Brian T. Martin v. State of Indiana ( 2013 )

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before May 30 2013, 8:40 am
any court except for the purpose of
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
THOMAS P. KELLER GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
AARON J. SPOLARICH
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
BRIAN T. MARTIN, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 71A03-1210-CR-446
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE ST. JOSEPH SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable John M. Marnocha, Judge
Cause No. 71D02-1205-FD-423
May 30, 2013
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
PYLE, Judge
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Brian Martin (“Martin”) appeals his conviction, following a jury trial, for Class C
misdemeanor operating while intoxicated1 (“OWI”) that was the underlying conviction
for his Class D felony OWI conviction.2
We affirm.
ISSUE
Whether sufficient evidence supports Martin’s underlying conviction.
FACTS
In the early morning hours of May 6, 2012, Norman Nestor (“Nestor”), a customer
at a Speedway gas station, saw a vehicle pull into the parking lot and park. The driver,
later determined to be Martin, was the only person in the car. Martin did not get out of
the car and “was sitting there over the steering wheel” with the car running and the lights
on. (Tr. 111). The cashier called 911, and St. Joseph County Police Officer Kyle Slater
(“Officer Slater”) was dispatched to the Speedway station.
As Officer Slater approached Martin’s car, he noticed that the car was running
with the radio on, saw the driver’s window was rolled down, and “smell[ed] a strong odor
of alcohol” coming from the car. (Tr. 119). Martin, who “appeared to be unconscious”
and had his head “kind of tilted to the side[,]” was holding a half-opened package of gum.
(Tr. 119). Officer Slater yelled at Martin in an attempt to wake him, but Martin did not
respond. The officer then rubbed his knuckles over Martin’s sternum, and Martin “woke
1
Ind. Code § 9-30-5-2.
2
I.C. § 9-30-5-3.
2
up, kind of dazed [and] confused” and was “very shaky” as he tried to find his
registration. (Tr. 120). Martin had “red glossy eyes” and his balance was “very
unsteady” as he got out of the car. (Tr. 122). Officer Slater administered a variety of
field sobriety tests, including the horizontal gaze nystagmus test and the walk-and-turn
test, which Martin failed. Officer Slater then offered Martin a portable breath test, but
Martin refused. The officer read the Indiana Implied Consent warning to Martin and
transported him to the police station, where he refused a certified chemical test.
The State ultimately charged Martin with Class C misdemeanor OWI and a Class
D felony enhancement for having a previous OWI conviction.3 On August 8, 2012, the
trial court held a jury trial. The jury found Martin guilty of the underlying Class C
misdemeanor OWI charge. Martin waived his right to a jury trial on the D felony
enhancement, and the trial court found him guilty of the Class D felony OWI. The trial
court only entered judgment of conviction on the Class D felony and imposed a two (2)
year sentence with one (1) year executed at the Department of Correction and one (1)
year suspended to probation.4 Martin now appeals his underlying conviction.
3
The State initially charged Martin with Class A misdemeanor OWI for the underlying charge with a
Class D felony enhancement but later amended it to the Class C misdemeanor.
4
We note the Abstract of Judgment indicates that Martin was found guilty of OWI as a Class A
misdemeanor instead of a Class C misdemeanor. We instruct the trial court to correct the Abstract of
Judgment.
3
DECISION
Martin argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his underlying
conviction for Class C misdemeanor OWI.5
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction,
appellate courts must consider only the probative evidence and reasonable
inferences supporting the verdict. It is the fact-finder’s role, not that of
appellate courts, to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence to
determine whether it is sufficient to support a conviction. To preserve this
structure, when appellate courts are confronted with conflicting evidence,
they must consider it most favorably to the [jury’s verdict]. Appellate
courts affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the
elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It is therefore not
necessary that the evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis of
innocence. The evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be
drawn from it to support the verdict.
Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146-47 (Ind. 2007) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
Martin contends there was not sufficient evidence to prove that he was intoxicated
or that he operated a vehicle. In addition, Martin contends that the State did not present
sufficient evidence of intoxication because it did not present evidence of Martin’s blood
alcohol content. We disagree.
Indiana Code § 9-30-5-2(a) provides that a defendant commits Class C
misdemeanor OWI when he “operates a vehicle while intoxicated[.]” To prove that a
person was intoxicated, the State is not required to submit proof of his blood alcohol
content. See Miller v. State, 641 N.E.2d 64, 69 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (“To establish the
offense of driving while intoxicated, the State is required to establish that the defendant
5
Martin does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support his enhancement of his conviction
to a Class D felony.
4
was impaired, regardless of his blood alcohol content.”), trans. denied. A person is
“intoxicated” if he is under the influence of alcohol “so that there is an impaired
condition of thought and action and the loss of normal control of a person’s faculties.”
I.C. § 9–13–2–86(1).6 Evidence of any of the following may establish that a person is
impaired: (1) consumption of significant amounts of alcohol; (2) impaired attention and
reflexes; (3) watery or bloodshot eyes; (4) the odor of alcohol on the breath; (5) unsteady
balance; (6) failure of field sobriety tests; and (7) slurred speech. Fields v. State, 888
N.E.2d 304, 307 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
Here, the State presented evidence that Martin drove into the Speedway parking
lot where he slumped over his steering wheel with his car running and did not respond
when Officer Slater yelled at him. Martin emitted a strong odor of alcohol; had red,
glossy eyes; was unsteady in his balance; had shaky manual dexterity; and failed field
sobriety tests. Thus, there was probative evidence from which the jury could have found
Martin was intoxicated. See, e.g., Matlock v. State, 944 N.E.2d 936, 941 (Ind. Ct. App.
2011) (finding sufficient evidence of intoxication where defendant smelled of alcohol,
had glassy, bloodshot eyes, unsteady balance, and failed field sobriety tests).
Martin also argues that the State did not present sufficient evidence that he
operated the vehicle. Specifically, Martin contends that the evidence was insufficient
because the police did not observe him driving and because there was no evidence that he
drove his vehicle erratically or in an unsafe manner. Martin appears to argue that the
6
We note that I.C. § 9–13–2–86(1) was amended in the most recent legislative session, see 2013 Ind.
Legis. Serv. P.L. 196-2013 (S.E.A 536), (effective May 7, 2013), but the specific provision at issue in this
case was not amended.
5
State needed to prove that he drove the vehicle in an intoxicated manner. The statute,
however, merely provides that the State prove that he operated or drove the vehicle
“while” intoxicated, not drove in an intoxicated manner. See I.C. § 9-30-5-2(a).
This case is unlike the cases to which Martin cites where a determination of the
sufficiency of the evidence on the element of operating a vehicle was dependent on
inferences from circumstantial evidence. Here, the record reveals that Nestor, a customer
in the Speedway gas station, saw Martin drive into the parking lot and park his car.
Martin was the only person in the car. As there was an eyewitness to Martin operating
the vehicle, the evidence was sufficient to show that Martin operated the vehicle.
Martin’s argument is nothing more than an invitation to reweigh the evidence,
which we will not do. See Drane, 867 N.E.2d at 146. Because there was probative
evidence from which the jury could have found Martin guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
of Class C misdemeanor OWI, we affirm his conviction.
Affirmed.
KIRSCH, J., and VAIDIK, J., concur.
6