Com. v. Harris, D. ( 2014 )

J-S29014-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
DANIEL C. HARRIS
Appellant No. 1291 MDA 2013
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 10, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-22-CR-0002176-2012
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., WECHT, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J.: FILED AUGUST 22, 2014
Appellant, Daniel C. Harris, appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered January 10, 2013, by the Honorable Richard A. Lewis, Court of
Common Pleas of Dauphin County. We affirm.
On the evening of February 20, 2012, Harrisburg City Police Officers
were dispatched to an apartment located at 1416 Thompson Street to
investigate a reported shooting.1 Therein, police discovered the victim, Matt
Harrell, lying in a fetal position on the floor next to a bed with a gunshot
wound to the back of the head. The victim was pronounced dead at the
scene. Eyewitnesses Chuck Long, Tandra Jones and Thalia Waddell, who
____________________________________________
*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1
For a detailed recitation of the facts and history of this case, we direct the
-written memorandum opinion. See Trial
Court Opinion, 11/20/13 at 3-19.
J-S29014-14
were present at the time of the shooting, observed that a fight had ensued
between Harris, who had been at the apartment selling crack cocaine, and
the victim, because Harris believed the victim had stolen a bag of drugs.
During the altercation, Harris shot the victim, who then fell off a bed onto
the floor. Harris reportedly then stood over the victim and shot him several
more times, including a shot to the back of the head, while the victim was
on his knees on the floor. Shortly thereafter, Long reported the crime to the
police. Both Long and Jones identified Harris as the shooter.
Harris was arrested and charged with, among other crimes, one count
of Criminal Homicide2 and Firearms Not to be Carried without a License.3
Following a jury trial, on January 10, 2013, Harris was convicted of both
charges and sentenced to an aggregate term of life imprisonment. On April
26, 2013, by agreement with the Commonwealth, the trial court reinstated
nunc pro tunc. Thereafter, on May 6, 2013, Harris
filed a post-sentence motion requesting a new trial, which the court denied
on June 18, 2013. This timely appeal followed.
On appeal, Harris raises the following issues for our review:
I. -
weight of the evidence
justice where the Commonwealth: presented the
unreliable, contradictory, and inconsistent testimony of
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2
18 PA.CONS.STAT.ANN. § 2501(a).
3
18 PA.CONS.STAT.ANN. § 6106.
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Tandras Jones, Charles Long, and Thalia Waddell, and;
[sic] failed to prove that Appellant committed the crimes
charged?
II. Assuming arguendo that [Harris] was the shooter, whether
the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence to
failed to prove that [Harris] possessed specific intent and
en and intense passion and
self-defense?
Harris challenges both the sufficiency and the weight of the evidence
in support of his convictions. We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence as follows:
The standard we apply when reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in
the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient
evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we
may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the
fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances
established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every
possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt
may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so
weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of
fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The
Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly
circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test,
the entire record must be evaluated and all evidence actually
received must be considered. Finally, the trier of fact while
passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the
evidence produced is free to believe all, part or none of the
evidence. Furthermore, when reviewing a sufficiency claim, our
Court is required to give the prosecution the benefit of all
reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.
However, the inferences must flow from facts and circumstances
proven in the record, and must be of such volume and quality as
to overcome the presumption of innocence and satisfy the jury
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of an accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The trier of fact
cannot base a conviction on conjecture and speculation and a
verdict which is premised on suspicion will fail even under the
limited scrutiny of appellate review.
Commonwealth v. Slocum, 86 A.3d 272, 275-276 (Pa. Super. 2014)
(citation omitted).
Conversely, a challenge to the weight of the evidence
the evidence is sufficient to sustain the verdict, but seeks a new trial on the
ground that the evidence was so one-sided or so weighted in favor of
Commonwealth v. Orie, 88 A.3d 983, 1015 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation
omitted). Our standard when reviewing a weight of the evidence claim is
well settled.
A motion for a new trial based on a claim that the verdict is
against the weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion
of the trial court. A new trial should not be granted because of a
mere conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same
facts wou
the facts, certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to
ignore them or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to
de
be awarded when the jury's verdict is so contrary to the
evidence as to shock one's sense of justice and the award of a
new trial is imperative so that right may be given another
opportunity
An appellate court's standard of review when presented with a
weight of the evidence claim is distinct from the standard of
review applied by the trial court:
Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the
exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question of
whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.
Because the trial judge has had the opportunity to hear
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and see the evidence presented, an appellate court will
give the gravest consideration to the findings and reasons
advanced by the trial judge when reviewing a trial court's
determination that the verdict is against the weight of the
evidence. One of the least assailable reasons for granting
or denying a new trial is the lower court's conviction that
the verdict was or was not against the weight of the
evidence and that a new trial should be granted in the
interest of justice.
This does not mean that the exercise of discretion by the trial
court in granting or denying a motion for a new trial based on a
challenge to the weight of the evidence is unfettered. In
describing the limits of a trial court's discretion, we have
explained:
wisdom and skill so as to reach a dispassionate conclusion
within the framework of the law, and is not exercised for
the purpose of giving effect to the will of the judge.
Discretion must be exercised on the foundation of reason,
as opposed to prejudice, personal motivations, caprice or
arbitrary actions. Discretion is abused where the course
pursued represents not merely an error of judgment, but
where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable or where
the law is not applied or where the record shows that the
action is a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will.
Id. at 1015-1016 (citation omitted).
Instantly, Harris first argues that the testimony of Commonwealth
witnesses Jones, Long, and Waddell was so unreliable, contradictory and
inconsistent as to render the verdict against the weight of the evidence.
Specifically, Harris alleges the witnesses did not accurately describe the
outfit worn by Harris the night of the murder, that they incorrectly testified
habitual drug abusers who had previous convictions for crimes involving
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accounts of the shooting were substantially similar in all major aspects. The
trial court summarized the testimony thusly:
Chuck Long and Tandras Jones provided eyewitness
testimony stating that Harris [shot the victim] in the neck during
the struggle on the bed. (N.T. 1/18/13, pp. 172-177; 222).
Within a day of the incident, Long and Jones positively identified
Harris as the shooter by choosing his picture out of a photo array
and also identified him at trial. (N.T. 1/18/13, pp. 180; 233-
234). Jones and Long testified that after the first shot, they saw
continued over the missing sack of drugs. (N.T. 1/18/13, pp.
177; 223-224). Ms. Jones and Mr. Long also testified that they
saw Harris shoot [the victim] in the head while [the victim] was
on his knees. (N.T. 1/18/13, pp. 224; 229-230). Additionally,
Thal
-287).
When she ran into the bathroom for safety, she heard two more
shots and a person hitting the floor. Ms. Waddell came out of
the bathroom and found [the victim] curled upon the floor as he
took his last breath. (N.T. 1/1/13, pp. 288-290).
presented essentially the same set of factual circumstances
leading up to the murder: the individuals who were present at
the time of the shooting; Harris had been in the apartment
several times that day to sell drugs; [the victim] was trying to
trade barber clips to Harris for crack cocaine; Harris discovered
that a bag of drugs belonging to him was missing; he pulled a
gun on [the victim] as he believed that while they were
drugs; an argument and physical fight ensued; Harris shot [the
victim] during a struggle on the bed and then shot him at least
two more times while [the victim] was off the bed, on his knees,
still denying that he had stolen any drugs.
See Trial Court Opinion, 11/20/13 at 20-21.
surrounding the
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inconsistent as to be unreliable. The jury clearly resolved any
inconsistencies among the testimony as it saw fit and reached a verdict.
See Orie is free to believe
all, part or none of the evidence and must determine the credibility of the
reviewing the record, we find no misapplication of law or abuse of discretion
Lastly, Harris contends that, assuming arguendo he did shoot the
victim, the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for first-degree
murder because the Commonwealth failed to establish Harris possessed a
- Id.obtain a first-degree murder conviction, the Commonwealth must
demonstrate that a human being was unlawfully killed, the defendant
perpetrated the killing, and that the defendant acted with malice and a
Commonwealth v. Burno, --- A.3d ---, 2014 WL
2722758 at *10 (Pa., filed June 26, 2014) (citation omitted). A specific
Id.(citation omitted).
-defense claim, we note that
upon or toward another person is justifiable when the actor believes that
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such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself
against the use of unlawfu PA.CONS.STAT.ANN.
§ 505(a). Although the defendant has no burden to prove self-
Commonwealth v. Mouzon,
53 A.3d 738, 740 (Pa. 2012) (citation omitted). Once a justification defense
Commonwealth v. Torres, 766
A.2d 342, 345 (Pa. 2001).
The Commonwealth sustains its burden if
the following: 1) the accused did not reasonably believe that he was in
danger of death or serious bodily injury; or 2) the accused provoked or
continued the use of force; or 3) the accused had a duty to retreat and the
Commonwealth v.
McClendon
remains the province of the [finder of fact] to determine whether the
accused's belief was reasonable, whether he was free of provocation, and
Id.In support of his self-defense claim, Harris claims that he reasonably
victim in an attempt to recover his pro
contends the victim, who outweighed Harris, then pinned him to the ground
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so that he was unable to retreat. Id. at 16. We do not find these
allegations sufficient to support a finding that Harris reasonably believed he
was in danger of death or serious bodily injury. Moreover, as previously
noted, three separate Commonwealth witnesses testified that they observed
Harris shoot the victim in the head while the victim was on his knees
testimony that the he had been pinned by the
victim or that he was unable to safely retreat. Clearly, the jury credited the
that he acted in self-defense.
For the same reason,
individual without lawful justification commits voluntary manslaughter if at
the time of the killing he is acting under a sudden and intense passion
person confronted by the same series of events, would become impassioned
to the extent t
Commonwealth v. Truong, 36 A.3d 592, 600 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation
omitted), appeal denied, 618 Pa. 688, 57 A.3d 70 (2012). Harris baldly
record to substantiate this claim. Therefore, this claim, too, fails.
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the weight and sufficiency of the evidence, we affirm his judgment of
sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/22/2014
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