Mariea L. Best v. Russell C. Best ( 2014 )

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Sep 03 2014, 9:56 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
ANDREW C. MALLOR ANDREW Z. SOSHNICK
KENDRA G. GJERDINGEN TERESA A. GRIFFIN
Mallor Grodner LLP Faegre Baker Daniels LLP
Bloomington, Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
)
MARIEA L. BEST )
Appellant-Respondent, )
)
vs. ) No. 06A04-1403-DR-124
)
)
RUSSELL C. BEST )
Appellee-Petitioner. )
APPEAL FROM THE BOONE CIRCUIT COURT
The Honorable Rebecca S. McClure, Special Judge
Cause No. 06C01-0209-DR-381
September 3, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MATHIAS, Judge
The seemingly never-ending, post-dissolution litigation in this case has resulted in
this third appeal in which Mariea Best (“Mariea”) is challenging the jurisdiction of the
Boone Circuit Court and its contempt order against her.
We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
Mariea and Russell Best’s (“Russell”) marriage was dissolved in 2004. They
initially agreed to share joint legal and physical custody of their two children, A.B., born
in 1992 and M.B., who has Down Syndrome and was born in 1995. Since 2006, the
parties disagreements concerning custody and other issues relating to their children have
been intensely litigated in Boone Circuit Court. See Appellant’s App. pp. 1-78. A.B. is
now emancipated and Russell has custody of M.B.
The parties’ current dispute revolves around the establishment of a guardian for
M.B., who is now twenty years old. In October 2011, the parties entered in a Mediated
Agreed Entry, which was approved by the Boone Circuit Court. The Agreed Entry
provides in pertinent part:
Neither party (ether personally or in a representative capacity) will seek
guardianship of [M.B.] prior to her attaining twenty-one years of age unless
necessary for medical or public benefits purposes. If it becomes necessary
before age twenty-one (21), it is agreed that Russell will serve as the
guardian. Barring establishment of a guardianship, the custody order and
jurisdiction of this Court remain in full force and effect.
Appellant’s App. p. 127.
After M.B.’s nineteenth birthday, the parties ultimately agreed that a guardianship
over M.B. should be established even though she is not yet twenty-one years old.
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However, despite the terms of the October 2011 Agreed Entry, Mother filed several
motions in an attempt to be named M.B.’s guardian.1 Therefore, on October 31, 2013,
Russell filed a petition to enforce the October 2011 Agreed Entry.
The Boone Circuit Court heard argument on Russell’s petition on December 20,
2013. The court then issued the following order:
2. The parties further agreed in their Mediated Agreed Entry that in the
event it became necessary for guardianship of [M.B.] to be established prior
to [M.B.] reaching the age of twenty one (21), Petitioner Russell Best
would serve as M.B.’s guardian.
3. The parties’ Mediated Agreed Entry provided that barring establishment
of a guardianship, the custody order and jurisdiction of the Boone Circuit
Court would remain in full force and effect.
***
8. The issue of the guardianship of [M.B.] was resolved by the parties’
2011 Mediated Agreed Entry in which Mari[e]a Best and Russell Best
agreed that if guardianship of [M.B.] was necessary prior to [M.B’s] twenty
first birthday, Russell Best would serve as [M.B.’s] guardian. The parties’
agreement of October, 2011, further specified that the Boone Circuit Court,
with Special Judge Rebecca S. McClure, presiding, retained jurisdiction
and authority to enforce the Mediated Agreed Entry of the parties.
9. Pursuant to Boone County Local Rules of Court, in Boone County only
Boone Superior Court I . . . has jurisdiction over guardianship proceedings.
Boone Circuit Court has no such jurisdiction.
10. The Court hereby Orders that if deemed necessary for medical or public
benefits purposes, Russell Best shall with the consent of Mariea Best, file a
petition to establish guardianship over the person of [M.B.] in a court of
proper jurisdiction.
Appellant’s App. pp. 212-13.
Mariea appealed the order and argued that “[b]y forcing Mother to consent to
Father’s guardianship of their daughter when she no longer believes it is in the daughter’s
1
In addition to requesting a modification of the October 2011 Agreed Entry in Boone Circuit Court,
Mariea asked the court to order the parties to refrain from filing a petition to establish guardianship over
M.B. Mariea then filed a petition to establish guardianship of M.B. in Hamilton Superior Court on
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best interest, the Dissolution Court is attempting to usurp the probate court of its duty to
determine the person who will act in the best interest of the incapacitated person.” In re
Marriage of Best and Best, No. 06A04-1401-DR-46, Slip op. at 1 (Ind. Ct. App. June 25,
2014). Our court affirmed the trial court’s order after the following brief discussion:
Settlement agreements are contractual in nature and binding if
approved by the trial court. The dissolution court that enters a settlement
agreement is in the best position to resolve questions of interpretation and
enforcement of that agreement and retains this authority. This task is an
exercise in the construction of the terms of a written contract, which is a
pure question of law. Our standard of review is therefore de novo. When
interpreting a settlement agreement, we apply the general rules of contract
construction. Unless the terms of the contract are ambiguous, they will be
given their plain and ordinary meaning.
The parties’ Mediated Agreed Entry provides that under certain
circumstances, Mariea and Russell agree that Russell will act as M.B.’s
guardian. Mariea and Russell do not dispute these circumstances exist.
Pursuant to the Mediated Agreed Entry that Mariea signed and the
dissolution court approved, the dissolution court had the authority to order
Mariea to consent to Russell’s guardianship of M.B.
Slip op. at 2 (internal citations omitted).
While that appeal was pending, Russell filed a petition to establish a guardianship
over M.B.’s person in Boone Superior Court No. 1. Russell also requested that Mariea
consent to his guardianship petition. After Mariea refused to consent, Russell filed a
petition requesting that the Boone Circuit Court hold Mariea in contempt for her willful
and intentional failure to comply with the parties’ October 2011 Mediated Agreed Entry
and the court’s December 20, 2013 order.
An evidentiary hearing was held on February 19, 2014, and Mariea was found in
contempt. That same day, the court ordered Mariea to sign a blanket consent to the
guardianship of M.B. by Russell by 8:00 a.m. on February 20, 2014. The Boone Circuit
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Court ordered Russell’s counsel to prepare the consent and ordered counsel to include
language “that it is without prejudice to [Mariea’s] right to request a replacement
guardian.” Appellant’s App. p. 78. Mariea now appeals.2 Additional facts will be
provided as necessary.
I. Jurisdiction
Mariea argues that the dissolution court, i.e. the Boone Circuit Court, lacked
authority to order her to sign a blanket consent to Russell’s guardianship over M.B.
Mariea’s argument fails for several reasons but can be most simply resolved under the
law-of-the-case doctrine.
The law-of-the-case doctrine states that an appellate court’s determination of a
legal issue binds both the trial court and the appellate court in any later appeal involving
the same case and substantially the same facts. Murphy v. Curtis, 930 N.E.2d 1228, 1234
(Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. The purpose of this doctrine is to minimize
unnecessary relitigation of legal issues once they have been resolved by an appellate
court. Id. This doctrine is based on the policy that once an issue is litigated and decided,
that should be the end of the matter. Id.Our court has already determined that the Boone Circuit Court “had the authority
to order Mariea to consent to Russell’s guardianship of M.B.” In re Marriage of Best and
Best, No. 06A04-1401-DR-46, Slip op. at 2 (Ind. Ct. App. June 25, 2014). As our court
previously observed, in the court-approved October 2011 Mediated Agreed Entry, Mariea
2
Russell filed a request to consolidate Mariea’s appeal of the December 2013 order with the appeal in this
cause. Our court denied the request.
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and Russell agreed that Russell would serve as M.B.’s guardian if it was necessary to
establish a guardianship prior to her twenty-first birthday. Id.; see also Appellant’s App.
p. 127. That same agreed entry provided that “[b]arring establishment of a guardianship,
the custody order and jurisdiction of this Court remain in full force and effect.”
Appellant’s App. p. 127.
Mariea now appeals from the Boone Circuit Court’s February 19, 2014 order
finding her in contempt for failing to comply with the December 2013 order (the order
affirmed in our court’s June 25, 2014 memorandum decision) in which the court ordered
Mariea to consent to Russell’s guardianship of M.B. Because our court already
determined that the Boone Circuit Court had authority to order Mariea to consent to
Russell’s guardianship of M.B., the Boone Circuit Court retained jurisdiction to
adjudicate Russell’s petition requesting that the court find Mariea in contempt of its
December 2013 order.3 Cf. Fackler v. Powell, 839 N.E.2d 165, 167 (Ind. 2005) (stating
that a dissolution court retains jurisdiction to interpret the terms of its decree and decide
questions emanating from its decree pertaining to its enforcement).
Finally, we observe that Mariea conveniently ignores her decision to enter into the
October 2011 Mediated Agreed Entry wherein she agreed that Russell would serve as
M.B.’s guardian if a guardianship needs to be established before M.B. attains the age of
twenty-one. Mariea argues that the Boone Circuit Court has prevented her from
3
In an argument similar to that raised in her prior unsuccessful appeal, Mariea argues that by ordering her
to sign a blanket consent to Russell’s petition to establish a guardianship over M.B., the Boone Circuit
Court violated her “Fourteenth Amendment right to fair process” because the court did not consider
whether it was in M.B.’s best interests to have Russell appointed as her guardian. M.B.’s best interests
will be considered during the guardianship proceedings, see Ind. Code § 29-3-5-4, which proceedings are
not within the jurisdiction of the Boone Circuit Court.
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participating in the ensuing guardianship proceedings and/or challenging Russell’s
petition to establish guardianship over M.B. But Mariea agreed to those terms shortly
before M.B.’s eighteenth birthday, and the Boone Circuit Court is simply enforcing the
parties’ agreement.
II. Contempt
“‘Uncontradicted evidence that a party is aware of a court order and willfully
disobeys it is sufficient to support a finding of contempt.’” Bessolo v. Rosario, 966
N.E.2d 725, 730 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting Evans v. Evans, 766 N.E.2d 1240, 1243
(Ind. Ct. App. 2002)), trans. denied. A determination of whether a party is in contempt is
a matter within the trial court’s sound discretion, and we reverse only where there has
been an abuse of that discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion occurs where the trial court’s
decision is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. Id.Mariea argues that she did not willfully disobey the Boone Circuit Court’s
December 20, 2013 order, which ordered Mariea to consent to Russell’s petition to
establish a guardianship over M.B.’s person “if deemed necessary for medical or public
benefits purposes . . . in a court of proper jurisdiction.” Appellant’s App. p. 213. Mariea
argues that the “court of proper jurisdiction” had not yet been determined because
guardianship proceedings were pending in Hamilton Superior Court I and Boone
Superior Court I.4
4
Mariea also argues that she could not be found in contempt because the Boone Circuit Court’s
December 20, 2013 order is void for lack of jurisdiction. Because Mariea’s jurisdictional claim has been
twice rejected by this court, we need not consider this argument.
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However, at the contempt hearing, Mariea testified that she would not sign a
consent to Russell’s guardianship over the person of M.B. in any court. She specifically
refused to sign a consent in guardianship proceedings in either the Hamilton Superior or
Boone Superior Courts. Moreover, in violation of the October 2011 Mediated Agreed
Entry, Mariea filed a petition in Hamilton Superior Court requesting to be appointed as
M.B.’s guardian. Mariea filed the Hamilton County guardianship action after she filed a
motion in Boone Circuit Court requesting that the court order the parties to refrain from
filing a guardianship petition over M.B.’s person. After agreeing in October 2011 that
Russell would serve as M.B.’s guardian, Mariea flatly refused to execute a blanket
consent to Russell’s guardianship petition as she was ordered to do in the December 20,
2013 order. Tr. pp. 26-27. For all of these reasons, the Boone Circuit Court acted well
within its discretion when it found Mariea in contempt of the court’s December 20, 2013
order.
Conclusion
Mariea’s claim that the Boone Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction or authority to
order her to consent to Russell’s petition to establish guardianship over M.B. was
adjudicated in our court’s memorandum decision dated June 25, 2014. We are bound by
our court’s prior decision. We also observe that Mariea is bound by the October 2011
Mediated Agreed Entry wherein she agreed to consent to Russell’s guardianship over
M.B. We therefore conclude that the Boone Circuit Court acted within its discretion
when it held Mariea in contempt when she refused to consent to Russell’s guardianship
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petition after being ordered to do so on December 20, 2013. For all of these reasons, we
affirm the judgment of the Boone Circuit Court.
Affirmed.
RILEY, J., and CRONE, J., concur.
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