Jarrell Outlaw v. State of Indiana ( 2013 )

Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
Jun 28 2013, 6:58 am
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before
any court except for the purpose of
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
VALERIE K. BOOTS GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Marion County Public Defender Agency Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
ERIC P. BABBS
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
JARRELL OUTLAW, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 49A04-1210-CR-521
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Viola J. Taliaferro, Senior Judge
Cause No. 49F18-1008-FD-67271
June 28, 2013
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MAY, Judge
Jarrell Outlaw appeals his convictions of Class A misdemeanor auto theft1 and Class A
misdemeanor resisting law enforcement.2 Outlaw also appeals the order he pay $166 in court
costs. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 27, 2010, Joseph Gaines reported his vehicle stolen. That evening, Officer
Freddie Haddad of the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department observed a vehicle
fitting the description of Gaines’ vehicle and initiated a traffic stop. Officer Haddad
approached the vehicle, which Outlaw was driving. Before Officer Haddad could speak with
Outlaw, the vehicle sped away.
Officer Haddad pursued the vehicle and radioed for assistance. During the pursuit,
Outlaw struck a curb and crashed the vehicle. Outlaw then ran away. Officer David Hurt
responded to Officer Haddad’s request for assistance and saw an individual matching
Outlaw’s description running between houses in the area and making furtive gestures.
Officer Hurt stopped Outlaw, who was out of breath and unable to speak. Officer Haddad
then arrived on the scene and identified Outlaw as the driver of the stolen vehicle.
The State charged Outlaw with one count of Class D felony auto theft and two counts
of Class D felony resisting law enforcement. After a bench trial, the court found Outlaw
guilty of Class D felony auto theft and one count of Class D felony resisting law
enforcement, but the court entered both convictions as Class A misdemeanors pursuant to
1
Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2.5(b).
2
Ind. Code § 35-44-3-3 (2010); recodified as Ind. Code § 35-44-3-3 effective July 1, 2012.
2
Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7(b). The trial court sentenced Outlaw to 365 days on probation, with 2
days credit, and ordered Outlaw to pay $166.00 in court costs and $755.57 in restitution.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
1. Sufficiency of the Evidence
When reviewing sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction, we consider only the
probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the trial court’s decision. Drane v.
State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). It is the fact-finder’s role, and not ours, to assess
witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to support a
conviction. Id. To preserve this structure, when we are confronted with conflicting
evidence, we consider it most favorably to the trial court’s ruling. Id. We affirm a
conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. It is therefore not necessary that the evidence overcome
every reasonable hypothesis of innocence; rather, the evidence is sufficient if an inference
reasonably may be drawn from it to support the trial court’s decision. Id. at 147.
Outlaw argues the State did not prove he committed auto theft and resisting law
enforcement because Officer Haddad’s testimony identifying Outlaw as the person driving
the stolen vehicle and running from police was incredibly dubious. Under the “incredible
dubiosity rule,” we may impinge on the factfinder’s responsibility to judge the credibility of
the witness “only when it has confronted ‘inherently improbable testimony or coerced,
equivocal, wholly uncorroborated testimony of incredible dubiosity.’” Rodgers v. State, 422
N.E.2d 1211, 1213 (Ind. 1981). We will reverse a conviction if the sole witness presents
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inherently improbable testimony and there is no circumstantial evidence of the defendant’s
guilt. White v. State, 706 N.E.2d 1078, 1079-80 (Ind. 1999).
Officer Haddad’s testimony was not incredibly dubious. Officer Haddad testified he
saw Outlaw driving the stolen vehicle. After Outlaw was apprehended, Officer Haddad
identified him as the person who ran from the stolen vehicle after it crashed. Officer Hurt
testified he stopped Outlaw, who was out of breath and unable to speak, after receiving a
radio transmission from Officer Haddad with a description matching Outlaw. Outlaw’s
argument to the contrary is a request to reweigh the evidence and judge witness credibility,
which we cannot do. See Drane, 867 N.E.2d at 146.
2. Order to Pay Court Costs
Outlaw argues the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered him to pay court
costs of $166.00. As Outlaw invited any error, we need not decide this issue. Error invited
by the complaining party is not reversible error. Booher v. State, 773 N.E.2d 814, 822 (Ind.
2002). As such, invited errors are not subject to appellate review. Gamble v. State, 831
N.E.2d 178, 184 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied.
During sentencing, Outlaw’s counsel stated, “Well, [Outlaw] would pay costs of
$165.00, you have to order that.” (Tr. at 141.) As Outlaw conceded he would pay the court
costs, he cannot now complain they were imposed in error.3
3
Although the trial court ordered court costs of $166.00, after Outlaw conceded he would have to pay $165.00,
Outlaw has not alleged error regarding the discrepancy in the amount ordered. His only assertion is that the
costs should not have been imposed at all. As that argument was waived for appeal, we need not address the
discrepancy of $1.00.
4
CONCLUSION
Officer Haddad’s testimony was not incredibly dubious, and there was sufficient
evidence Outlaw committed the crimes of which he was convicted. Outlaw invited any error
in the imposition of court costs. Accordingly, we affirm.
Affirmed.
BAKER, J., and MATHIAS, J., concur.
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