petition for post-conviction relief from that
    prior judgment of conviction." 
    Id. at 418 n.14.
    Moore interprets this statement to mean that once a
    prior conviction has been used to enhance sentencing, the criminal defendant must wait until after the
    subsequent enhanced sentencing to attack the prior conviction in a post conviction relief motion. As
    the State points out in its brief, this is a misinterpretation of the law. Reading further into the Sones
    opinion, the Court's meaning becomes apparent. "The Mississippi Supreme Court has made it clear,
    however, that attacks on prior convictions that are not facially invalid must be made collaterally, in a
    motion for relief from the prior judgment of conviction, not at trial or sentencing." 
    Id. at 419. The
    Court simply meant that the sentencing hearing was not the appropriate place for attacking the prior
    conviction. Moore's reliance on the Sones decision and its underlying case law to support his theory
    that his PCR motion was not time barred is misplaced.
    Moore was convicted and sentenced in Cause No. 11,575 on July 8, 1983. For those defendants
    convicted before the April 17, 1984, enactment date of the Mississippi Uniform Post-Conviction
    Collateral Relief Act, the deadline for filing a PCR motion was April 17, 1987. Campbell v. State,
    
    611 So. 2d 209
    , 210 (Miss. 1992). Moore filed his PCR motion attacking the convictions in Cause
    No. 11,575 nearly six years after the deadline, on February 2, 1993. His original claim that his guilty
    pleas were not knowing and voluntary would fall under the exception for claims affecting
    fundamental constitutional rights. See Chunn v. State, 
    669 So. 2d 29
    , 32 (Miss. 1996) (citing Boykin
    v. Alabama, 
    395 U.S. 238
    (1969)); Bevill v. State, 
    669 So. 2d 14
    , 17 (Miss. 1996) (citing Luckett v.
    State, 
    582 So. 2d 428
    (Miss.1991); Smith v. State, 
    477 So. 2d 191
    (Miss.1985)). However, "merely
    raising" such a claim does not operate to waive the procedural bar. 
    Bevill, 669 So. 2d at 17
    . Moore's
    argument that his guilty pleas were rendered unknowing and involuntary due to the trial court's
    failure to advise him that the convictions could be used to enhance sentencing in a subsequent felony
    conviction is without merit. The trial judge must inform the accused of the consequences of pleading
    guilty. URCCC 8.04; Gilliard v. State, 
    462 So. 2d 710
    , 712 (Miss. 1985) (citing Henderson v.
    Morgan, 
    426 U.S. 637
    (1976)). However, we do not extend that rule to require a trial judge to
    advise a criminal defendant of the possibility that his guilty plea could be used to support a later
    conviction as a habitual offender. Moore's original PCR motion was properly dismissed as time
    barred, and Judge Vollor properly found that Moore's 60(b)(6) motion was not timely filed.
    II.
    WHETHER MOORE'S GUILTY PLEAS WERE RENDERED INVOLUNTARY DUE TO
    THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO ADVISE HIM OF THE MINIMUM PENALTIES
    AND HIS RIGHT AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION.
    In his 60(b)(6) attack on Judge Vollor's order denying him post conviction relief, Moore asserted for
    the first time that his guilty pleas were involuntary because Judge Wicker did not inform him of the
    minimum sentences or his right against self incrimination. In addition to being untimely filed, these
    claims are barred, because Moore failed to raise them in his original PCR motion. Common Cause,
    supra; Gardner v. State, 
    531 So. 2d 805
    , 808-809 (Miss. 1988) (citing Colburn v. State, 
    431 So. 2d 1111
    , 1114 (Miss. 1983)). The lower court's denial of Moore's 60(b)(6) motion was appropriate in
    light of the procedural bars.
    CONCLUSION
    Because Moore filed his 60(b)(6) motion three years after the trial court's denial of post conviction
    relief, Judge Vollor properly found that the motion was not filed within a reasonable time. In
    addition, Moore's Sones claim is without merit. Because he failed to file his original PCR motion
    before the deadline and raised no claim falling within the recognized exceptions, it was properly
    dismissed by the trial court as time-barred. Moore's new claim that his guilty pleas were involuntary is
    additionally barred for failure to raise the issue in his original PCR motion.
    We therefore affirm the lower court's denial of post conviction relief in this case.
    LOWER COURT'S DENIAL OF POST CONVICTION RELIEF AFFIRMED.
    PRATHER, C.J., PITTMAN, P.J., BANKS, McRAE, ROBERTS, SMITH, MILLS AND
    WALLER, JJ., CONCUR.