Robert Grubbs v. State of Indiana ( 2012 )


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  • Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be
    regarded as precedent or cited before                        FILED
    any court except for the purpose of                        Jul 23 2012, 9:03 am
    establishing the defense of res judicata,
    collateral estoppel, or the law of the                            CLERK
    of the supreme court,
    case.                                                           court of appeals and
    tax court
    APPELLANT PRO SE:                                ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
    ROBERT GRUBBS                                    GREGORY F. ZOELLER
    Pendleton, Indiana                               Attorney General of Indiana
    GEORGE P. SHERMAN
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    ROBERT GRUBBS,                                   )
    )
    Appellant-Defendant,                      )
    )
    vs.                                )      No. 53A01-1109-PC-606
    )
    STATE OF INDIANA,                                )
    )
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                       )
    APPEAL FROM THE MONROE CIRCUIT COURT
    The Honorable Marc R. Kellams, Judge
    Cause No. 53C02-0509-PC-599
    July 23, 2012
    MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    BROWN, Judge
    Robert Grubbs, pro se, appeals the denial of his motion for reconsideration and
    motion to correct error. Grubbs raises two issues which we consolidate and restate as
    whether the court erroneously denied these motions. We affirm.
    The relevant facts follow. In August 2002, the State charged Grubbs with murder.
    Grubbs v. State, No. 53A05-0401-CR-32, slip op. at 3 (Ind. Ct. App. August 23, 2004).
    After a jury trial, Grubbs was found guilty of murder and sentenced to sixty-five years of
    imprisonment. 
    Id. Grubbs appealed
    and argued that the testimony of the witnesses was
    incredibly dubious and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, and
    this court affirmed. 
    Id. at 2.
    In September 2005, Grubbs filed a petition for post-conviction relief and alleged
    that he received ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel and that prosecutor
    misconduct denied him a fair trial. On October 17, 2008, the court denied Grubbs’s
    petition. On September 24, 2009, the court forwarded a copy of the chronological case
    summary to Grubbs following correspondence from Grubbs. On December 14, 2010,
    following further correspondence from Grubbs, the court forwarded a copy of the order
    denying Grubbs’s petition for post-conviction relief to Grubbs.1 On June 2, 2011, Grubbs
    filed a motion for reconsideration and argued that the court abused its discretion when it
    denied his petition “without benefit of an evidentiary hearing to determine if [Grubbs]
    wished to hire private counsel; proceed [pro se]; withdraw to amend his [pro se] petition;
    or to withdraw his petition without prejudice . . . .” Appellant’s Appendix at 30. On
    August 2, 2011, the court denied Grubbs’s motion to reconsider.
    1
    The record does not contain a copy of Grubbs’s correspondence with the court.
    2
    On September 1, 2011, Grubbs filed a “Belated Motion to Correct Errors” and
    argued that the court erred when it denied his petition for post-conviction relief without
    first allowing him to amend his petition. 
    Id. at 34.
    On October 11, 2011, the court
    denied Grubbs’s motion to correct errors.
    The issue is whether the post-conviction court erred in denying Grubbs’s motion
    for reconsideration and motion to correct error. Grubbs appears to argue that the court
    erred in denying his petition for post-conviction relief because the court should have held
    an evidentiary hearing prior to denying his petition for post-conviction relief and should
    have given him time to “hire private counsel, [proceed] pro se, withdraw to amend his
    [pro se] petition, or to withdraw his petition without prejudice . . . .” Appellant’s Brief at
    5.
    The State argues that filing a notice of appeal thirty days following the October
    17, 2008 order denying post-conviction relief would have been the appropriate avenue to
    challenge the court’s denial of post-conviction relief and “not a motion to reconsider filed
    over two and a half years after the post-conviction court denied relief” or a motion to
    correct error filed more than thirty days after the court’s denial of Grubbs’s petition for
    post-conviction relief. Appellee’s Brief at 4. In his reply brief, Grubbs argues that he
    would have filed a timely appeal had he been made aware of his right to appeal by
    counsel.
    The post-conviction court’s October 17, 2008 order denying Grubbs’s petition
    constituted a final judgment. See Post-Conviction Rule 1(6) (“The court shall make
    specific findings of fact, and conclusions of law on all issues presented, whether or not a
    3
    hearing is held. . . . This order is a final judgment.”). “An appeal may be taken by the
    petitioner or the State from the final judgment in this proceeding, under rules applicable
    to civil actions.” Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(7).
    Ind. Trial Rule 59(C) and Ind. Appellate Rule 9(A)(1) required Grubbs to either
    file a motion to correct error or a notice of appeal within thirty days of the court’s
    October 17, 2008 order. However, Grubbs did not file a motion to correct error or a
    notice of appeal within thirty days of the court’s order. Ind. Appellate Rule 9(A)(5)
    provides that “[u]nless the Notice of Appeal is timely filed, the right to appeal shall be
    forfeited except as provided by [Post-Conviction Rule 2],” which is not applicable in the
    present case. See Greer v. State, 
    685 N.E.2d 700
    , 702 (Ind. 1997) (holding that Post-
    Conviction Rule 2 was a vehicle for belated direct appeals alone and “provides a method
    for seeking permission for belated consideration of appeals addressing conviction, but
    does not permit belated consideration of appeals of other post-judgment petitions”);
    Taylor v. State, 
    939 N.E.2d 1132
    , 1135 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that the petitioner
    could not use Post-Conviction Rule 2(1) “as a vehicle for filing a belated notice of appeal
    from his post-conviction relief proceeding”). Accordingly, we cannot say that the court
    erred in denying Grubbs’s motions. See Strowmatt v. State, 
    779 N.E.2d 971
    , 975 (Ind.
    Ct. App. 2002) (holding that the petitioner forfeited his right to appeal the denial of his
    petition of post-conviction relief where the notice of appeal was not filed within thirty
    days of the denial); Sceifers v. State, 
    663 N.E.2d 1191
    , 1192-1193 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996)
    (holding that Post-Conviction Rule 2 applies only to matters on direct appeal and that the
    4
    trial court properly denied a petition to file a belated motion to correct error), trans.
    denied, cert. denied, 
    519 U.S. 895
    , 
    117 S. Ct. 239
    (1996).
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of
    Grubbs’s motion for reconsideration and motion to correct error without prejudice to his
    right to seek successive post-conviction relief.
    Affirmed.
    BAKER, J., and KIRSCH, J., concur.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 53A01-1109-PC-606

Filed Date: 7/23/2012

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021