Rashard Ranson v. State of Indiana ( 2014 )

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before
any court except for the purpose of Jan 31 2014, 9:10 am
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
BARBARA J. SIMMONS GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Oldenburg, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
ANGELA N. SANCHEZ
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
RASHARD RANSON, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 49A04-1307-CR-329
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Amy Jones, Judge
Cause No. 49F08-1304-CM-25244
January 31, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
BRADFORD, Judge
CASE SUMMARY
Appellant-Defendant Rashard Ranson was convicted of Class A misdemeanor
resisting law enforcement after running from a police officer who had told him to stop.
Ranson contends that his conviction cannot stand because the State failed to establish that the
officer had sufficient reason to detain Ranson. Because well-established Indiana precedent
holds that a person may not flee from a police officer who has told him to stop, even if the
order is unlawful, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
At approximately 2:00 p.m. on April 7, 2013, Marion County Sheriff’s Deputy Henry
Turner, who was in full uniform, saw Ranson “in the rear of the building tree line” at the
Bent Tree apartment complex. Tr. p. 5. Deputy Turner was off-duty and although he had
worked security part-time for approximately one year at Bent Tree, Deputy Turner did not
recognize Ranson. Moreover, Deputy Turner was aware that Bent Tree had recently had a
“high rate of burglaries, especially when you’re in the rear.” Tr. p. 6. When Deputy Turner
asked Ranson to stop, Ranson “observed” Deputy Turner and started walking away “at a
rapid pace” toward the Carlton Apartments, which Deputy Turner also know had recently
been experiencing frequent burglaries. Tr. p. 6. Deputy Turner then said, “Stop, police[,]”
and Ranson fled. Tr. p. 6. On April 18, 2013, the State charged Ranson with Class A
misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. On June 12, 2013, the trial court found Ranson
guilty as charged and sentenced him to one year of incarceration with all but four days
suspended to probation.
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DISCUSSION AND DECISION
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we consider
only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. Drane v. State,
867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). It is the factfinder’s role to assess witness credibility and
weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to support a conviction. Id. We
consider conflicting evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Id. We
affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find that the elements of the
crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.A person resists law enforcement if that person “flees from a law enforcement officer
after the officer has, by visible or audible means … identified himself or herself and ordered
the person to stop[.]” Ind. Code § 35-44-3-3(a)(3). Ranson does not dispute that the
evidence indicates that he fled after Deputy Turner identified himself as a law enforcement
officer and ordered Ranson to stop. Ranson argues, however, that his conviction cannot
stand because Deputy Turner had insufficient justification to detain him. We disagree.
It is well settled that “[i]n Indiana, an individual may not flee from a police
officer who has ordered the person to stop, regardless of the apparent or
ultimate lawfulness of the officer’s order.” Dandridge v. State, 810 N.E.2d
746, 749 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied; see also State v. Howell, 782
N.E.2d 1066, 1067 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003); Lashley v. State, 745 N.E.2d 254, 261
(Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied; Corbin v. State, 568 N.E.2d 1064, 1065
(Ind. Ct. App. 1991). On several occasions, this Court has noted that the
resisting law enforcement statute does not condition the offense upon a lawful
order. Alspach v. State, 755 N.E.2d 209, 211 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans.
denied; Lashley, 745 N.E.2d at 261; Corbin, 568 N.E.2d at 1065.… Because
of the danger flight poses and the fact that a defendant has judicial remedies if
he does not flee, the rule in our State is that even if a police officer does not
have reasonable suspicion to stop a defendant, the defendant has no right to
flee when the officer orders him to stop.
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Cole v. State, 878 N.E.2d 882, 886 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). Consequently, even if we assume,
arguendo, that Deputy Turner had no legal right to detain Ranson, that fact does not affect
the validity of Ranson’s conviction for resisting law enforcement.1
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
MATHIAS, J, and PYLE, J., concur.
1
Ranson relies on two recent decisions from this court to support his argument that he had a right to
flee from an illegal detention, Griffin v. State, 997 N.E.2d 375 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. pending, and
Gaddie v. State, 991 N.E.2d 137, 141 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. granted, opinion vacated, 2013 WL
6421778 (Ind. Dec. 6, 2013). Gaddie, however, has been vacated by order of the Indiana Supreme Court and a
transfer petition is pending in Griffin, which means that, lacking certification, it currently has no precedential
value. Unless and until the Indiana Supreme Court determines that one has the right to flee from an unlawful
police request to stop, we shall follow the myriad Indiana cases holding that one has no such right.
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