Charrise Belton v. State of Indiana , 6 N.E.3d 1043 ( 2014 )

FOR PUBLICATION
Apr 17 2014, 9:00 am
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
SUZY ST. JOHN GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Marion County Public Defender Attorney General of Indiana
Appellate Division
Indianapolis, Indiana JESSE R. DRUM
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
CHARRISE BELTON, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 49A04-1310-CR-487
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable James A. Joven, Judge
Cause No. 49F13-1303-CM-16642
April 17, 2014
OPINION - FOR PUBLICATION
BRADFORD, Judge
CASE SUMMARY
On March 7, 2013, Appellant-Defendant Charrise Belton was riding in a vehicle
driven by her then-boyfriend, Tacolby Calloway. Belton waited in the vehicle while
Calloway entered a home located near the intersection of 33rd Street and Orchard Avenue in
Indianapolis. Calloway appeared to be under the influence of drugs when he exited the home
approximately thirty minutes later. Calloway subsequently became upset with Belton and
threatened to assault her. Fearing for her safety, Belton drove away from Calloway. Belton
was stopped by a member of the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department for a traffic
infraction approximately one-half of a mile away.
The State subsequently charged Belton with Class A misdemeanor driving while
suspended. Following a bench trial, the trial court found Belton guilty as charged and
imposed a 365-day suspended sentence. On appeal, Belton contends that the State did not
present sufficient evidence to negate her necessity defense. Concluding that the evidence
presented by the State was insufficient to negate Belton’s necessity defense, we reverse.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On the evening of March 7, 2013, Belton was a passenger in a vehicle driven by her
then-boyfriend, Calloway. Calloway drove the vehicle to a home located near the
intersection of 33rd Street and Orchard Avenue in Indianapolis. Belton stayed in the vehicle
while Calloway entered the home.
Belton observed that Calloway appeared to be under the influence of drugs when he
returned approximately thirty minutes later. Specifically, Belton believed that Calloway was
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under the influence of embalming fluid because she “could smell it and [she] could tell by his
demeanor.” Tr. p. 9. Upon exiting the home, Calloway appeared “aggravated because he
had [had] a dispute with one of the guys that were … that was getting high with him.” Tr. p.
10 (brackets added, ellipsis in original).
Calloway soon turned his aggression toward Belton and began directing insults at her.
When Belton indicated that she might leave Calloway if he did not calm down, Calloway
threatened to “whoop [Belton’s] a[**].” Tr. p. 11. Calloway repeated his threat to assault
Belton numerous times. Belton feared that Calloway would follow through on his threat to
assault her because he had previously done so on at least two separate occasions. Belton
feared “that it would be worse” on “that particular night” because Calloway “was on drugs.”
Tr. p. 12. Based on Calloway’s demeanor, Belton “knew” that Calloway would assault her
that night if she stayed. Tr. p. 12.
At some point, Calloway put the key in the ignition as if he were going to start the
vehicle in which he and Belton were sitting and drive away. Calloway, however, exited the
vehicle without explanation and went back inside the home. Fearing for her safety, Belton
took advantage of the opportunity by sliding over and into the driver’s seat and driving away.
Belton, who was “in a neighborhood [she] didn’t know nothing about[,]” decided to drive in
the direction of 16th Street and Bellefontaine Street, where some of her family resided. Tr. p.
12.
After Belton had been driving for approximately seven or eight blocks, or
approximately one-half of a mile, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Officer Jason Ross
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initiated a traffic stop of the vehicle driven by Belton because it appeared that the vehicle’s
registration was expired.1 During the traffic stop, Belton admitted that her driver’s license
was suspended and stated that she only drove because of her need to remove herself from the
situation involving Calloway. Finding no reason to doubt the veracity of Belton’s
explanation, Officer Ross “issued [Belton] a summons in lieu of arresting her and allowed
her to leave the [vehicle] parked where it was … on the side of the road.” Tr. p. 6 (ellipsis
added).
On March 23, 2013, the State charged Belton with Class A misdemeanor driving
while suspended. On September 11, 2013, following a bench trial, the trial court found
Belton guilty as charged and sentenced her to a 365-day suspended sentence. The trial court
also ordered that Belton’s driver’s license be suspended for a period of ninety days. This
appeal follows.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
Belton does not contest that she drove a vehicle while her driver’s license was
suspended. She argues, however, that she did so out of manifest necessity and that the State
failed to present sufficient evidence to negate her necessity defense.
In order to prevail on a claim of necessity, the defendant must show (1) the act
charged as criminal must have been done to prevent a significant evil, (2) there
must have been no adequate alternative to the commission of the act, (3) the
harm caused by the act must not be disproportionate to the harm avoided, (4)
the accused must entertain a good faith belief that his act was necessary to
prevent greater harm, (5) such belief must be objectively reasonable under all
the circumstances, and (6) the accused must not have substantially contributed
to the creation of the emergency. Toops v. State, 643 N.E.2d 387, 390 (Ind. Ct.
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Upon further investigation, Officer Ross determined that the vehicle’s registration was not expired.
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Ohio App. 1994). In order to negate a claim of necessity, the State must disprove at
least one element of the defense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Pointer v.
State, 585 N.E.2d 33, 36 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (discussing State’s burden in the
context of an analogous self-defense claim). The State may refute a claim of
the defense of necessity by direct rebuttal, or by relying upon the sufficiency of
the evidence in its case-in-chief. Id. The decision whether a claim of
necessity has been disproved is entrusted to the fact-finder. Id. Where a
defendant is convicted despite [her] claim of necessity, this court will reverse
the conviction only if no reasonable person could say that the defense was
negated by the State beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
Dozier v. State, 709 N.E.2d 27, 29 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). On appeal, our review is centered
on whether the evidence presented to the trial court as fact-finder was sufficient to sustain the
conviction. Id. at. 30.
When reviewing whether the State presented sufficient evidence to negate a
defendant’s claim of necessity, we apply the same standard of review used for
all sufficiency of the evidence questions. We neither reweigh the evidence nor
judge the credibility of witnesses. Johnson v. State, 671 N.E.2d 1203, 1209
(Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied. Rather, we examine only the evidence
most favorable to the State along with all reasonable inferences to be drawn
therefrom. Id. If there is substantial evidence of probative value to sustain the
conviction, then it will not be set aside. Id.
Id.
In raising the necessity defense at trial, counsel for Belton presented evidence that
Belton believed that it was necessary for her to drive away from Calloway in order to prevent
a greater harm, i.e., a physical assault on Belton from Calloway. Defense counsel argued that
Belton’s belief was reasonable in light of the fact that Calloway repeated his threat to
physically assault Belton numerous times, he had physically assaulted her on at least two
prior occasions, and Belton believed such assault would be worse than prior assaults because
of the fact that Calloway was under the influence of what she believed to be embalming
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fluid. Defense counsel further argued that Belton did not substantially contribute to the
creation of the emergency and that she did not have an adequate alternative to driving, as she
was in an unfamiliar area with an individual who was under the influence of drugs and was
threatening to physically assault her. In addition, nothing in the record indicates that Belton
caused any harm to others by driving away from the situation involving Calloway or was
driving in an unsafe manner when Officer Ross initiated the traffic stop.
The trial court appeared to accept defense counsel’s arguments regarding the emergent
situation. However, in finding Belton guilty of the charged offense, the trial court stated the
following:
All right based on the evidence that’s been presented and as admitted by
Defense, the State has proven the elements of Driving While Suspended. Now
the only question is, is the defense of necessity successfully interposed or not?
While there may have been an emergent situation at the time when Miss Belton
initially tried … initially drove away the Court does agree with the State that
that emergent situation, that necessity abates at some point. Now what is that
point? Is it seven or eight blocks? Is it further? Is it … does the defendant
have to reach the destination that she was seeking or is there an alternative?
The emergent situation and this is assuming that everything is to believed from
Miss Belton (inaudible) about her abusive boyfriend, she escaped that
situation. The emergent situation abated … the necessity abated upon escaping
the reportedly abusive boyfriend. The better course of action may have been to
go to a gas station or somewhere where she could have called police but was
there a gas station within the seven or eight blocks? I don’t know. I’m not
familiar with that area and there’s no evidence about that so I’m left to
determine if the defense of necessity is successfully interposed between. I
think that it is not. I think that Miss Belton, you could have gone somewhere
away from your boyfriend in a manner where you could’ve stopped driving
sooner than that.
Tr. pp. 18-19 (ellipses in original).
On appeal, Belton challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the trial court’s
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determination that the emergent situation had abated and that she had driven further than was
necessary under the circumstances. Initially, we note that the State did not present any
evidence at trial relating to whether Belton could have safely stopped driving at any point
before she was stopped by Officer Ross. Belton testified that she was unfamiliar with the
area of Indianapolis in which the incident with Calloway occurred and that she was driving in
the direction of an area of Indianapolis in which some of her family resided. Officer Ross
acknowledged that Belton had only driven approximately one-half of a mile from the home
where she had left Calloway. In addition, the record is devoid of any evidence indicating that
Belton passed a gas station or any other business where she could have sought refuge and
called police before she was stopped by Officer Ross.
Generally, we agree with the trial court’s determination that the circumstances making
it necessary for Belton to drive would abate at some point. While the trial court offered what
it termed a “better course of action” whereby Belton could have stopped driving sooner, the
record is devoid of any evidence suggesting that the circumstances presumed by the court in
stating said course of action existed in the area of Indianapolis in which Belton was driving.
Our review of the record demonstrates that the trial court’s determination that the
circumstances had abated to a point where it was no longer necessary for Belton to drive in
the instant matter are not based upon evidence presented by the State to negate Belton’s
necessity defense but rather on the trial court’s speculation that Belton had driven further
than necessary, i.e., past a safe location where she could have stopped and called police. As
such, we conclude that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the trial court’s determination in
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this regard.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed.
RILEY, J., and ROBB, J., concur.
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