Constance L. Jones v. Jean L. Markey d/b/a Markey Bonding d/b/a Markey Bonds d/b/a A-AAA Bail Bonds, Inc. ( 2012 )

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
APPELLANT PRO SE: ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
CONSTANCE L. JONES ANTHONY S. CHURCHWARD
Anderson, Indiana Leonard, Hammond, Thoma & Terrill
Fort Wayne, Indiana
FILED
Jun 28 2012, 9:16 am
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
CONSTANCE L. JONES, )
)
Appellant-Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) No. 02A05-1110-SC-534
)
JEAN L. MARKEY d/b/a )
MARKEY BONDING d/b/a )
MARKEY BONDS d/b/a )
A-AAA BAIL BONDS, INC., )
)
Appellee-Defendant. )
APPEAL FROM THE ALLEN SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Jennifer L. DeGroote, Magistrate
Cause No. 02D01-1012-SC-22648
June 28, 2012
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
CRONE, Judge
Case Summary
Constance L. Jones appeals the small claims judgment in favor of Jean L. Markey
d/b/a Markey Bonding d/b/a Markey Bonds d/b/a A-AAA Bail Bonds, Inc. (hereinafter
referred to as “Markey Bonding”). In 2004, Constance’s son was arrested and jailed on two
sets of criminal charges. Constance paid Markey Bonding bail bond premiums to post bond
for her son and to obtain his release from the Allen County Jail. Markey Bonding posted
bond for those two sets of charges, and Constance’s son was released. However,
immediately after he was released, he was arrested on different charges. In 2010, Constance
filed a small claims action against Markey Bonding seeking a refund of the bond premiums
she paid to Markey Bonding. The small claims court entered judgment in favor of Markey
Bonding. Constance presents three issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as
one: whether the small claims court clearly erred when it entered judgment in favor of
Markey Bonding. Finding no clear error, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
The facts of this case are agreed upon. On December 21, 2004, Constance’s son,
Donald Jones, was arrested and charged with armed robbery, escape, and resisting law
enforcement under cause number 02D04-0412-MC-2365. On December 22, 2004, the State
filed separate charges against Donald for theft, resisting law enforcement, and criminal
recklessness under cause number 02D04-0412-MC-2369. On December 22, 2004, Constance
went to Markey Bonding to obtain a bail bond for release of her son from the Allen County
Jail. The bail amount set on cause number MC-2365 was $45,000. The bail amount set on
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cause number MC-2369 was $11,500. Accordingly, on December 22, Constance gave
Markey Bonding two checks and some cash totaling $5650, which represented the ten-
percent bond premium amount for Markey Bonding to post bond and obtain Donald’s release
on those two sets of charges. Bond was posted by Markey Bonding and received by the clerk
of the Allen Superior Court on December 22, 2004.
Donald was released from the Allen County Jail on the evening of December 22,
2004. He was given his personal property and was taken to the exit door by one of the
confinement officers. After Donald exited the building and proceeded approximately fifty
feet to a public sidewalk, he was immediately arrested by Fort Wayne Police officers based
upon probable cause that he had committed additional offenses of robbery and receiving
stolen property.
On December 20, 2010, Constance filed a small claims action against Markey
Bonding seeking damages in the amount of $5650, the amount that she paid to Markey
Bonding for the bond premiums to secure release of her son. A small claims trial was held
on August 11, 2011. Constance argued that Donald was never released from custody, and
therefore Markey Bonding should refund the premiums she paid. On September 12, 2011,
the small claims court entered its order which provided in pertinent part:
The Court, having taken this matter under advisement, now finds that the
Plaintiff has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence, that she is
entitled to the damages alleged against the Defendant. The Court finds that the
Plaintiff’s son was “released” in compliance with her posting of a bond. The
fact that he was immediately rearrested upon his release for different charges
does not result in an obligation of the Defendant to repay the bond posted for
the initial charges.
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Appellant’s App. at 6. This appeal followed.
Discussion and Decision
“We review facts from a bench trial under a clearly erroneous standard with due
deference paid to the trial court’s opportunity to assess witness credibility.” Branham v.
Varble, 952 N.E.2d 744, 746 (Ind. 2011). This deferential standard of review is particularly
important in small claims actions, as the trials are informal and have the sole objective of
dispensing speedy justice between parties according to the rules of substantive law. Id.Because Constance had the burden of proof at trial, we apply a negative judgment standard of
review. See LTL Truck Serv., LLC v. Safeguard, Inc., 817 N.E.2d 664, 667 (Ind. Ct. App.
2004). We will not reverse a negative judgment on appeal unless it is contrary to law. Id. A
judgment is contrary to law when the evidence, along with all reasonable inferences, is
without conflict and leads unerringly to a conclusion opposite that reached by the court.
M.K. Plastics Corp. v. Rossi, 838 N.E.2d 1068, 1074 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
Constance contends that, because Donald was immediately rearrested on different
charges following his release from the Allen County Jail, he was never truly “released from
custody.” Appellant’s Br. at 28. Therefore, she argues, Markey Bonding did not earn the
bond premiums that she paid to obtain Donald’s release.1 Although Constance believes that
the question of whether her son was “released from custody” is a complex legal
1
Constance raises two additional arguments that we conclude bear no relevance to her essential claim
for relief. Therefore, we do not directly address those arguments.
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determination, we disagree and conclude simply that the facts do not support her argument
that she is entitled to a refund of the bond premiums paid to Markey Bonding.
Our supreme court has described the process of executing bail through a bail
bondsman in relevant part as follows:
A defendant who executes a bail bond under Indiana Code Section 35-33-8-
3.2(a)(1)(A) uses a bail agent, commonly referred to as a bail bondsman. A
“bail agent” is a person who has been approved by the Commissioner of the
Department of Insurance and appointed by an insurer through a power of
attorney to execute or countersign bail bonds for the insurer in connection with
judicial proceedings for which the person receives a premium. I.C. § 27-10-1-
4. A “premium” is the amount of money the defendant pays the bail agent
prior to the execution of the bail bond. I.C. § 27-10-1-8. The premium, which
is usually ten percent of the bond, is for the bail agent’s services.
Lake Cnty. Clerk’s Office v. Smith, 766 N.E.2d 707, 709 (Ind. 2002).
In general terms, “bail bond” is a bond given
to obtain the defendant’s release from confinement. The effect of the release
on bail bond is to transfer custody of the defendant from the officers of the law
to the custody of the surety on the bail bond, whose undertaking is to redeliver
the defendant to legal custody at the time and place appointed in the bond.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 187 (8th ed. 2004). Custody means “[t]he care and control of a
thing or person for inspection, preservation, or security.” Id. at 412. “Physical custody” is
the “[c]ustody of a person (such as an arrestee) whose freedom is directly controlled and
limited.” Id. at 1183.
Here, it is undisputed that Markey Bonding acted as a bail agent when it posted bond
to obtain Donald’s release from confinement on the two sets of charges for which Constance
paid the bond premiums. Donald was given his personal items and was escorted to the exit
door of the Allen County Jail. He was allowed to leave, his freedom being no longer directly
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controlled and limited. Donald walked approximately fifty feet to a public sidewalk before
he was arrested on different charges. The fact that Donald was quickly arrested on wholly
separate charges is of no moment to Markey Bonding. Markey Bonding did exactly what it
was paid to do: it posted bond and obtained Donald’s release on the two sets of charges for
which Donald was incarcerated at that time. We agree with the small claims court that
Constance failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that she is entitled a refund
of the bond premiums. We cannot say that the evidence, along with all reasonable
inferences, is without conflict and leads unerringly to a conclusion opposite that reached by
the small claims court. Accordingly, we affirm.
Affirmed.
VAIDIK, J., and BRADFORD, J., concur.
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