Sheila Taylor v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION                                                               FILED
    May 16 2016, 9:42 am
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                             CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                                          and Tax Court
    court except for the purpose of establishing
    the defense of res judicata, collateral
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                  ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Steven Ripstra                                          Gregory F. Zoeller
    Ripstra Law Office                                      Attorney General of Indiana
    Jasper, Indiana
    Larry D. Allen
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Sheila Taylor,                                          May 16, 2016
    Appellant-Defendant,                                    Court of Appeals Case No.
    51A04-1509-CR-1376
    v.                                              Appeal from the Martin Circuit
    Court
    State of Indiana,                                       The Honorable Lynne Ellis, Judge
    Appellee-Plaintiff                                      Trial Court Cause No.
    51C01-1501-F4-12
    Bailey, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 51A04-1509-CR-1376 | May 16, 2016               Page 1 of 6
    Case Summary
    [1]   Sheila Taylor appeals her six year sentence for conspiracy to commit dealing in
    methamphetamines.1 We affirm.
    Issues
    [2]   Taylor presents two issues for review:
    I.        Whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing;
    and
    II.       Whether Taylor’s six year sentence is inappropriate.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [3]   Taylor pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit dealing in
    methamphetamines, a Level 4 felony. Pursuant to her plea agreement, Taylor’s
    sentence was capped at the advisory sentence of six years.2 At the sentencing
    hearing, Taylor offered her own unsworn statement and testimony from five
    witnesses to emphasize her efforts toward rehabilitation and also the effect
    incarceration would have on her nine-year-old son. The trial court found
    1
    Ind. Code §§ 35-48-4-1.1, 35-41-5-2.
    2
    I.C. § 35-50-2-5.5.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 51A04-1509-CR-1376 | May 16, 2016   Page 2 of 6
    Taylor’s history and commission of crime while on probation to be aggravating
    factors, and imposed the advisory sentence. Taylor appealed.
    Discussion and Decision
    Abuse of Discretion
    [4]   In the sentencing hearing, Taylor’s counsel argued for leniency because of
    Taylor’s cooperation with court orders and being “on track for rehabilitation,”
    as well as the effect Taylor’s incarceration would have upon her son. (Tr. 81-
    82.) Taylor now claims that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to
    specifically recognize these circumstances and her guilty plea as mitigators.
    [5]   “[S]entencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and
    are reviewed on appeal only for abuse of discretion.” Anglemyer v. State, 
    868 N.E.2d 482
    , 490 (Ind. 2007), decision clarified on reh’g 
    875 N.E.2d 218
    . Abuse of
    discretion occurs if the decision is ‘clearly against the logic and effect of the
    facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual
    deductions to be drawn therefrom.’” 
    Id. Where the
    court has imposed an
    advisory sentence, the defendant has a “particularly heavy burden” to prove
    such an abuse of discretion. Golden v. State, 
    862 N.E.2d 1212
    , 1216 (Ind. Ct.
    App. 2007), trans. denied. One way a court can abuse its discretion is to omit a
    mitigating factor advanced by the defense when the mitigating factor is both
    significant and clearly supported by the record. Crawley v. State, 
    677 N.E.2d 520
    ,
    523 (Ind. 1997); 
    Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 490-91
    . However, the trial court is
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 51A04-1509-CR-1376 | May 16, 2016   Page 3 of 6
    not required to explain why it has declined to recognize a particular factor as
    mitigating. 
    Id. at 493.
    [6]   Taylor did not establish that the effect of her incarceration on her son would be
    disproportionate in comparison to children of other incarcerated parents. Thus
    the court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to find hardship to Taylor’s son
    to be a significant mitigating circumstance. See Weaver v. State, 
    845 N.E.2d 1066
    , 1074 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied.
    [7]   As for Taylor’s compliance with court orders and post-arrest rehabilitation
    efforts, the evidence was conflicting. While Taylor participated in some
    treatment programs after her arrest, she did not complete the mandatory relapse
    prevention classes.
    [8]   Taylor pled guilty, for which she received a significant benefit. Two other
    charges were dismissed and her sentence was capped at the advisory sentence.
    Taylor’s decision to plead guilty may properly be considered a pragmatic
    decision as opposed to a mitigating factor. See 
    Anglemyer, 875 N.E.2d at 220
    -
    21.
    [9]   The sentence imposed was neither unlawful nor outside of the statutory range,
    and the trial court did not refuse to recognize a clearly advanced and significant
    mitigating circumstance. We do not find any abuse of discretion.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 51A04-1509-CR-1376 | May 16, 2016   Page 4 of 6
    Inappropriateness of Sentence
    [10]   Taylor asserts that her six year sentence is inappropriate and deserves revision.
    We disagree.
    [11]   The authority granted to this Court by Article 7, § 6 of the Indiana Constitution
    permitting appellate review and revision of criminal sentences was implemented
    by the Indiana Supreme Court through Appellate Rule 7(B). We may “revise a
    sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s
    decision, the court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature
    of the offense and the character of the offender.” Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B).
    The primary purpose in this type of review is to “leaven the outliers” and focus
    on the aggregate sentence for the crime(s) committed. Caldwell v. State, 
    895 N.E.2d 1219
    , 1125 (Ind. 2008). The appellant bears the burden of
    “persuad[ing] the appellate court that his or her sentence has met this
    inappropriateness standard of review.” Kimbrough v. State, 
    979 N.E.2d 625
    , 630
    (Ind. 2012) (quoting Childress v. State, 
    848 N.E.2d 1073
    , 1080 (Ind. 2006)).
    [12]   The nature of the offense is that Taylor conspired to deal methamphetamine, in
    an amount of one to five grams. There are no significant facts in the record that
    would lead us to depart from the advisory sentence.
    [13]   As to Taylor’s character, she has eight criminal convictions and one juvenile
    adjudication. Her record includes convictions for: criminal mischief, drunk
    driving, public intoxication, disorderly conduct, intimidation, and conversion.
    She was also convicted of forgery, a class C felony, in January 2013. One year
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 51A04-1509-CR-1376 | May 16, 2016   Page 5 of 6
    of this forgery sentence was suspended and Taylor was ordered to serve the
    balance through an adult day reporting program. Despite this leniency,
    however, Taylor committed the present offense while serving her day reporting
    sentence. Taylor’s charges and convictions show an escalating pattern of
    criminal behavior. Taylor’s advisory sentence is not inappropriate in light of
    the nature of the offense and her character.
    Conclusion
    [14]   The trial court did not abuse its discretion and the sentence is not inappropriate.
    [15]   Affirmed.
    Bradford, J., and Altice, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 51A04-1509-CR-1376 | May 16, 2016   Page 6 of 6