Lance Fleming v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Aug 27 2019, 10:29 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
CLERK
court except for the purpose of establishing Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
the defense of res judicata, collateral and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Michael R. Fisher Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
J.T. Whitehead
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Lance Fleming, August 27, 2019
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-CR-47
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Mark D. Stoner,
Appellee-Plaintiff Judge
The Honorable Jeffrey L. Marchal,
Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No.
49G06-1707-F3-26238
Altice, Judge.
Case Summary
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-47 | August 27, 2019 Page 1 of 11
[1] Following a bench trial, Lance Fleming was convicted of Level 3 felony
attempted rape and Level 3 felony rape. Fleming presents two issues for our
review:
1. Is the evidence sufficient to support his conviction for
attempted rape by other sexual conduct?
2. Do his convictions for attempted rape and rape violate double
jeopardy principles?
[2] We affirm.
Facts & Procedural History
[3] K.J. first met Fleming in 2002 at AT&T where they both worked, and the two
became friends. In 2008, they had a one-time sexual encounter. While their
sexual relationship did not continue, they remained friends off and on. Fleming
would often assist K.J. with projects around her house or help with her son.
[4] In October 2015, K.J. was living in Indianapolis with her nineteen-year-old son.
On October 8, 2015, K.J. worked at AT&T from 1:30 p.m. to 10:00 p.m., and
then she went to a second job with Labor Ready, where she was helping to
remodel a Wal-Mart. K.J. worked through the night until 6:30 or 7:00 a.m. on
October 9, 2015. K.J. had been having trouble with a door to her laundry
room, so on her way home she called and left a message for Fleming, asking
him if he could help her fix the door. Fleming called her back and told her that
he would come by sometime that morning.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-47 | August 27, 2019 Page 2 of 11
[5] K.J. arrived home around 7:30 or 8:00 a.m. She changed into a nightgown and
went to sleep in her bed. A short time later, K.J. was awakened by the sound of
her doorbell. She went to the door and saw Fleming standing outside. When
she let him in, Fleming attempted to hug her, but she “pulled away”. Transcript
Vol. 2 at 18. K.J. told Fleming about the problem with the laundry room door,
and Fleming told her that he had to retrieve his tools. K.J. was feeling
lightheaded, so she went to her bedroom and sat down on the bed. She
eventually laid down.
[6] After returning with his tools, Fleming entered K.J.’s bedroom and told her that
“he wanted [her].” Id. at 22. K.J. tried to roll over to the other side of her bed
to get away from Fleming, but Fleming grabbed her ankle. Fleming then
started taking off his clothes, and K.J. reacted by telling Fleming, “we can’t do
this, you’re married.” Id. Fleming got on top of K.J., raised up her nightgown,
and began kissing her on the mouth and on her breasts. At some point,
Fleming removed K.J.’s underwear. K.J. testified that Fleming was then
“trying to go down on [her],” by which she meant attempting to perform oral
sex. Id. at 24. Fleming was unsuccessful in placing his mouth on K.J.’s vagina
because she was twisting and moving so much in an effort to get away from
him. K.J. kept telling him, “I can’t do this” and “[w]e can’t do this.” Id. at 25.
[7] Fleming, who had K.J. pinned down, then forced K.J.’s legs open with his legs
and inserted his penis into her vagina. K.J. continued to twist and move
around, trying to get Fleming off of her. The weight of Fleming’s body on top
of her in addition to her asthma made it difficult for K.J. to breathe. While
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-47 | August 27, 2019 Page 3 of 11
struggling to breathe, K.J. kept telling Fleming “we can’t do this,” and “no.”
Id. at 27. Fleming eventually stopped and rolled off K.J.
[8] K.J., still in her nightgown, got up and went into the living room where she
curled up in a chair and called her sister, who did not answer. Fleming
remained on the bed for a few minutes before he got up and went into the living
room. K.J. then went into her closet, where she felt safe, and called her
boyfriend. When Fleming came back into the bedroom to retrieve his clothes,
K.J. backed away and told Fleming, “you got to go, you got to go.” Id. at 29.
Fleming got dressed and left K.J.’s home. K.J. decided not to call the police
because she did not want her son to come home to “the police and chaos.” Id.
[9] After Fleming left, K.J. got dressed and went to the hospital to report the
incident. She was wearing a different pair of underwear and left her nightgown
at home. Before she arrived at the hospital, K.J.’s sister called her back and
K.J. told her what happened. K.J.’s sister testified that K.J. was “extremely
upset and she was crying” when they spoke. Id. at 50.
[10] At the hospital, K.J. underwent a sexual assault examination. K.J. reported to
a forensic nurse that Fleming had attempted oral sex on her and that he
achieved vaginal penetration with his penis. K.J. reported that Fleming might
have ejaculated. During the physical examination, the forensic nurse observed
four distinct injuries, consisting of lacerations and abrasions, to K.J.’s vaginal
area. The forensic nurse testified that K.J.’s injuries were more consistent with
forced sex than with consensual sex.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-47 | August 27, 2019 Page 4 of 11
[11] Detective Fernando Cervantes of the sex crimes unit was dispatched to the
hospital to investigate. Detective Cervantes met briefly with K.J. and took an
initial statement. He took an evidence technician to K.J.’s home, where they
took pictures and collected evidence, including K.J.’s nightgown and sheets.
Detective Cervantes then located Fleming. He advised Fleming of his rights,
and Fleming agreed to give a statement. Fleming admitted to knowing K.J.,
admitted to receiving a call from her about the needed door repair, and
admitted to going to her house that morning, but he denied having any sexual
contact with her.
[12] At trial Fleming testified in his own defense. He admitted that he was going to
perform oral sex on K.J. and that he got “kind of close to her vagina.” Id. at
129. Contrary to K.J.’s version of events, Fleming testified that he did not
complete the act of oral sex because K.J. told him that she had “not washed
yet,” and so he “kind of worked [his] way back on up.” Id. Fleming also
admitted that he inserted his penis into K.J.’s vagina and testified that such was
consensual. He tried to explain his prior statement to Detective Cervantes that
he did not have any sexual contact with K.J. on the morning in question by
asserting that he did not understand the question that was asked because he was
surprised and focused on Detective Cervantes’s suggestion that Fleming forced
himself on K.J.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-47 | August 27, 2019 Page 5 of 11
[13] On July 17, 2017, 1 the State charged Fleming with Level 3 felony attempted
rape, Level 3 felony rape, and Level 6 felony criminal confinement. On
October 17, 2018, just prior to the scheduled start of Fleming’s jury trial,
Fleming waived his right to trial by jury, and the matter was tried to the bench.
At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court found Fleming guilty as
charged and entered convictions thereon. On December 6, 2018, the trial court
held a sentencing hearing. The court vacated Fleming’s conviction for criminal
confinement, citing double jeopardy, and sentenced Fleming to concurrent
terms of five years for his Level 3 felony convictions. Fleming now appeals.
Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
Discussion & Decision
1. Sufficiency
[14] Fleming argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his attempted rape
conviction. When we consider a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence,
we neither reweigh the evidence nor assess the credibility of the witnesses.
Suggs v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1190, 1193 (Ind. 2016). Instead, we consider only the
evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the conviction. Id. We will
1
The nearly two-year delay in filing of charges was because the State waited until the DNA tests came back
and confirmed that swabs taken from K.J.’s external and internal genitalia and her breasts contained DNA
consistent with Fleming’s DNA profile.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-47 | August 27, 2019 Page 6 of 11
affirm if there is probative evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could
have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
[15] As charged, the State was required to establish that Fleming did attempt to
commit the crime of rape by knowingly or intentionally causing K.J. to submit
to other sexual conduct when she was compelled by force or imminent threat of
force. Ind. Code § 35-42-4-1(a)(1). As relevant here, “[o]ther sexual conduct”
is defined as an act involving “a sex organ of one (1) person and the mouth or
anus of another person.” Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-221.5. As the substantial step
toward commission of the crime, the State alleged that Fleming “removed his
clothing, then removed [K.J.]’s underwear, . . . then placed his face near [K.J.]’s
vagina.” Appellant’s Appendix Vol. II at 20.
[16] Fleming argues that K.J.’s testimony that Fleming attempted to perform oral
sex on her was speculative and did not constitute evidence of probative value
sufficient to support his conviction for attempted rape by other sexual conduct.
We disagree. We note that Fleming himself admitted that he was going to
perform oral sex on K.J. and that he got close to her vagina with his mouth.
This belies Fleming’s claim that K.J.’s testimony that he was attempting to
perform oral sex was mere speculation as to his intent to perform oral sex.
According to K.J., Fleming was not successful in placing his mouth on her
vagina because she was twisting and struggling as she tried to get out from
underneath him. Contrary to Fleming’s claim, forensic evidence was not
needed to establish that Fleming attempted to force K.J. to submit to oral sex.
In short, Fleming’s argument is simply a request to reweigh the evidence and
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-47 | August 27, 2019 Page 7 of 11
assess the credibility of the witnesses, which we will not do. See Suggs, 51
N.E.3d at 1193. The evidence is sufficient to support Fleming’s conviction for
attempted rape by other sexual conduct.
2. Double Jeopardy
[17] The double jeopardy clause of the Indiana Constitution provides, “No person
shall be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense.” Ind. Const. art. 1, section
14. The double jeopardy clause is intended to prevent the State from being able
to proceed against a person twice for the same criminal transgression.
Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32, 49 (Ind. 1999). Under Indiana’s Double
Jeopardy Clause, a defendant may not be convicted of two offenses if “with
respect to either the statutory elements of the challenged crimes or the actual
evidence used to convict, the essential elements of one challenged offense also
establish the essential elements of another challenged offense.” Richardson v.
State, 717 N.E.2d at 49 (emphases in original); see also Layman v. State, 42
N.E.3d 972, 980 n.7 (Ind. 2015).
[18] Fleming argues that his alleged conduct was “described as part of one
continuing incident where the alleged first offense [i.e., attempted rape by other
conduct] was actually part and parcel of the second [i.e., rape by sexual
intercourse].” Appellant’s Brief at 18. Fleming thus contends that under the
continuing crime doctrine, his convictions for both attempted rape and rape
cannot stand.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-47 | August 27, 2019 Page 8 of 11
[19] The continuing crime doctrine is a category of Indiana’s prohibition against
double jeopardy and applies when “actions that are sufficient in themselves to
constitute separate criminal offenses may be so compressed in terms of time,
place, singleness of purpose, and continuity of action as to constitute a single
transaction.” Walker v. State, 932 N.E.2d 733, 735 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (citing
Riehle v. State, 823 N.E.2d 287, 296 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied). Where,
however, the defendant is charged with two or more distinct chargeable crimes,
the continuing crime doctrine does not apply. Id.; see also Hines v. State, 30
N.E.3d 1216, 1219 (Ind. 2015) (“The continuous crime doctrine does not seek
to reconcile the double jeopardy implications of two distinct chargeable crimes;
rather, it defines those instances where a defendant’s conduct amounts only to a
single chargeable crime.”) (quoting Boyd v. State, 766 N.E.2d 396, 400 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2002)).
[20] In Collins v. State, 717 N.E.2d 108 (Ind. 1999), our Supreme Court was
confronted with a situation in which different sex acts comprised multiple
charges. Specifically, the defendant was convicted of two separate counts of
criminal deviate conduct—one based on compelled oral sex and the other based
on compelled anal sex. Both acts constituted sexual deviate conduct. As
pertinent to this case, the Court rejected the defendant’s argument that there
was only one continuous assault because once the assault began, he paused
only to reposition his victim before continuing the assault. The Court observed
that “[d]istinguishing separate crimes is often difficult, particularly in cases of
sexual assault.” Id. at 110. The Court emphasized:
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-47 | August 27, 2019 Page 9 of 11
We do not approve any principle which exempts one from
prosecution from all the crimes he commits because he sees fit to
compound or multiply them. Such a principle would encourage
the compounding and viciousness of the criminal acts.
Id. (quoting Brown v. State, 459 N.E.2d 376, 378 (Ind. 1984)). Given that
resolution of such claims is extremely fact-sensitive, the Court applied the
actual evidence test in determining whether the offenses were the “same
offense” for purposes of double jeopardy.
[21] Here, there is no dispute that the two offenses have distinct statutory elements.
Our focus is thus on the actual evidence used to convict Fleming of the
offenses. This analysis requires a consideration of whether the evidentiary facts
used to establish the essential elements of one offense may also have been used
to establish all of the essential elements of the other challenged offense. See
Spivey v. State, 761 N.E.2d 831, 833 (Ind. 2002) (“[T]he Indiana Double
Jeopardy Clause is not violated when the evidentiary facts establishing the
essential elements of one offense also establish only one or even several, but not
all, of the essential elements of a second offense.”).
[22] Fleming’s conviction for attempted rape by other sexual conduct was
established by K.J.’s testimony that Fleming tried to perform oral sex on her but
was unable to because of her efforts to prevent him from doing so. Fleming
also testified that he was going to perform oral sex on K.J. and that his mouth
was close to her vagina. Fleming’s conviction for rape was established by K.J.’s
testimony that Fleming pinned her down and compelled her to submit to sexual
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-47 | August 27, 2019 Page 10 of 11
intercourse and forensic evidence demonstrating that DNA profiles obtained
during K.J.’s sexual assault examination matched Fleming’s. Fleming admitted
at trial that he inserted his penis into K.J.’s vagina. Fleming’s convictions for
attempted rape and rape were proven by separate and distinct facts. There is no
double jeopardy violation.
[23] Judgment affirmed.
Kirsch, J. and Vaidik C.J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-47 | August 27, 2019 Page 11 of 11