Arthula Miller v. State of Indiana ( 2013 )

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing Nov 21 2013, 8:54 am
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
APPELLANT PRO SE: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
ARTHULA MILLER GREGORY F. ZOELLER
New Castle Correctional Facility Attorney General of Indiana
New Castle, Indiana
MONIKA PREKOPA TALBOT
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
ARTHULA MILLER, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 49A05-1212-PC-664
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Lisa F. Borges, Judge
The Honorable Stanley E. Kroh, Master Commissioner
Cause No. 49G04-0702-PC-19096
November 21, 2013
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
CRONE, Judge
Case Summary
Pursuant to the Davis/Hatton procedure,1 Arthula Miller brings this consolidated direct
and post-conviction appeal challenging his convictions on eight felony counts and two
misdemeanor counts. Miller raises three issues for our review, which we restate as: (1)
whether the prosecutor engaged in misconduct; (2) whether the post-conviction court erred in
concluding that Miller was not denied the effective assistance of trial counsel; and (3)
whether the post-conviction court abused its discretion when it denied Miller’s request to
subpoena certain witnesses and documents for the post-conviction evidentiary hearing.
Finding no error or abuse of discretion, we affirm his convictions.
Facts and Procedural History
The facts most favorable to Miller’s convictions indicate that Miller first met Pamela
Taylor in 1995 when they were in the Army Reserves. They got in touch again in 2002, and
Miller moved into Taylor’s home in 2004. Within a few months, the two became
romantically involved. The relationship was very stressful for Taylor because Miller was
very controlling and did not get along with her son. In early 2006, a break-in occurred at
Taylor’s home. Someone came in through her son’s bedroom window and stole a video
1
The Davis/Hatton procedure involves the termination or suspension of a direct appeal that has
already been initiated, upon appellate counsel’s motion for remand or stay, in order to allow a post-conviction
relief petition to be pursued in the trial court. Slusher v. State, 823 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)
(citing Hatton v. State, 626 N.E.2d 442, 443 (Ind. 1993), and Davis v. State, 267 Ind. 152, 368 N.E.2d 1149,
1151 (1977)). If, after a full evidentiary hearing, the petition for post-conviction relief is denied, the appeal
can be reinitiated. Id. Under such circumstances, the direct appeal and the post-conviction relief appeal are
consolidated. Id. Therefore, in addition to the issues initially raised in the direct appeal, the issues litigated in
the post-conviction relief proceeding may also be raised. Id. “This way, a full hearing and record on the issues
will be included in the appeal.” Id. The Davis/Hatton procedure is particularly useful where a defendant
needs to develop an evidentiary record to support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Peaver v.
State, 937 N.E.2d 896, 899 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied (2011).
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game collection. Miller insisted on and paid for the installation of a monitored security
system. Miller was the only one at the home when ADT came to install the security system.
After the installation, Miller told Taylor the password and passcode for the new system.
Thereafter, in September 2006, Taylor asked Miller to move out of the home. Miller finally
moved out on October 28, 2006.
On November 20, 2006, Taylor came home to discover that the screen had been cut on
her son’s bedroom window. While waiting for a police officer to arrive and take a report,
Taylor had a telephone conversation with Miller. Miller then came over to the house but
stayed out of view while the police officer was there. Immediately after the officer left,
Miller attacked Taylor. He pinned her against the wall and yelled that he did not understand
why they were no longer together. Miller ordered Taylor into the bedroom and told her to
take her clothes off. Miller pulled a knife from behind his back and held it to Taylor’s neck.
He told her repeatedly that they were going to have sex and that she had “better do it right.”
Trial Tr. at 66. As Taylor cried, Miller forced her to perform oral sex on him. He then bound
her hands together with zip ties. Miller put a condom on and had intercourse with Taylor.
Afterward, Taylor begged Miller to leave, but he held the knife to her and told her that he
would have to kill her so that he would not go to jail. Miller placed a pillow on Taylor’s face
attempting to smother her. He finally stopped, and Taylor promised that she would not tell
anyone about the incident. Taylor started to feel an allergic reaction from the latex condom
that Miller had used. Miller suddenly became calm and apologetic. After repeated
assurances that she would not tell anyone what had happened, Miller left. Taylor did not
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report the incident that night because of her promises to Miller. Taylor also did not report the
incident the next day out of fear that no one would believe her because she had failed to
report it right away.
Miller called Taylor almost every day following that incident. Sometime in
December, Taylor agreed to meet Miller for dinner. The dinner was very upsetting for
Taylor. Miller also made arrangements to spend New Year’s Eve with Taylor. Taylor had
consensual sex with Miller that night. Because Taylor’s ex-husband is in prison for killing
an ex-girlfriend, Taylor hoped that being with Miller consensually would perhaps help them
end their relationship on a “good note.” Id. at 77.
On January 27, 2007, Taylor awoke to the sound of her car alarm. She called 911.
After reviewing video from surveillance cameras that she had installed, Taylor believed that
Miller had opened her Jeep with a key. Taylor left Miller a voicemail, and Miller arrived at
the house before police. Miller denied that it was him on the video. Due to the poor video
quality, the police were unsure of whether it was Miller on the video. Officers did not arrest
Miller. Taylor told Miller that she knew he was the perpetrator and that she was going to get
her locks changed.
On Monday, January 29, 2007, Taylor left work early to get a no-contact order against
Miller. She called Miller and told him to stay away from her. That same day, William Jones
was waiting for his children’s school bus near Taylor’s home when he observed a man, later
identified as Miller, park his vehicle a significant distance from Taylor’s home and then walk
to her home. Jones watched as Miller entered Taylor’s residence through the overhead
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garage door. Jones found Miller’s activity suspicious and called 911 to report the activity.
The next evening, January 30, 2007, Taylor returned home from work and errands. As
she turned off her security system, she suddenly saw Miller standing in the hallway of her
home. Miller was wearing a mask and gloves. He demanded the videotape from her car
break-in. Taylor told him that she had taken the videotape to work. Miller ordered Taylor to
take off her clothes. After she complied, he had her put on a robe and ordered her to leave
two messages on his cell phone. He instructed her about what to say on the messages,
including that she missed him, loved him, and wanted to see him. Miller showed Taylor that
he had brought a lambskin condom so that she would not suffer an allergic reaction. He
forced her to perform oral sex on him and then forced her to have sexual intercourse. He
covered her face with the same pillow as before, causing Taylor to experience severe neck
pain. Miller explained to Taylor that everything was her fault. He ordered her to go into the
bathroom so that she could wash herself in a bath. After forcing her to spend what seemed
like almost forty minutes in the bathtub, Miller finally let Taylor get out of the tub. He
instructed her to leave a third message on his cell phone. He told her to say something about
how he did not come over that night, that she really wanted to see him, and “another I love
you.” Id. at 95. After Taylor spent hours talking and assuring Miller that she would not call
the police, Miller finally left. Taylor called the police, reported that she had been raped, and
then went to the hospital emergency room for a sexual assault examination.
Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department Sergeant Craig McCartt took Miller’s
statement on January 31, 2007. One of the first things Miller told Sergeant McCartt was that
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he had voice messages from Taylor on his phone. Miller initially denied seeing Taylor or
speaking with her on January 30, but later changed his story and stated that he went to
Taylor’s house on that date at her invitation. Miller admitted to having sexual intercourse
with Taylor while at her house, but claimed it was consensual. Miller denied having keys to
Taylor’s residence.
Officers subsequently executed a search warrant of Miller’s apartment. In Miller’s
bedroom closet, officers found a serrated knife later identified by Taylor as the knife used in
the November attack, as well as a key to Taylor’s Jeep and a key to the garage door of
Taylor’s residence. Officers also found zip ties in Miller’s linen closet. A search of Miller’s
vehicle revealed lambskin condoms and gloves which Taylor also later identified from the
January attack.
On February 2, 2007, the State charged Miller with ten counts: count I, class A felony
rape; count II, class A felony criminal deviate conduct; count III, class B felony criminal
confinement; count IV, class B felony burglary; count V, class B felony rape: count VI, class
B felony criminal deviate conduct; count VII, class D felony criminal confinement; count
VIII, class D felony intimidation; count IX, class A misdemeanor domestic battery; and
count X, class A misdemeanor battery. Notwithstanding the number and seriousness of the
charges, and contrary to the advice of his appointed counsel, Miller insisted on requesting
and proceeding with a speedy trial. Following a jury trial on April 9 and 10, 2007, the jury
found Miller guilty as charged. On April 17, 2007, the trial court sentenced Miller to an
aggregate term of ninety years. Miller, by counsel, timely initiated a direct appeal to this
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Court. However, pursuant to the Davis/Hatton procedure, Miller filed a motion to dismiss
the appeal without prejudice, which we granted on October 5, 2007.
On March 7, 2011, Miller filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, and on June
16, 2011, he filed a pro se amended petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction
court held an evidentiary hearing on October 18, 2011. Thereafter, on December 5, 2012, the
post-conviction court issued its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment denying
Miller’s petition for relief. This appeal followed.
Discussion and Decision
I. Direct Appeal: Prosecutorial Misconduct
We first address Miller’s direct appeal contention that the prosecutor committed
various acts of misconduct, such as soliciting perjured testimony, withholding evidence
material to the defense, and permitting a witness to nod her head instead of answering
verbally while testifying. To properly preserve a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, the
defendant must ask the trial court, at the time the misconduct occurs, to admonish the jury or
move for a mistrial if admonishment is inadequate. Castillo v. State, 974 N.E.2d 458, 468
(Ind. 2012). “Failure to request an admonishment or mistrial waives the claim, unless the
defendant can demonstrate that the misconduct rises to the level of fundamental error.” Id.Fundamental error is a narrow exception which places a heavy burden on the defendant. Id.To avoid procedural default, the defendant must demonstrate error that makes “a fair trial
impossible or constitute[s] clearly blatant violations of basic and elementary principles of due
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process … present[ing] an undeniable and substantial potential for harm.” Benson v. State,
762 N.E.2d 748, 756 (Ind. 2002).
It appears from our review of the record that Miller failed to object, request an
admonishment, or move for a mistrial regarding any of his alleged instances of prosecutorial
misconduct. Moreover, on appeal, Miller neither claims nor attempts to demonstrate
fundamental error. Therefore, his claims of prosecutorial misconduct are waived.
We note that, in addition to being procedurally defaulted as a direct appeal issue,
Miller’s prosecutorial misconduct claims may not be considered in terms of post-conviction
relief because freestanding claims of fundamental error are unavailable in post-conviction
proceedings. See Sanders v. State, 765 N.E.2d 591, 592 (Ind. 2002). “In post-conviction
proceedings, complaints that something went awry at trial are generally cognizable only
when they show deprivation of the right to effective counsel or issues demonstrably
unavailable at the time of trial or direct appeal.” Id. To the extent that some of Miller’s
claims of prosecutorial misconduct cover the same points as his post-conviction relief
allegations of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, those claims will be disposed of below in
the context of ineffective assistance.
II. Post-Conviction: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
In his petition for post-conviction relief, Miller contends that he was denied the
effective assistance of trial counsel. Our supreme court has explained that post-conviction
proceedings “are not super-appeals and provide only a narrow remedy for subsequent
collateral challenges.” State v. Cooper, 935 N.E.2d 146, 148 (Ind. 2010). A petitioner for
8
post-conviction relief bears the burden of establishing the grounds for relief by a
preponderance of the evidence. Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(5). When appealing the denial
of a petition for post-conviction relief, the petitioner stands in the position of one appealing
from a negative judgment. Henley v. State, 881 N.E.2d 639, 643 (Ind. 2008). The reviewing
court will not reverse the judgment unless the petitioner shows that the evidence as a whole
leads unerringly and unmistakably to a conclusion opposite that reached by the post-
conviction court. Id. at 643-44. Further, the post-conviction court here issued findings of
fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1(6). We will
reverse those findings and judgment only upon a showing of clear error, which leaves us with
a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Taylor v. State, 929 N.E.2d 912,
917 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. We accept the post-conviction court’s findings of
fact unless clearly erroneous, but we accord no deference to legal conclusions. Id. “The
post-conviction court is the sole judge of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the
witnesses.” Id.To prevail on a post-conviction claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant
must satisfy the two components set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
First, a defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. Id. at 687. This
requires a showing that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness, committing errors so serious that the defendant was deprived of the
“counsel” guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 687-88. Second, the defendant must
establish prejudice; that is to say, the defendant must demonstrate that there is a reasonable
9
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different. Id. at 694. Failure to satisfy either component will cause a claim to fail,
and most ineffective assistance claims can be resolved by a prejudice inquiry alone. French
v. State, 778 N.E.2d 816, 824 (Ind. 2002). On appeal, we strongly presume that counsel
rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable
professional judgment. Stevens v. State, 770 N.E.2d 739, 746 (Ind. 2002), cert. denied
(2003).
A. Failure to Investigate and Prepare for Trial
Although Miller raises several claims of ineffective assistance, he concentrates on his
allegation that his counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to properly investigate
his case and prepare for trial. Specifically, Miller argues that his counsel failed to conduct a
“professional investigation” into the facts and circumstances of his case and further contends
that counsel failed to conduct a “professional interview” of Miller as part of his trial
preparation. Appellant’s Br. at 37-49.
While it is undisputed that effective representation requires adequate pretrial
investigation and preparation, it is well settled that we should resist judging an attorney’s
performance with the benefit of hindsight. Badelle v. State, 754 N.E.2d 510, 538 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2001), trans. denied. Accordingly, when deciding a claim of ineffective assistance for
failure to investigate, we apply a great deal of deference to counsel’s judgments. Boesch v.
State, 778 N.E.2d 1276, 1283 (Ind. 2002). Establishing failure to investigate as a ground for
ineffective assistance of counsel requires going beyond the trial record to show what the
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investigation, if undertaken, would have produced. Woods v. State, 701 N.E.2d 1208, 1214
(Ind. 1998), cert. denied (1999). “This is necessary because success on the prejudice prong
of an ineffectiveness claim requires a showing of a reasonable probability of affecting the
result.” Id.Miller’s trial counsel, Ben Jaffe, testified at the post-conviction hearing that although
he admittedly did not meet with Miller face-to-face at the jail prior to trial, he did speak with
Miller prior to trial, and that, at Jaffe’s instruction, Miller sent him a detailed letter regarding
his version of events and the defenses he wished to pursue. Jaffe stated, “We were very
familiar with the defenses that you wanted to set forth. So in terms of knowing where the
case was going and how we were going to defend against it, we were on the same page.”
PCR Tr. at 14. Additionally, we agree with the post-conviction court that a review of the
trial transcript reveals that Jaffe appeared more than familiar with the State’s evidence and
Miller’s version of events as demonstrated in his opening statement, direct examination of
Miller, cross examination of the State’s witnesses, and closing argument.
Miller maintains that “[h]ad counsel conducted a professional investigation, counsel
would have learned that Miller had no reason to rape Taylor.” Appellant’s Br. at 38.
Contrary to Miller’s implication, Jaffe vigorously pursued that precise defense, alerting the
jury to evidence of the ongoing consensual sexual relationship between Miller and his
accuser as well as inconsistencies in her story. That a defense strategy was ultimately
unsuccessful does not mean that counsel was constitutionally ineffective. Wilkes v. State,
984 N.E.2d 1236, 1245 (Ind. 2013). Miller has failed to show what additional information
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could have been discovered by counsel that would have had a reasonable probability of
changing his counsel’s defense strategy, much less the result of his trial. The post-conviction
court determined that Miller failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance on this issue, and
Miller has not met his burden on appeal to show that the evidence conclusively points to a
contrary conclusion.2
B. Remaining Claims of Ineffective Assistance
Miller raises additional claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, including
allegations that his trial counsel failed to subpoena requested witnesses, failed to request
severance of charges, and failed to object to testimony and numerous pieces of evidence.3
However, in the thirty-eight pages of his pro se appellant’s brief that are dedicated solely to
these remaining claims of ineffective assistance, Miller provides this Court with virtually no
information to show how his counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of
2
Prior to the commencement of trial, Jaffe alerted the trial court, in Miller’s presence, that because of
time constraints due to Miller’s speedy trial request, Jaffe had not had a chance “to check on a couple of things
[Miller] thinks are important.” Tr. at 25. Jaffe informed the court that his efforts to encourage Miller to waive
his speedy trial request and to move for a continuance of the trial date had been unsuccessful. When
specifically asked by the trial judge if he would like a continuance to allow his attorney to follow up on some
details, Miller declared that he wished to proceed with the trial. We agree with the post-conviction court that
Miller “made a knowing and informed decision to proceed to trial. Miller’s attempt now to fault his trial
counsel for his own insistence upon a speedy trial is not well taken.” Appellant’s App. at 127.
3
As noted earlier, some of Miller’s direct appeal claims of prosecutorial misconduct overlap with his
ineffective assistance of counsel claims. For example, Miller argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct
by allowing the victim to commit what Miller purports to be perjury and that his counsel was ineffective for
failing to object to such purportedly perjured testimony. Similarly, Miller argues that the prosecutor committed
misconduct by allowing the victim to nod her head while testifying rather than requiring her to verbally
respond and that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the same. To the extent that these issues
overlap and can be considered on post-conviction relief in the context of ineffective assistance of counsel for
failure to object, as we discuss below, these claims are waived for lack of cogent argument.
12
reasonableness or that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
For example, Miller asserts that his counsel was ineffective for failing to contact or
subpoena his requested witnesses, and he cites legal authority supporting that general
proposition. However, Miller does not name any witnesses that he believes should have been
contacted, and he makes no attempt to educate us as to what information or testimony those
witnesses would have provided. See Lee v. State, 694 N.E.2d 719, 722 (Ind. 1998) (when
ineffective assistance argument is premised on failure to present witnesses, petitioner must
offer evidence identifying the witnesses and what their testimony would have been), cert.
denied. As to his claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion for severance
of charges, Miller makes no attempt to demonstrate why severance was appropriate or that
such motion would have been successful. See Wales v. State, 768 N.E.2d 513, 523 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2002) (to prevail on ineffective assistance claim based upon counsel’s failure to file
motions, petitioner must demonstrate that motions would have been successful), trans.
denied. Regarding Miller’s numerous claims of counsel’s failure to object, Miller makes no
attempt to demonstrate that objections would have been sustained if made. See Benefield v.
State, 945 N.E.2d 791, 799 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (to prevail on ineffective assistance claim
based upon counsel’s failure to object, petitioner must show that objection would have been
sustained).
Miller’s argument on these claims can be summarized as a series of bald assertions of
error followed by citation to legal authority. What remains conspicuously absent is cogent
13
reasoning explaining how the legal authority supports the assertions of error. As we have
explained,
Parties to an appeal are required to present cogent argument supported with
adequate citation to authority because it promotes impartiality in the appellate
tribunal. A court which must search the record and make up its own
arguments because a party has not adequately presented them runs the risk of
becoming an advocate rather than an adjudicator. A brief should not only
present the issues to be decided on appeal, but it should be of material
assistance to the court in deciding those issues. On review, we will not search
the record to find a basis for a party’s argument nor will we search the
authorities cited by a party in order to find legal support for its position.
Thomas v. State, 965 N.E.2d 70, 77 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (internal quotation marks
omitted), trans. denied. In sum, Miller’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are not
supported by cogent reasoning and are therefore waived.4 See Ind. Appellate Rule
46(A)(8)(a). Waiver notwithstanding, his bald assertions are insufficient to carry his burden
of establishing prejudice by a preponderance of the evidence. The post-conviction court
properly denied Miller’s claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
III. Post-Conviction Court’s Denial of Request for Subpoenas
As a final matter, Miller argues that the post-conviction court deprived him of a fair
evidentiary hearing when, although it granted his request to subpoena his trial attorney, it
denied his request to subpoena several additional witnesses and documents for the post-
4
Miller includes two additional claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal that he did not
raise in his original or amended petition for post-conviction relief. Namely, he argues that his counsel failed to
object when all “African-Americans were procedurally excluded from the jury” and that his counsel permitted
the prosecutor to commit a “Brady” violation. Appellant’s Br. at 73-78, 98. For an argument to be available in
post-conviction proceedings as to why counsel was ineffective, the petitioner must have raised such ground in
his petition for post-conviction relief. See Bahm v. State, 794 N.E.2d 444, 445 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), opinion
on reh’g, trans. denied. Consequently, these two additional claims are also waived.
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conviction hearing. Specifically, Miller sought additional subpoenas for “Pamela Taylor,
Anne Harrigan, William Jones, Sylvester Coleman, Terry Tyler, ‘ADT Tech from March 9,
2006’, as well as various records and documents.” Appellant’s App. at 42.
Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1(9)(b) provides, “If the pro se petitioner requests
issuance of subpoenas for witnesses at an evidentiary hearing, the petitioner shall specifically
state by affidavit the reason the witness’ testimony is required and the substance of the
witness’ expected testimony.” That rule further provides, “If the court finds the witness’
testimony would be relevant and probative, the court shall order that the subpoena be issued.
If the court finds the proposed witness’ testimony is not relevant, it shall enter a finding on
the record and refuse to issue the subpoena.” Id. When determining whether to issue
subpoenas, the post-conviction court has broad discretion, and we will reverse its decision
only for an abuse of discretion. Johnson v. State, 832 N.E.2d 985, 994 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005),
trans. denied. “An abuse of discretion has occurred if the court’s decision is against the logic
and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court.” Id.The post-conviction court in this case concluded that, because Miller was asserting an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, he had provided sufficient information to support the
issuance of a subpoena for his trial attorney. However, regarding the additional witnesses
and documents, the court determined, “It appears Petitioner seeks to re-litigate various claims
not available under the Rules for Post-Conviction Relief: the Court finds no support for
issuance of the additional subpoenas sought by Petitioner and DENIES the request.”
Appellant’s App. at 42.
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Here, Miller has not included in his appendix his request for the subpoenas or his
affidavit stating the reason the additional witnesses’ testimony is required and the substance
of the expected testimony. While this does not result in waiver of his claim, see Ind.
Appellate Rule 49(B) (party’s failure to include any item in appendix shall not waive any
issue or argument), our review is constrained solely to the arguments provided in his
appellant’s brief. According to Miller, he sought the testimony of the various witnesses to
present the post-conviction court with “material evidence and testimony not heard at trial,”
“crucial relevant testimony,” and “documentary evidence directly impacting on the issue of
innocence.” Appellant’s Br. at 115-16. Miller provides us no information regarding the
actual substance of the expected testimony.
We agree with the post-conviction court’s conclusion that the matters about which
Miller intended to examine these witnesses were not related to issues cognizable during post-
conviction proceedings. Essentially, Miller wanted a do-over of his trial. He was not so
entitled. We remind Miller that post-conviction proceedings create a narrow remedy and are
not “super appeals.” Cooper, 935 N.E.2d at 148. The post-conviction court acted within its
discretion in refusing to issue the additional requested subpoenas. Accordingly, we affirm.
Affirmed.
BARNES, J., and PYLE, J., concur.
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