Lysa Wefler v. Mark Wefler ( 2013 )


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  • Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    Aug 26 2013, 5:39 am
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be
    regarded as precedent or cited before
    any court except for the purpose of
    establishing the defense of res judicata,
    collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:                             ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
    THOMAS F. GODFREY                                   LYNN HAMMOND
    Gordon A. Etzler & Associates, LLP                  Valparaiso, Indiana
    Valparaiso, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    LYSA WEFLER,                                        )
    )
    Appellant-Respondent,                        )
    )
    vs.                                  )      No. 45A03-1206-DR-268
    )
    MARK WEFLER,                                        )
    )
    Appellee-Petitioner.                         )
    APPEAL FROM THE LAKE CIRCUIT COURT
    The Honorable George C. Paras, Judge
    The Honorable Michael A. Sarafin, Magistrate
    Cause No. 45C01-0708-DR-663
    August 26, 2013
    MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    PYLE, Judge
    STATEMENT OF THE CASE
    Lysa Wefler (“Lysa”) appeals the trial court’s finding of contempt for violating the
    settlement agreement in the dissolution of her marriage to Mark Wefler (“Mark”).
    We affirm.
    ISSUES
    1. Whether the trial court can award a monetary judgment in a contempt
    proceeding.
    2. Whether there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s contempt
    order.
    FACTS
    Lysa and Mark were married on June 18, 1996. Lysa and Mark separated in 2007,
    and Lysa filed for divorce. On March 10, 2008, Lysa and Mark entered into a settlement
    agreement, which provided in relevant part that:
    11. Real Estate. The parties agree that Wife shall be awarded all right,
    title, and interest in and to the marital home located at 1637 Vine Court in
    Hobart, Lake County, Indiana. Wife shall be exclusively responsible for
    the payment of all costs associated with said home including, but not
    limited to, mortgage, home loans, maintenance and upkeep, insurance,
    taxes, etc. If Wife is more than forty-five (45) days late on the mortgage
    payment, the parties agree the house shall be immediately placed on the
    market for sale.
    The parties further agree that Wife shall have four (4) years from the
    entry of this Order in which to refinance the property and remove
    Husband’s name from the mortgage. The parties also agree that Husband
    shall equally share with the garage [sic] door replacement expenses;
    however, his share shall not exceed Two Hundred Fifty ($250.00) Dollars.
    (Lysa’s App. 4-5). The trial court accepted the settlement agreement and entered an
    order dissolving the marriage on April 11, 2008.
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    On April 20, 2011, Mark filed a petition to hold Lysa in contempt for not
    complying with the settlement agreement. In the relevant parts of his petition, Mark
    alleged that Lysa did not make full monthly mortgage payments, thereby increasing the
    amount owed to the mortgage company. On February 8, 2012, the trial court entered an
    order finding Lysa in contempt and entering a judgment in favor of Mark for $8,571.87.
    Lysa filed a motion to correct error, essentially alleging that Mark suffered no damages
    that would require a monetary judgment and that the trial court erred in releasing an
    escrow check to Mark. The trial court denied the motion.
    DECISION
    Lysa argues that the trial court could not enforce a monetary judgment in the
    contempt proceedings and that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of
    contempt and an award of damages. We address these issues separately.
    1. Monetary Judgment in Contempt Proceeding
    Lysa argues that the trial court improperly enforced a monetary judgment through
    contempt proceedings. She relies on our decisions in Coleman v. Coleman, 
    539 N.E.2d 34
    (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) and Dawson v. Dawson, 
    800 N.E.2d 1000
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
    In those cases, we held that monetary judgments were enforceable through execution
    instead of contempt proceedings. 
    Coleman, 539 N.E.2d at 34
    ; 
    Dawson, 800 N.E.2d at 1003
    . Here, the trial court did not attempt to enforce a judgment in the contempt
    proceedings. Rather, the trial court found Lysa in contempt and awarded damages in the
    form of a judgment to compensate Mark for his alleged loss. “Once a party has been
    found in contempt, monetary damages may be awarded to compensate the other party for
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    injuries incurred as a result of the contempt.” Cowart v. White, 
    711 N.E.2d 523
    , 531
    (Ind. 1999). Thus, the trial court could issue a monetary judgment in this circumstance.
    2. Sufficiency of Evidence for Contempt Finding and Monetary Judgment
    Lysa further argues that, even if the trial court could issue a monetary judgment as
    part of a contempt order, there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s
    decision.
    “Contempt is for the benefit of the party who has been injured or damaged by the
    failure of another to conform to a court order issued for the private benefit of the
    aggrieved party.” 
    Id. at 530.
    Whether a party is in contempt is left to the discretion of
    the trial court. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 
    871 N.E.2d 390
    , 394 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). An abuse
    of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision is against the logic and effect of the
    facts and circumstances before the court. 
    Id. “As with
    other sufficiency matters, when
    reviewing a trial court’s determination on contempt matters, we will neither reweigh
    evidence nor judge witness credibility.” 
    Id. “We will
    affirm unless, after a review of the
    entire record, we have a firm and definite belief that a mistake has been made.” 
    Id. Our Indiana
    Supreme Court has stated that “[w]hen the sufficiency of the evidence is
    challenged, the burden is upon the defendant to convince the reviewing court that the
    evidence is insufficient.” Cato v. State, 
    396 N.E.2d 119
    , 121 (Ind. 1979); It is not
    appropriate for a reviewing court to reach a conclusion or make assumptions about
    evidence heard by a fact-finder that were not included in the record on appeal. 
    Id. This position
    is not limited to criminal cases. In Sears, Roebuck & Co. (Auto Dept.) v. Roque,
    
    414 N.E.2d 317
    , 322 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980), this Court stated that “[w]e agree that the
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    sufficiency of the evidence cannot be examined on appeal without presenting all of the
    evidence that may have been taken into consideration by the trial court.”
    Here, the only substantive evidence for our consideration is the transcript from the
    motion to correct error hearing. The trial court makes mention of evidence that it
    considered in finding Lysa in contempt; none of that evidence was provided in the record
    on appeal.   Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 9(F)(5), a Notice of Appeal shall
    designate “all portions of the Transcript necessary to present fairly and decide the issues
    on appeal.” App. R. 9(F)(5) further states that, “[i]f the appellant intends to urge on
    appeal that a finding of fact or conclusion thereon is unsupported by the evidence or is
    contrary to the evidence, the Notice of Appeal shall request a Transcript of all the
    evidence.” “‘Although not fatal to the appeal, failure to include a transcript works as a
    waiver of any specifications of error which depend upon evidence.’” In re Walker, 
    665 N.E.2d 586
    , 588 (Ind. 1996) (quoting Campbell v. Criterion Grp., 
    605 N.E.2d 150
    , 160
    (Ind. 1992)). Accordingly, Lysa’s argument as to the sufficiency of the evidence to
    support the trial court’s contempt finding and award of damages is waived.
    Affirmed.
    VAIDIK, J., and KIRSCH, J., concur.
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