Aaron Lee Anderson, III v. State of Indiana ( 2013 )

Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not
be regarded as precedent or cited
before any court except for the purpose
Apr 04 2013, 9:26 am
of establishing the defense of res
judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law
of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
JAMES D. CRUM GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Coots Henke & Wheeler, P.C. Attorney General of Indiana
Carmel, Indiana
JONATHAN R. SICHTERMANN
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
AARON LEE ANDERSON, III, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 29A02-1208-CR-694
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE HAMILTON CIRCUIT COURT
The Honorable Paul Felix, Judge
Cause No. 29C01-1201-FB-649
April 4, 2013
MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION
BARNES, Judge
Case Summary
Aaron Anderson appeals his conviction and sentence for Class B felony unlawful
possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon. We affirm.
Issues
Anderson raises two issues, which we restate as:
I. whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain his conviction
for Class B felony unlawful possession of a firearm by a
serious violent felon; and
II. whether his sixteen-year sentence is inappropriate in light
of the nature of the offense and the character of the
offender.
Facts
On January 22, 2012, Sergeant Robert Dine of the Westfield Police Department
initiated a traffic stop of a vehicle that had a headlight out. As soon as the vehicle
stopped, the front seat passenger opened the door and ran. Sergeant Dine recognized the
passenger as Anderson and yelled for him to stop. Anderson continued to run, and
Sergeant Dine chased him. However, Sergeant Dine lost sight of Anderson at the corner
of Jersey Street and Poplar Street.
Valerie Steffen lived on Poplar Street and was standing on her back deck while
she was taking her dog outside. Steffen heard shouts and saw Anderson running. A few
seconds later, she heard a “thump, thump, thump” near her. Tr. p. 103. Anderson was
found hiding in a nearby backyard shed, and Steffen reported the noise to officers.
Anderson smelled of marijuana and told the officers that he had thrown out a bag of
marijuana as he was running. The officers searched the area but were unable to locate the
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marijuana. Marijuana was, however, found on Anderson’s person when he was searched
at the jail. Approximately an hour later, Steffen went onto her back deck again and saw a
firearm in a pile of snow on her deck. She contacted the officers again, and they
retrieved the loaded weapon.
The State charged Anderson with Class B felony unlawful possession of a firearm
by a serious violent felon, Class C felony carrying a handgun without a license, Class A
misdemeanor possession of marijuana, Class A misdemeanor carrying a handgun without
a license, and Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. After a bifurcated jury
trial, the jury found Anderson guilty as charged.
The trial court sentenced Anderson to concurrent sentences of sixteen years for the
Class B felony unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon conviction,
364 days for the Class A misdemeanor possession of marijuana conviction, and 364 days
for the Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement conviction. The trial court did
not enter judgments of conviction on the remaining guilty verdicts due to double jeopardy
concerns.
Analysis
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Anderson argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for
Class B felony unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon. When
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence needed to support a criminal conviction, we
neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility. Bailey v. State, 907 N.E.2d 1003,
1005 (Ind. 2009). “We consider only the evidence supporting the judgment and any
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reasonable inferences that can be drawn from such evidence.” Id. We will affirm if there
is substantial evidence of probative value such that a reasonable trier of fact could have
concluded the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. A conviction may be
based purely on circumstantial evidence. Hayes v. State, 876 N.E.2d 373, 375 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2007), trans. denied. “On appeal, the circumstantial evidence need not overcome
every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” Id. It is enough if an inference reasonably
tending to support the conviction can be drawn from the circumstantial evidence. Id.
The offense of unlawful possession by a serious violent felon is governed by
Indiana Code Section 35-47-4-5, which provides: “A serious violent felon who
knowingly or intentionally possesses a firearm commits unlawful possession of a firearm
by a serious violent felon, a Class B felony.” According to Anderson, there is no
substantial evidence that he was in possession of the firearm found on Steffen’s deck.
The State argues that the facts here are similar to those in Peters v. State, 959 N.E.2d 347,
355-56 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), in which we found sufficient evidence to sustain the
defendant’s conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon.
In Peters, the State presented evidence that the defendant ran with his hands in his
pockets during a foot pursuit with an officer. A gun was later found on the roof of a
church, in an area where the officer could not see the defendant during the foot pursuit
and where the markings in the snow suggested the defendant had fallen down. The
defendant had .9mm bullets in his pocket when he was arrested, and the gun was a .9mm
Glock. The gun had been reported stolen by a person who lived in Columbus, Ohio, and
the defendant lived in Columbus, Ohio. Based on this evidence, we concluded that the
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jury reasonably could have inferred the defendant had possessed the gun found on the
roof of the church.
Here, the State demonstrated that Anderson was a passenger in a vehicle stopped
by Sergeant Dine. Anderson ran from the vehicle, and Sergeant Dine chased him.
Steffen was standing on her deck when Anderson ran past. A couple of seconds later,
Steffen heard a “thump, thump, thump” near her. Tr. p. 103. Anderson told officers that
he threw a bag of marijuana, but they were unable to locate the marijuana until they
searched Anderson at the jail. Approximately one hour later, Steffen noticed a gun in a
pile of snow on her deck.
Anderson argues that Peters is distinguishable because the defendant there had
bullets in his pocket and the gun was stolen from his hometown. Despite some factual
differences between this case and Peters, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to
show that Anderson was in possession of the weapon. A jury could have reasonably
inferred from the evidence that Anderson threw the loaded gun onto Steffen’s roof and
that it fell into the snow pile on her deck. Although Anderson was not seen with the gun,
the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to sustain his conviction.
II. Inappropriate Sentence
Anderson argues that his sixteen-year sentence is inappropriate in light of the
nature of the offense and the character of the offender. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B)
provides that we may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of
the trial court’s decision, we find that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature
of the offense and the character of the offender. When considering whether a sentence is
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inappropriate, we need not be “extremely” deferential to a trial court’s sentencing
decision. Rutherford v. State, 866 N.E.2d 867, 873 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). Still, we must
give due consideration to that decision. Id. We also understand and recognize the unique
perspective a trial court brings to its sentencing decisions. Id. Under this rule, the burden
is on the defendant to persuade the appellate court that his or her sentence is
inappropriate. Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006).
The principal role of Rule 7(B) review “should be to attempt to leaven the outliers,
and identify some guiding principles for trial courts and those charged with improvement
of the sentencing statutes, but not to achieve a perceived ‘correct’ result in each case.”
Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008). We “should focus on the forest—
the aggregate sentence—rather than the trees—consecutive or concurrent, number of
counts, or length of the sentence on any individual count.” Id. When reviewing the
appropriateness of a sentence under Rule 7(B), we may consider all aspects of the penal
consequences imposed by the trial court in sentencing the defendant, including whether a
portion of the sentence was suspended. Davidson v. State, 926 N.E.2d 1023, 1025 (Ind.
2010).
The nature of the offense is that Anderson ran from police officer through a
residential neighborhood. Steffen saw Anderson running and heard a noise near her.
When the officers found Anderson, he claimed to have thrown a bag of marijuana while
he was running. Instead, some marijuana was found in his boxer shorts during a search at
the jail. An hour later, Steffen found a loaded gun in a pile of snow on her deck.
Anderson argues that his discarding of the gun shows that he did not mean to harm
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anyone. We disagree. His act of throwing a loaded handgun in a residential
neighborhood endangered many people.
As for Anderson’s character, although he is only twenty-eight years old, he has a
substantial criminal history. As a juvenile, Anderson was found delinquent for acts that
would be criminal mischief, possession of alcohol by a minor, and possession of a
controlled substance. He has adult convictions for Class B felony robbery, Class D
felony escape, and two convictions for Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement.
During his incarcerations, Anderson received numerous conduct reports, including some
for major offenses. After his release from incarceration, Anderson violated work release,
probation, or parole seven times during a six-year period. During his current jail
incarceration, he had several write-ups for unauthorized communication, fighting, and
threatening jail staff. The trial court acknowledged that Anderson seemed remorseful and
determined to change his behavior.
Based on Anderson’s criminal history, the trial court concluded that an aggravated
sentence was proper. Given Anderson’s criminal history, we cannot say that the sixteen-
year sentence imposed by the trial court was inappropriate in light of the nature of the
offense and the character of the offender.
Conclusion
The evidence is sufficient to sustain Anderson’s conviction for Class B felony
unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon. Further, we cannot say that
Anderson’s sixteen-year sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and
the character of the offender. We affirm.
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Affirmed.
BAKER, J., and RILEY, J., concur.
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