Gregory Voltaire v. State of Indiana ( 2013 )


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  • Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),                                  Sep 12 2013, 5:36 am
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be
    regarded as precedent or cited before
    any court except for the purpose of
    establishing the defense of res judicata,
    collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:                           ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
    ZACHARY A. WITTE                                  GREGORY F. ZOELLER
    Fort Wayne, Indiana                               Attorney General of Indiana
    JUSTIN F. ROEBEL
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    GREGORY VOLTAIRE,                                 )
    )
    Appellant-Defendant,                       )
    )
    vs.                                )        No. 02A03-1303-CR-104
    )
    STATE OF INDIANA,                                 )
    )
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                        )
    APPEAL FROM THE ALLEN SUPERIOR COURT
    The Honorable Wendy W. Davis, Judge
    Cause No. 02D06-1207-FD-1015
    September 12, 2013
    MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    SHEPARD, Senior Judge
    Gregory Voltaire appeals his class D felony sexual battery convictions and his
    class B misdemeanor battery sentence. We affirm his convictions but reverse and remand
    on a sentencing issue.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    In August 2011, eighteen-year-old D.J. interviewed with Voltaire for a job at his
    clothing store, Voltaire Designs. At the end of the interview, Voltaire told her she could
    start the next day.
    Voltaire called D.J. shortly after the interview and asked her to come back. When
    she got there, he told her he liked his employees to wear clothing from his store. D.J.
    picked out a shirt and some jeans but then realized she did not have enough money for
    the jeans. Voltaire said they could “work something out.” Tr. p. 107. D.J. declined and
    said she could pay for the jeans the next day, but Voltaire again insisted they could “work
    something out.” Id. D.J. believed Voltaire was asking for sex. Id. at 121-22.
    When D.J. went to put the jeans back, Voltaire pushed her into his office, locked
    the door behind them, and subjected her to several unwanted sexual touchings. D.J.
    managed to get away only after her cell phone rang and a customer entered the store.
    Sixteen-year-old C.Y. worked at Voltaire Designs from August through October
    2011. As with D.J., Voltaire told C.Y. he preferred the employees to wear clothing from
    the store. He pointed out a bra and underwear and asked C.Y. to model them for him.
    C.Y. did not try them on. She took them to the back room and emerged a little later,
    telling Voltaire they did not fit.
    2
    During C.Y.’s employment, Voltaire repeatedly touched her in ways that made her
    uncomfortable. For example, he subjected her to long hugs, pressed his erections against
    her body, and tried to get her to touch his penis. These advances scared C.Y., and she
    finally decided she could not take it anymore when Voltaire told her that “we can’t help
    what happens in the store” and that “humans can’t control themselves” and then
    “smacked [her] butt” as she was leaving at the end of her shift. Id. at 171, 175, 176.
    C.Y. walked out and never returned.
    A jury found Voltaire guilty of two counts of class D felony sexual battery and
    one count of class B misdemeanor battery. The trial court sentenced him to one and a
    half years on the first D felony, with half a year suspended to probation; one and a half
    years on the second D felony, with one year suspended to probation; and one year
    suspended to probation for the B misdemeanor. The felonies were ordered to be served
    consecutively with each other but concurrent to the misdemeanor.
    ISSUES
    Voltaire raises two issues: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain his
    class D felony sexual battery convictions and (2) whether his one-year sentence for class
    B misdemeanor battery exceeds the maximum term authorized by statute.
    DISCUSSION AND DECISION
    I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
    As to both victims, Voltaire contends that the State did not sufficiently prove that
    they were compelled to submit to the touching by force or the imminent threat of force.
    3
    When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we do not reweigh the evidence
    or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Delarosa v. State, 
    938 N.E.2d 690
     (Ind. 2010).
    We affirm if the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdicts
    could have allowed a reasonable jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
    doubt. 
    Id.
    To convict Voltaire of the class D felony sexual batteries, the State had to prove
    beyond a reasonable doubt that he touched D.J. and C.Y., with intent to arouse or satisfy
    his or their sexual desires, when they were compelled to submit to the touching by force
    or the imminent threat of force. See 
    Ind. Code § 35-42-4-8
    (a)(1) (1998). The presence or
    absence of forceful compulsion is to be determined from the perspective of the victim,
    not the assailant. McCarter v. State, 
    961 N.E.2d 43
     (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied.
    The evidence regarding D.J. shows that Voltaire pushed her into his office and
    locked the door. D.J. struggled and pushed him away, telling him no and to get off of
    her, but he kept grabbing her and “pull[ing her] back onto him.” Tr. p. 109. At one
    point, he grabbed her neck in a way that made her feel he would choke her, and she
    feared he would hurt or kill her. 
    Id. at 111
    . Voltaire unbuttoned her pants, put his hand
    inside her shirt, and rubbed his erection against her bottom. 
    Id.
    The evidence regarding C.Y. shows she felt compelled to submit to Voltaire’s
    persistent advances over the course of several months.              He subjected her to
    uncomfortable, lingering hugs where “he wouldn’t let go.” 
    Id. at 171
    . When C.Y. tried
    to get away from his grip, he would exert force to stop her. 
    Id. at 172
    . He kissed her
    during one hug but only got part of her lip because she moved away. 
    Id. at 170
    . On
    4
    fifteen to twenty different occasions, Voltaire hugged or touched C.Y. where she could
    feel his erection against her body. 
    Id. at 159
    . Once when she was sitting down, Voltaire
    got on his knees between her legs, grabbed her legs, asked if her boyfriend ever
    performed oral sex on her, and said he could do it better. 
    Id. at 156
    . On another
    occasion, he grabbed her arm and tried to put her hand on his penis. 
    Id. at 162-63
    . On
    yet another occasion, he tried to give her a massage and then tried to get on top of her and
    “straddle” her. 
    Id. at 172-73
    . C.Y. tried to stop him, but he “forcefully continued” until
    she was able to push him off. 
    Id. at 173
    . C.Y. thought Voltaire was a “predator” and was
    scared of him. 
    Id. at 182
    .
    Voltaire argues that there was not enough evidence that D.J. and C.Y. submitted
    out of fear. While fear may be evidence of force or threat of force, fear is not an element
    of sexual battery, nor is it a prerequisite to proving force or imminent threat of it.
    McCarter, 
    961 N.E.2d at 46
    .
    We conclude the evidence is sufficient to show that D.J. and C.Y. were compelled
    to submit to Voltaire’s sexual touchings by force or the imminent threat of force.
    II. MISDEMEANOR BATTERY SENTENCE
    Voltaire next contends his one-year sentence suspended to probation for the class
    B misdemeanor battery violates Indiana Code section 35-50-3-3 (1977), which provides
    in relevant part, “A person who commits a Class B misdemeanor shall be imprisoned for
    a fixed term of not more than one hundred eighty (180) days.” The State concedes
    Voltaire’s sentence improperly exceeds the statutory maximum for a class B
    misdemeanor but notes the court’s authority to place him on probation for one year if any
    5
    part of his misdemeanor sentence is suspended. See 
    Ind. Code § 35-50-3-1
    (b) (2002).
    We therefore reverse the class B misdemeanor sentence and remand with instructions to
    enter a sentence complying with our misdemeanor sentencing statutes.
    CONCLUSION
    We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions.
    VAIDIK, J., and BROWN, J., concur.
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 02A03-1303-CR-104

Filed Date: 9/12/2013

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014