J.S. v. W.S. (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                            FILED
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                                   Aug 27 2019, 9:21 am
    court except for the purpose of establishing
    CLERK
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                      Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    estoppel, or the law of the case.                                                 and Tax Court
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
    Kathleen M. Meek
    Romy N. Elswerky
    Justin T. Bowen
    Bowen & Associates, LLC
    Carmel, Indiana
    ATTORNEYS FOR AMICI CURIAE
    COUNSEL FOR AMICI CURIAE
    NATIONAL FEDERATION OF THE
    BLIND AND NATIONAL FEDERATION
    OF THE BLIND OF INDIANA
    Sharon Krevor-Weisbaum
    Emily L. Levenson
    Brown, Goldstein & Levy, LLP
    Baltimore, Maryland
    COUNSEL FOR AMICUS CURIAE
    INDIANA DISABILITY RIGHTS
    Thomas E. Crishon
    Indiana Disability Rights
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DC-580 | August 27, 2019                   Page 1 of 15
    J.S.,                                                    August 27, 2019
    Appellant-Petitioner,                                    Court of Appeals Case No.
    19A-DC-580
    v.                                               Appeal from the Morgan Circuit
    Court
    W.S.,                                                    The Honorable Matthew G.
    Appellee-Respondent                                      Hanson, Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    55C01-1809-DC-1731
    Crone, Judge.
    Case Summary
    [1]   J.S. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court’s decree which dissolved her marriage to
    W.S. (“Father”). Mother contends that the trial court abused its discretion in
    awarding sole physical custody of the parties’ minor daughter, A.S., to Father
    based in large part upon an allegedly erroneous finding regarding Mother’s
    blindness disability. Mother also asserts that the trial court abused its discretion
    in declining to award child support and in denying her request for spousal
    maintenance. Concluding that the trial court indeed made an erroneous finding
    regarding Mother’s disability, and as it is unclear whether the trial court would
    have awarded Father sole physical custody of A.S. absent that erroneous
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DC-580 | August 27, 2019       Page 2 of 15
    finding, we reverse and remand on the issue of child custody. Because the child
    support and spousal maintenance issues are integrally tied to child custody in
    this case, these issues should be also reconsidered upon remand accordingly.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [2]   A.S. was born to Mother and Father on June 29, 2013. Mother and Father
    subsequently married on September 29, 2013.1 At times during the marriage
    when both parties worked outside the home, Mother’s parents, A.S.’s maternal
    grandparents, provided the majority of the childcare for A.S.
    [3]   In July 2015, Mother became ill and was later diagnosed with pseudotumor
    cerebri. This condition rendered Mother legally blind. Following her
    diagnosis, Mother ceased working and became a stay-at-home mom and the
    primary caretaker for A.S. In 2016, Mother began receiving Social Security
    Disability and Supplemental Security Income based upon a finding that she was
    unable to work due to her disability.
    [4]   The parties eventually separated, and Mother filed a dissolution of marriage
    petition on September 10, 2018. Following a preliminary hearing, the trial
    court entered a preliminary order awarding the parties joint physical and legal
    custody of A.S. and ordering Father to pay Mother child support in the amount
    of $32 per week. At the time, Mother resided with her parents, and Father
    1
    Although A.S. was born before the parties were married, they agree that she should be considered a child of
    the marriage.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DC-580 | August 27, 2019                   Page 3 of 15
    resided with his father and stepmother in residences approximately eight to ten
    miles apart. The trial court held a final hearing on February 20, 2019, and
    entered a dissolution decree that same day. In the decree, the court sua sponte
    made the following relevant findings of fact regarding child custody:2
    12) The child is a female and is five (5) years of age.
    13) Mother wishes to have full physical and legal custody of the
    child.
    14) Father wishes to have full physical and legal custody of the
    child.
    15) The court did not hear from the child and her opinion, at this
    age, would be of no value.
    ….
    20) [T]he court will find [that] Father has a good relationship
    with the child.
    ….
    22) [T]he court will find [that] Mother has a good relationship
    with the child.
    23) The court heard minimal evidence about other parties around
    the child but since no concerns were raised the court must find
    that all relationships with other family members are good ones.
    2
    We replace the trial court’s references to “the wife” and “the husband” with “Mother” and “Father.”
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DC-580 | August 27, 2019                   Page 4 of 15
    24) At this time the parties live very close to one another and the
    school the child attends actually has bus routes to both parents’
    homes.
    25) The child is familiar with both homes in which the parents
    now live.
    26) That both Mother and Father live with their parents so while
    living situations could change, they would change for both
    parties if/when they move out to find their own homes.
    27) That the child is familiar with the community she is in as
    well.
    ….
    33) Mother has a physical disability that essentially makes her
    legally blind.
    34) That Mother is currently in [vocational] rehabilitation to
    figure out how to be on her own and also be able to go back to
    some sort of work.
    35) That this disability was not in place prior to her marriage and
    only developed in the past few years.
    36) This disability affects Mother’s ability to drive, work (at this
    time) and even to do daily things such as walking up stairs she is
    unfamiliar with.
    37) Mother does have some support systems in place with her
    family, however the physical disability could present issues with
    the safety and security of the child.
    ….
    40) There is no evidence that the child has been cared for by a de
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DC-580 | August 27, 2019   Page 5 of 15
    facto custodian.
    41) It is relevant that Father works during the days and Mother
    does not at this time, however, like Mother, has family in place
    to aid with custody.
    42) Likewise, it is believed [that] Mother will be working within
    the next six months to [a] year.
    43) After considering the factors for custody the court could have
    been convinced to continue joint physical custody of this child
    had either party requested it.
    44) However, in light of the positions of both parties, joint
    physical custody at this time is not likely to work.
    45) Therefore, taking into account the factors … and in
    consideration of the best interests of the child, the court will find
    that Father shall have full physical custody of the child.
    Appealed Order at 1-4.
    [5]   Mother was granted parenting time with A.S. in accordance with the Indiana
    Parenting Time Guidelines, subject to the addition of one overnight per week,
    and the order provided that Mother could provide daycare for A.S. during the
    summer while Father is working. Despite some communication issues between
    the parties, the court ordered that the parties would continue having joint legal
    custody of A.S. as provided in the preliminary order. The trial court declined to
    award any child support and further denied Mother’s request for incapacity
    spousal maintenance. This appeal ensued. We will provide additional facts in
    our discussion where necessary.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DC-580 | August 27, 2019   Page 6 of 15
    Discussion and Decision
    [6]   We begin by noting that Father has not filed an appellee’s brief. When an
    appellee fails to submit a brief, we do not undertake the burden of developing
    arguments for the appellee, and we apply a less stringent standard of review.
    M.R. v. B.C., 
    120 N.E.3d 220
    , 223 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). Thus, we may reverse
    if the appellant establishes prima facie error, which is error at first sight, on first
    appearance, or on the face of it. 
    Id. This rule
    relieves us of the burden of
    controverting arguments advanced in favor of reversal where that burden
    properly rests with the appellee. 
    Id. In any
    event, we are still obligated to
    correctly apply the law to the facts in the record in order to determine whether
    reversal is required. 
    Id. [7] The
    trial court here entered findings and conclusions in support of its
    dissolution decree. It does not appear from the record that either party
    requested such findings. When the trial court enters findings sua sponte, the
    specific findings control only as to the issues they cover, while a general
    judgment standard applies to any issue upon which the court has not found.
    Montgomery v. Montgomery, 
    59 N.E.3d 343
    , 349 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans.
    denied (2017). The specific findings will not be set aside unless they are clearly
    erroneous. Collyear-Bell v. Bell, 
    105 N.E.3d 176
    , 184 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). A
    finding is clearly erroneous when there are no facts or inferences drawn
    therefrom that support it. 
    Id. In reviewing
    the trial court’s findings, we neither
    reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. 
    Id. Clear error
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DC-580 | August 27, 2019   Page 7 of 15
    is “that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
    been made.” Masters v. Masters, 
    43 N.E.3d 570
    , 575 (Ind. 2015).
    Section 1 – Mother has established prima facie error regarding
    the trial court’s physical custody decision.
    [8]   Mother asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding Father sole
    physical custody of A.S. Specifically, Mother asserts that the trial court’s
    decision was based, in large part, on a clearly erroneous finding of fact that
    improperly presumed that her disability could present a safety and security risk
    to A.S. We agree with Mother.
    [9]   Our standard of review of initial child custody determinations is well settled.
    Determinations regarding child custody fall within the trial court’s sound
    discretion. Swadner v. Swadner, 
    897 N.E.2d 966
    , 974 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). In
    an initial custody determination, both parents are presumed equally entitled to
    custody. Hamilton v. Hamilton, 
    103 N.E.3d 690
    , 694 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans.
    denied. The trial court shall determine custody and enter a custody order in
    accordance with the best interests of the child by considering all relevant
    factors, including:
    (1) The age and sex of the child.
    (2) The wishes of the child’s parent or parents.
    (3) The wishes of the child, with more consideration given to the
    child's wishes if the child is at least fourteen (14) years of age.
    (4) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with:
    (A) the child’s parent or parents;
    (B) the child’s sibling; and
    (C) any other person who may significantly affect the child’s
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DC-580 | August 27, 2019   Page 8 of 15
    best interests.
    (5) The child’s adjustment to the child's:
    (A) home;
    (B) school; and
    (C) community.
    (6) The mental and physical health of all individuals involved.
    (7) Evidence of a pattern of domestic or family violence by either
    parent.
    (8) Evidence that the child has been cared for by a de facto
    custodian, and if the evidence is sufficient, the court shall
    consider the factors described in section 8.5(b) of this chapter.
    Ind. Code § 31-17-2-8. In deference to the trial court’s proximity to the issues,
    we do not reweigh the evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses. Hughes
    v. Rogusta, 
    830 N.E.2d 898
    , 902 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). Instead, we consider the
    evidence most favorable to the judgment, with all reasonable inferences drawn
    in favor of the judgment. 
    Id. We will
    affirm the trial court’s custody
    determination absent an abuse of discretion. 
    Swadner, 897 N.E.2d at 974
    .
    [10]   Here, in considering factors (1) through (5) and factors (7)3 and (8), the trial
    court specifically found that either those factors did not apply under the
    circumstances presented or that Mother and Father were essentially on equal
    footing when it came to physical custody and the best interests of A.S.
    3
    Although the trial court noted one prior domestic violence incident between Mother and Father where
    Mother was charged but able to avoid prosecution by participating in a diversion program, see Appealed
    Order ¶ 38, the trial court made no finding regarding “a pattern of domestic or family violence by either
    parent” as there was no evidence presented of such a pattern.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DC-580 | August 27, 2019                    Page 9 of 15
    However, in considering factor (6), the mental and physical health of all
    individuals involved, the trial court found in relevant part:
    33) Mother has a physical disability that essentially makes her
    legally blind.
    ….
    37) Mother does have some support systems in place with her
    family, however the physical disability could present issues with
    the safety and security of the child.
    Appealed Order at 3-4.
    [11]   Upon review of the record, we agree with Mother that there is no evidence to
    support Finding 37. There was minimal evidence presented as to the onset of
    Mother’s disability as well as general testimony regarding her progress and
    adaptations to manage her disability and to eventually become employable. As
    for the safety and security of A.S., Mother and Father each testified and agreed
    that there were absolutely no safety concerns regarding Mother’s legal blindness
    and her ability to parent and care for A.S. There was no other evidence
    presented regarding Mother’s disability as it related to the best interests of A.S.
    [12]   This Court has previously addressed the role of a parent’s disability in the
    analysis of the best interests of the child. In re Marriage of Lang, 
    668 N.E.2d 285
    ,
    288-89 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). In Lang, we approved of the reasoning of a
    California Supreme Court case, In re Marriage of Carney, 
    598 P.2d 36
    (Cal.
    1979), which determined that it was impermissible for a trial court to rely on a
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DC-580 | August 27, 2019   Page 10 of 15
    parent’s physical disability “as prima facie evidence of the person’s unfitness as
    a parent or of probable detriment to the child; rather in all cases the court must
    view the handicapped person as an individual and the family as a whole.” 
    Id. at 42.
    The Carney court explained,
    To achieve this, the court should inquire into the person’s actual
    and potential physical capabilities, learn how he or she has
    adapted to the disability and manages its problems, consider how
    the other members of the household have adjusted thereto, and
    take into account the special contributions the person may make
    to the family despite or even because of the handicap.
    
    Id. Weighing these
    and all other relevant factors, the court must carefully
    determine whether the parent’s disabling condition will in fact have a
    “substantial and adverse effect on the best interest of the child.” Id.; see Clark v.
    Madden, 
    725 N.E.2d 100
    , 105 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (approving of and adopting
    Carney’s reasoning).
    [13]   It is apparent that rather than make a careful determination of whether
    Mother’s disability will in fact have an adverse effect on the best interests of
    A.S., the trial court here improperly presumed that it could without any
    supporting evidence. Because there was no evidence cited to or seemingly
    relied upon by the trial court that otherwise tipped the scales in favor of Father
    being awarded sole physical custody, we cannot say that the findings as a whole
    support the court’s ultimate conclusion that an award of sole physical custody
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DC-580 | August 27, 2019   Page 11 of 15
    to Father was in A.S.’s best interests.4 In other words, Mother has established
    prima facie error as we are not confident that the trial court would have reached
    the same conclusion absent the clearly erroneous finding and presumption
    regarding her disability.5 Accordingly, we reverse the court’s physical custody
    order and remand for the court to reconsider the issue in light of our decision.
    Upon remand, we instruct the court to enter only proper findings supported by
    the evidence as well as to enter additional specific findings that better articulate
    its physical custody determination.6
    Section 2 – The trial court must reconsider child support and
    spousal maintenance on remand.
    [14]   Because a determination of child support is integrally tied to the physical
    custody issue, an award of child support must be also reconsidered upon
    remand. However, based upon its prior minimal findings on this issue, we
    believe that some guidance would be useful. It appears that both parties
    4
    The trial court did note Father’s allegation that Mother drinks alcohol often and that her alcohol use was at
    the root of their one instance of domestic violence, as it caused them to “argue about trifle things.” Appealed
    Order at 3. However, there was no evidence presented, and the trial court made no finding, that Mother’s
    alcohol use is currently excessive and/or poses any threat to the safety of A.S. In other words, it does not
    appear that the trial court relied on Mother’s alcohol use in making its physical custody determination.
    5
    Because we conclude that the trial court’s finding in this regard is clearly erroneous, we decline to address
    Mother’s assertion that the trial court’s custody order runs afoul of the Indiana Civil Rights Law and
    discriminates against her in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act.
    6
    The trial court stated that it would have been inclined to award joint physical custody had either party
    requested it. To be clear, the trial court is not precluded from entering a custody arrangement not specifically
    advanced by either party so long as that custody arrangement is in the child’s best interests. Richardson v.
    Richardson, 
    34 N.E.3d 696
    , 704 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). Nevertheless, we acknowledge the trial court’s
    proximity to the issues and recognize that the court had, and may still have upon remand, other valid reasons
    for deciding that joint physical custody is not in A.S.’s best interests.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DC-580 | August 27, 2019                    Page 12 of 15
    requested an award of child support in conjunction with their requests for
    physical custody. Mother also requested incapacity spousal maintenance.
    After awarding sole physical custody of A.S. to Father, the trial court simply
    found that “there will be no child support ordered.” Appealed Order at 5. The
    court further stated, “in lieu of no child support, the court will not order any
    spousal maintenance as well,” reasoning “[e]ssentially these amounts would
    cancel each other out.” 
    Id. These sparse
    findings do not pass muster.
    [15]   We observe as a general matter that decisions regarding child support rest
    within the sound discretion of the trial court. Taylor v. Taylor, 
    42 N.E.3d 981
    ,
    986 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. Indiana Code Section 31-16-6-1
    provides a list of relevant factors a trial court should consider in making a child
    support determination and our supreme court has promulgated the Indiana
    Child Support Guidelines and provided worksheets to aid the trial court.
    Indeed, a calculation made pursuant to the Child Support Guidelines is
    presumed valid. In re Marriage of Duckworth, 
    989 N.E.2d 352
    , 354 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2013). But this Court “cannot review a support order to determine if it
    complies with the guidelines unless the order reveals the basis for the amount
    awarded.” Vandenburgh v. Vandenburgh, 
    916 N.E.2d 723
    , 728 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2009). “Such revelation could be accomplished either by specific findings or by
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DC-580 | August 27, 2019   Page 13 of 15
    incorporation of a proper worksheet.” Cobb v. Cobb, 
    588 N.E.2d 571
    , 574 (Ind.
    Ct. App. 1992).7
    [16]   Simply put, from what the trial court did here, we are wholly unable to
    determine whether the court complied with the Child Support Guidelines, and
    therefore reconsideration and clarification of the child support order (or lack
    thereof) is appropriate. See, e.g., Dye v. Young, 
    655 N.E.2d 549
    , 551 (Ind. Ct.
    App. 1995). Accordingly, on remand, in addition to reconsidering child
    custody, the trial court must reconsider its order regarding child support and
    enter an order revealing the basis for the amount, even if that amount is zero,
    awarded to either party. Moreover, because the trial court’s denial of Mother’s
    request for spousal maintenance appears to have been based primarily upon its
    decision to award no child support rather than upon a consideration of
    Mother’s incapacity, the trial court must clarify its decision regarding spousal
    maintenance in tandem with its reconsideration of child support. We note that,
    while an award of spousal maintenance is a discretionary decision, a trial court
    “should normally award incapacity maintenance” if it finds a spouse to be
    “physically or mentally incapacitated to the extent that the ability of that spouse
    to support himself or herself is materially affected[.]” Cannon v. Cannon, 
    758 N.E.2d 524
    , 527 (Ind. 2001).
    7
    Although Mother submitted a child support worksheet that the trial court clearly used to support its
    preliminary award of child support to Mother, the trial court did not reference it or incorporate the worksheet
    into its dissolution decree.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DC-580 | August 27, 2019                   Page 14 of 15
    [17]   In sum, we find prima facie error and reverse the trial court’s dissolution decree
    as it relates to physical custody, child support, and spousal maintenance, and
    we remand for reconsideration and clarification of these issues. The trial
    court’s dissolution decree is affirmed in all other respects.
    [18]   Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
    Baker, J., and Kirsch, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DC-580 | August 27, 2019   Page 15 of 15