Mickell Biggs v. State of Indiana ( 2013 )

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of Mar 20 2013, 8:30 am
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
J. DIRK CARNAHAN GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Vincennes, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
JAMES B. MARTIN
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
MICKELL BIGGS, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 42A04-1208-CR-410
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE KNOX SUPERIOR COURT I
The Honorable W. Timothy Crowley, Judge
Cause No. 42D01-1204-FA-35
March 20, 2013
MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION
BAKER, Judge
In this case, Mickell Biggs challenges the amount and “cash only” nature of his
bail, which, after a bail reduction hearing, the trial court set at $15,000. More
particularly, Biggs claims that the trial court violated his right to reasonable bail under
the Indiana Constitution.1
Concluding that the trial court did not err in fixing the amount of Biggs’s bail or in
requiring that it be fully executed in cash, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
FACTS
On April 19, 2012, Biggs was charged with two counts of class A felony child
molesting. The probable cause affidavit on which the charges were based alleged that on
two occasions, Biggs forced his twelve-year-old niece, T.M.A., to engage in sexual
activity with him.
On the first occasion, Biggs allegedly made T.M.A. get on the tailgate of his truck
and told her to remove her pants, but she refused. After Biggs “grabbed her pants and
ripped them down[,]” he fondled her “girl private area” with his finger and “stuck his
finger inside of her.” Appellant’s App. p. 6, 8.
On the second occasion, Biggs allegedly made T.M.A. watch a pornographic
movie with him and told her it was “sex education.” Id. at 8. Biggs told T.M.A. to take
off her pants, and she complied “because she was scared.” Id. Biggs then engaged in
sexual intercourse with T.M.A. When T.M.A. asked Biggs to stop, “he told her that she
would get use[d] to it” and continued for several more minutes. Id.
1
Ind. Const. art. 1, §§ 16, 17.
2
In addition, Biggs allegedly told T.M.A. that “if she told anyone then he would
hurt her[,]” that “no one would believe her[,] and that she would get in trouble not him.”
Appellant’s App. p. 6, 8.
The probable cause affidavit also referenced the police interview that was
conducted with Biggs. During this interview, Biggs made the following statements:
[Biggs] stated that he was watching a pornographic movie and [T.M.A.]
came in. [Biggs] stated that he had his 1 year old [son] on his chest . . .
while watching the movie. [Biggs] advised that he tried to shut the movie
off but was not quick enough. [Biggs] advised that [T.M.A.] asked him
about the movie and if it was real. [Biggs] stated that he had been
masturbating to the movie prior to her walking in. [Biggs] said he had
baggy shorts on and had them pulled to the side.
[Biggs] said that [T.M.A.] sat in front of him on the bed and blocked the
way for the remote to shut the TV off. [Biggs] stated that [T.M.A.] pulled
her pants down and asked him to do what they were doing on the movie to
her. [Biggs] stated that she climbed on top of him and he was trying to get
her off of him but couldn’t. [Biggs] said that his shorts were bagging and
that he had a “woody” and when he rolled over that his penis did go inside
her.
Id. at 8-9.
Bail for Biggs was originally set in the amount of $50,000, cash only. At an initial
hearing, Biggs was found indigent and appointed defense counsel. On May 1, 2012,
Biggs filed an application for release on recognizance or for reduction of his bail. The
trial court held a bail reduction hearing on July 25, 2012.
Biggs testified that he was born in Tennessee and that he has some family there,
but he has lived in Indiana since he was a baby. Since that time, he has lived “[a]ll over
the place” in various southwestern Indiana counties. Tr. p. 4. Prior to his arrest, Biggs
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lived in an apartment with his wife of five years, their two sons, and his wife’s son from a
previous relationship. However, Biggs was uncertain if he would be able to return to the
apartment if he met bail because they lived in federally assisted housing. Biggs testified
that if he could not return home, he would try to stay with a friend who lived close to his
family or with his sister in Pike County. However, Biggs stated that he may not be able
to stay with his sister because she sometimes watches her two granddaughters.
Biggs quit high school when he was fifteen. Since then, Biggs’s main profession
has been working on vehicles part-time. Biggs’s only full-time employment was in 2008
or 2009 when he worked for a pressure washing company for approximately a year but
then quit. Biggs’s wife does not work, but “[s]he’s trying to get disability because she’s
got bronchitis and some other stuff.” Tr. p. 8.
When asked about how much money he has, Biggs testified, “Right now I’ve got
none.” Id. at 11. Biggs owns a 1989 Lincoln, and he claimed that a few people owed
him money for work he had performed on their vehicles. Biggs’s father and sister had
offered to loan him some money, but he did not know how much they would be willing
or able to loan him.
Biggs has no criminal history other than “parking tickets or something like that.”
Tr. p. 7. Biggs also testified that he was aware of the potential penalties but that he
would “stay here and face this.” Id. at 11. Biggs stated that if his bail was reduced, he
would agree to any additional conditions that the trial court wanted to impose.
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Detective Jonathan Hillenbrand of the Vincennes Police Department testified that
the area where Biggs had lived with his family and the area where Biggs’s friend lived
nearby were both “[v]ery much” populated with children. Id. at 19.
After hearing arguments by Biggs’s defense counsel and the State, the trial court
stated:
I understand that the crime is serious and I also understand Mr. Biggs . . .
has no criminal history and has significant ties to the community. All those
things make this a very difficult decision. I’ve decided to reduce the bond,
but not to the degree that counsel is requesting. Court, having considered
all these factors and being duly advised, now determines that Mr. Biggs’
bond be reduced to the sum of $15,000 cash only. That might seem like an
awful lot of money and it is, in fact, an awful lot of money for Mr. Biggs, I
understand that, but it’s $35,000 less that it was when he walked in the
room. So, that’s the best I can do.
Tr. p. 24-25.
This interlocutory appeal ensued.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
As noted above, Biggs challenges both the reduced amount of his bail and its
“cash only” nature. More particularly, Biggs contends that the trial court erred because
Biggs has significant ties to the community and no criminal record.
The amount of a defendant’s bail rests within the sound discretion of the trial court
and will be reversed only for an abuse of that discretion. Perry v. State, 541 N.E.2d 913,
919 (Ind. 1989). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision is clearly
against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. Sneed v. State, 946
N.E.2d 1255, 1257 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
5
Nevertheless, our constitution guarantees a right to bail in most circumstances and
prohibits excessive bail. Ind. Const. art. 1, §§ 16, 17. The right to bail is interrelated
with the concept that an accused remains innocent until proven guilty. Hobbs v. Lindsey,
240 Ind. 74, 78, 162 N.E.2d 85, 88 (1959). Accordingly, bail is not intended to punish
the defendant in advance of a guilty verdict. Id. Rather, the primary purpose of bail is to
ensure the defendant’s presence at future court hearings. Id. The bail set for any
particular defendant must be based on the specific circumstances of that case. Green v.
Petit, 222 Ind. 467, 469, 54 N.E.2d 281, 281 (1944).
Indiana Code section 35-33-8-4(b) provides that the trial court may not set bail in
an amount higher than that which is “reasonably required to assure the defendant’s
appearance in court or to assure the physical safety of another person or the community if
the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant poses a risk to the
physical safety of another person or the community.” In determining what a reasonable
amount of bail is for each defendant, the trial court must consider the following factors as
they relate to the defendant’s risk of nonappearance:
(1) the length and character of the defendant’s residence in the community;
(2) the defendant’s employment status and history and his ability to give
bail;
(3) the defendant’s family ties and relationships;
(4) the defendant’s character, reputation, habits, and mental condition;
(5) the defendant’s criminal or juvenile record, insofar as it demonstrates
instability and a disdain for the court’s authority to bring him to trial;
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(6) the defendant’s previous record in not responding to court appearances
when required or with respect to flight to avoid criminal prosecution;
(7) the nature and gravity of the offense and the potential penalty faced,
insofar as these factors are relevant to the risk of nonappearance;
(8) the source of funds or property to be used to post bail or to pay a
premium, insofar as it affects the risk of nonappearance;
(9) that the defendant is a foreign national who is unlawfully present in the
United States under federal immigration law; and
(10) any other factors, including any evidence of instability and a disdain
for authority, which might indicate that the defendant might not recognize
and adhere to the authority of the court to bring him to trial.
Ind. Code § 35-33-8-4(b).
We initially note that Biggs is not appealing from the initial amount of bail set by
the trial court; rather, Biggs is appealing from the reduced amount set by the trial court
after he presented evidence on the factors described above. The trial court may reduce a
defendant’s bail if the defendant “presents additional evidence of substantial mitigating
factors . . . , which reasonably suggests that the defendant recognizes the court’s authority
to bring the defendant to trial.” I.C. § 35-33-8-5(c). However, the trial court may not
reduce the defendant’s bail if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant
poses a risk to the physical safety of another person or the community. Id.
In the instant case, the evidence demonstrates that the trial court weighed what it
believed to be the relevant factors under Indiana Code section 35-33-8-4(b) in arriving at
its decision. More particularly, the trial court weighed Biggs’s “significant ties to the
community” and his lack of criminal history with the nature and gravity of the alleged
7
crimes and the potential penalties for those crimes and determined that $15,000 was an
appropriate bail amount based on those factors. Tr. p. 24-25. See Hobbs, 240 Ind. at 79,
162 N.E.2d at 88 (opining that “[a]part from . . . the accused’s financial position, the
primary fact to be considered in determining an amount which would assure the
accused’s presence in court is the possible penalty which might be imposed by reason of
the offense charged”).
In this case, Biggs was charged with two class A felonies for molesting his twelve-
year-old niece on two separate occasions. Each class A felony carries with it a potential
sentence of twenty to fifty years, with the advisory sentence being thirty years. Ind. Code
§ 35-50-2-4. Moreover, when considering the circumstances as outlined in the probable
cause affidavit, Biggs may also have been subject to a number of possible sentence
aggravators. Thus, Biggs may very well be faced with a potential sentence of up to one
hundred years of incarceration. In light of this possible sentence, we cannot say that the
trial court erred in setting Biggs’s bail at $15,000.
Moreover, we find no error with the trial court’s decision requiring Biggs to
execute his bail with cash. The trial court has several options regarding how it chooses to
implement bail, and requiring the defendant to execute bail with cash is one of those
options. Ind. Code § 35-33-8-3.2(a).
Nevertheless, Biggs likens the facts of this case to Sneed v. State, 946 N.E.2d
1255 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), a case in which this Court held that the trial court erred by
requiring the defendant to fully execute her bail in cash in the absence of any evidence
8
suggesting she was a flight risk. In Sneed, the defendant was charged with two counts of
dealing in methamphetamine as a class A felony, and bail was set at $25,000. 946
N.E.2d at 1256. At a bail reduction hearing, Sneed testified that she had lived in Indiana
for more than twenty years, that her three daughters lived with her, and that all of her
family and friends lived in Indiana. Id. Although Sneed was unemployed, she had filed
for Social Security disability benefits, and a hearing on her petition had been scheduled.
Id. Finally, Sneed had two prior substance-abuse related misdemeanor convictions, but
she never failed to appear for a hearing and successfully completed probation for both
convictions. Id.Unlike the circumstances in Sneed, however, we note the particular severity of the
charges here and the lengthy term of incarceration that could result from Biggs’s
conviction on those charges. Moreover, the trial court could have reasonably concluded
that there was a high risk of Biggs’s nonappearance in light of the fact that Biggs did not
have his own money to post bail. In short, we conclude that the trial court did not err by
requiring Biggs to post his entire $15,000 bail in cash.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
BARNES, J., concurs.
RILEY, J., concurs in part and dissents in part.
9
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
MICKELL BIGGS, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 42A04-1208-CR-410
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
RILEY, Judge, concurring part and dissenting in part
While I agree with the majority’s decision to affirm the trial court’s reduced
amount of Biggs’ bail, I respectfully disagree with the “cash only” nature of the bail
bond. By statute, a trial court has several options regarding the manner of executing
bail; it may require the defendant to: execute a bail bond with sufficient solvent sureties;
deposit cash or securities in an amount equal to the bail; deposit cash or securities in an
amount not less than ten percent of the bail, as a court-sponsored bond; execute a bond
secured by real estate in the county, with requirements for the tax value of the real
estate; post a real estate bond; or perform any combination of the above requirements.
Ind. Code § 35-33-8-3.2(a). This statute, like the statute governing the amount of bail,
10
“also places the manner of executing the bail within the discretion of the trial judge.”
Sneed v. State, 946 N.E.2d 1255, 1260 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
Here, the trial court noted Biggs’ lack of criminal history and his significant ties to
the community. The record shows that Biggs is unemployed and is without the funds to
post a cash only bond. Thus, as in Sneed, it is only proper to consider the type of bail set
by the trial court. In effect, by denying Biggs the option of a surety bond provided by a
bail bondsman, the trial court condemned him to jail pending trial without explicitly
ordering him to be held or articulating any reason for doing so. Distinguishing Sneed, the
majority points to the severity of the charges and the lengthy term of incarceration
possibly faced by Biggs. However, like Biggs, Sneed was charged with two Class A
felonies and thus, fell within the same sentencing range as Biggs. The majority also
references the “high risk of Biggs’ nonappearance in light of the fact that Biggs did not
have his own money to post bail.” (Slip op. p. 9). I believe that this statement ignores
the nature of a surety bond provided by a bail bondsman. In Sneed, we elaborated that
A bail bondsman will, in return for a non-refundable fee paid by the
defendant, put up his own money with the trial court in the form of a surety,
pledging to cover the defendant’s bail. Because the bondsman is risking the
entire amount if the defendant fails to appear for trial, the bondsman has a
powerful incentive to return the defendant to court to face charges. On the
other hand, when the defendant is able to deposit the entire amount of the
cash bail without the help of a bondsman, it is not very likely anyone will
pursue the defendant if he or she decides to skip town prior to trial.
Id. at 1260 n. 4.
11
For these reasons, I conclude that under the facts and circumstances of this case
the trial court abused its discretion by requiring a cash only bail.
12