Hickman v. Chater, Commissioner ( 1997 )


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  • UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    VANESSA Y. HICKMAN,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    No. 96-1953
    SHIRLEY S. CHATER, COMMISSIONER OF
    SOCIAL SECURITY,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at New Bern.
    Malcolm J. Howard, District Judge.
    (CA-94-155-4-H)
    Submitted: August 26, 1997
    Decided: September 16, 1997
    Before WILKINS, NIEMEYER, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    _________________________________________________________________
    COUNSEL
    Richard Luby Cannon, III, Greenville, North Carolina, for Appellant.
    Janice McKenzie Cole, United States Attorney, Barbara D. Kocher,
    Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appel-
    lee.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
    Local Rule 36(c).
    _________________________________________________________________
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    Vanessa Hickman appeals the district court's order upholding the
    decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (Commissioner) that
    she is not disabled and therefore not entitled to supplemental security
    income (SSI). We affirm.
    Hickman claimed disability from July 31, 1992, through November
    16, 1993. She had a long history of morbid obesity and underwent
    gastric bypass surgery in November 1993. Following surgery, she lost
    a considerable amount of weight. She asserts that the Commissioner
    should have found her disabled at the third step of the sequential eval-
    uation process, see 
    20 C.F.R. § 416.920
    (d) (1997), because her
    impairments met or equaled an impairment listed at 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404,
    Subpt. P, App. 1 (1997) (the Listing). We review the Commissioner's
    decision to determine if substantial evidence supports the decision
    and the correct law was applied. Pass v. Chater , 
    65 F.3d 1200
    , 1202
    (4th Cir. 1995).
    Hickman contends that, until her weight dropped after her surgery,
    she was disabled under § 9.09 of the Listing because of obesity. That
    regulation requires that a woman of Hickman's height weigh at least
    274 pounds and have an identified physical problem in addition to her
    obesity. Assuming that Hickman's weight qualified, she did not pro-
    duce evidence that would render her disabled under§ 9.09. Although
    she claimed to suffer from back and leg pain, she offered no x-ray or
    similar imaging evidence, as required by § 9.09(A), showing arthritis
    in a joint or the lumbosacral spine. Rather, the x-rays offered showed
    only minor degenerative changes at the left sacroiliac joint. Similarly,
    while Hickman's blood pressure was elevated, the numerous blood
    pressure readings contained in the record do not show diastolic pres-
    sure that was persistently greater than 100 mm. Hg, as required by
    § 9.09(B). There is no assertion that Hickman suffered from any other
    2
    physical maladies specifically identified in § 9.09. Substantial evi-
    dence thus supports the finding that Hickman's obesity did not qualify
    under the Listing.
    The Commissioner also correctly concluded that Hickman's vari-
    ous problems, when considered in combination, did not meet or equal
    one listed in the regulations. See Hines v. Bowen, 
    872 F.2d 56
    , 59 (4th
    Cir. 1989). Her hypertension was not serious, although doctors moni-
    tored it. While she suffered from diabetes, the condition was con-
    trolled with medication. The ALJ found Hickman's complaints of
    pain not credible to the degree alleged because Hickman took no sig-
    nificant pain medication, engaged in daily activities such as cleaning,
    vacuuming, and dishwashing, and had sought no treatment for pain
    other than relatively mild painkillers. We find no reason to disturb
    this properly supported credibility determination.
    We accordingly affirm the judgment.* We dispense with oral argu-
    ment because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
    in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the deci-
    sional process.
    AFFIRMED
    _________________________________________________________________
    *Hickman claims that the ALJ should have solicited the testimony of
    a vocational expert. However, she did not raise this claim at the adminis-
    trative level, in her motion for judgment on the pleadings in the district
    court, or in her objections to the magistrate judge's report. Therefore, she
    has waived her right to raise the issue on appeal. See Pleasant Valley
    Hosp., Inc. v. Shalala, 
    32 F.3d 67
    , 70 (4th Cir. 1994); Muth v. United
    States, 
    1 F.3d 246
    , 250 (4th Cir. 1993); Praylow v. Martin, 
    761 F.2d 179
    ,
    180 n.1 (4th Cir. 1985).
    3